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CHAPTER - I 
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INTRODUCTION 
A democratic ideal of justice must rest on the three foundations of 
equality, liberty and ultimate control of government by the people. It is, 
however, far from easy to give these concepts a specific content. 
Democracy is certainly based on the ideal of equality, but no democratic 
state has seriously attempted to translate this ideal into the absolute 
equality of all. There are numerous inevitable inequalities of function and 
status, between adults and infants between sane persons and insane, 
between civilians and military, between private citizens and officials. We 
can still not formulate the principle of equality in more specific terms 
than Aristotle who said that justice meant the equal treatment of those 
who are equal before the law. We can give to this apparent tautology a 
more concrete meaning by saying that a democratic ideal of justice 
demands that inequalities shall be inequalities of function and service but 
shall not be derived from distinctions based on race, religion, or other 
personal attributes.1 
This means that a judiciary as independent from interference by 
the executive as is possible, given the interlocking of state functions and 
the human factor in the judicial function, is an essential of the democratic 
ideal of justice. But it is impossible to lay down a generally accepted rule 
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either as to the substance of these rights or as to the manner of their 
protection. The Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1948 by the United 
Nations, is vastly different from the Bill of Rights embodied in the 
American Constitution. The Australian Constitution contains no 
individual rights other than the guarantee of religious freedom and 
perhaps - though this is still very much open to doubt - a protection of 
the individual from the restriction of free inter-state trade by state 
regulation (section-92). British law knows of no guarantees of individual 
rights other than the limited guarantees of personal freedom in the Bill of 
Rights of 1688 and the Habeas Corpus Acts. Some additional protection 
for individuals is provided by the procedures established under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. In 
one type of democracy, a written constitution, which it is normally veiy 
difficult to alter, formulates and at the same time petrifies the meaning of 
the rue of law in a manner binding upon legislative and executive alike.2 
The state acts first as a protector. This is its traditional function, 
and classical liberal thought regards it as the only legitimate function of 
the state. Older British and American decisions reflect tins conception in 
describing defence, foreign affairs police and the administration of justice 
as the legitimate functions of the state.3 To this may be added a limited 
taxing power confined to the efficient discharge of these functions. These 
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are the traditional spheres of state sovereignty, and consequently, it is in 
this field that the inequalities which detract from the rule of law in 
Dicey's sense are most evident, though Dicey consistently attempted to 
belittle them for the sake of his principle.4 
The State functions as arbiter between different groups in society. 
The term 'collectivist' state is often used loosely. A social-service state 
need not be collectivist. It can be a parental or dictatorial state, dispensing 
social welfare among the citizens while forbidding them to engage in any 
autonomous collectivist association, like Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy or 
Franco's Spain. On the other hand, the state may take complete 
responsibility for all group activities going on within its borders, while 
regarding their quasi-autonomous organization as convenient and 
necessary form an administrative and managerial point of view.5 
The harsh reality is that the independent India had to inherit a 
complex caste problem. The wise founding-fathers of our Constitution 
knew it well that in free India any discrimination and exploitation by any 
section of society against any other sections could not be justified either 
morally or legally. So it was realized that the Colonialism of the higher 
caste must be ended through the Constitution. It is in this background that 
it became indispensable for them to adopt a policy of compensatory 
discrimination as an equalizer to those who were too weak socially and 
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economically in the case ridden society. They were quite aware that these 
masses had suffered social injustice too long and been separated by the 
poverty curtain too strong that if peaceful transformation of the nation 
into an egalitarian policy were not achieved, chaos, upsurge and massive 
disruptions would destroy the peaceful progress which is freedom's tryst 
with Indian destiny.6 Thus, the architects of our National Charter rightly 
considered the reservation in the various spheres of the life as one of the 
potential means of reducing inequalities. Special concessions have been 
made to these castes in terms of reservation of seats in the legislative, 
educational institutions, and government services and in terms of 
pecuniaiy benefits. 
The primary objective of the Constitution framers was that this 
backward and suppressed segment of Indian population should be 
emancipated at the accelerated pace to catch them up with the overall 
pace of national development. Unfortunately, Indian social system has for 
centuries perpetrated social and economic injustices by the so-called 
higher castes on the lower castes who have been systematically denied 
equal chance in the opportunities and facilities of the larger society. They 
have always been set apart from the mainstream of the national life and 
remained socially oppressed, economically condemned to live the life of 
penury and educationally coerced to learn the family-trade or occupation 
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and to take education set out for each caste and class by society. They 
were in a very real sense marginal men or outsiders to Indian system, they 
lived in communities but were not of it. 
The philosophy of reservation in fact envelops policies to 
safeguard the interests of historically disadvantaged classes of the people. 
It has a note of inter-generational justice a class is compensated for loss 
incurred by that class in earlier generation which resulted into present 
disadvantaged position.8 It aims at accomplishing the object of historical 
restitution or reparation to offset the systematic and cumulative 
deprivations suffered by the lower castes in the past.9 Though it entails a 
systematic departure from the norms of equality, i.e. merit, yet there are 
different justifications of these departures anti-discrimination, the general 
welfare and historical separation.10 It is perhaps with this objective in 
mind that T. Chinniah, during the Constituent Assembly Debates, 
strongly dared to establish his claim that reservation must continue for 
150 years for the strong argument that it had been the period during 
which opportunities had been denied to the Scheduled Castes in India.11 
That is why the lex suprema solemnly declares that the State shall take 
positive steps to remove or eliminate existing social inequalities by 
special measures and protect them from social injustices and all forms of 
exploitation. This is justified because unequal characteristics of human 
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beings are not as a result of innate superiority or inferiority but of unequal 
environment into which men are born and must live. If the inequality in 
their environment is removed or eliminated there will be greater chance 
to attain a stage of real and effective equality.12 
It is quite imperative to stress and impress upon that the 
reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward 
Classes in an exceptional and temporary measure designed to be used for 
the purpose of mitigation of the inequalities between communities. It is at 
all a device to consolidate and protect a group's separate integrity.*3 The 
period of reservation has been repeatedly extended five times but 
unfortunately still it is being felt that the inequalities, social, political and 
economic have not yet been removed and that they need this reservation 
for some time more so that their conditions are ameliorated and they are 
enabled to come on par with the rest of the nation. The truth remains that 
even today the lower layers of the weaker sections of people are where 
they were two centuries ago baring a few have monopolized all the 
benefits designed for the weaker sections of the society. The general 
opinion is that the benefits of reservation policy by and large have been 
snatched away by the top creamy layer of the Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes. Thus keeping the weakest of the 
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weak always weak and leaving the fortunate layers to consume the whole 
booty. 
In this conspectus, it is developing towards social disequilibria 
instead of functioning as an instrument of social engineering. The device 
of reservation has virtually become a tool of aggrandizement in the hands 
of politically dominant people, who always try to strike political bargain 
to retain the political privilege even at the cost of deserving. All this sad 
state of affairs has given birth to a new classes like pro-reservationisjLs 
and anti-reservationists. The distrust between the reservationists and anti-
reservationists will certainly have serious repercussions and ramificatiqns 
on our social structure and fabric which is already pregnant with many 
other serious problems and issues. Therefore it is incumbent upon to 
examine the impact of reservation policy on the weaker sections of the 
Indian society and see whether these poor brethren have really reaped the 
benefits of the reservations mechanism in the light of Constitutional 
philosophy, which envisioned an egalitarian society of preambulary 
concept thereof. 
Therefore, the researcher has undertaken the present study with the 
objective to see that to what extent the beneficiaries of reservation policy 
have been benefited in the light of the Constitutional commitment and 
guaranties therefor. An attempt has been made in the present study to 
assess the impact of various measures adopted for the welfare of the 
weaker sections of the people. It is also an endevour to examine the 
political, social and economic aspects of reservation policy and its 
impact. Moreover, special attention has been given to see as to how far 
the traditional caste-system has undergone a qualitative change. 
The Constitution of India in its Preamble avers two basic 
principles i.e. "equity" and "Social democracy", as such the policy of 
protective discrimination obviously is against the basic norms of the 
Constitution. But the framers of the Constitution as inevitable necessity in 
view of the past social history of India considered these contradictory 
provisions. 
The Constitution of any country or nation is primarily made to 
shape and reform the society of that country. Our Constitution has also 
been made for this purpose, which envisages constructing a society 
wherein every individual is able to get his needs and maintain a uniform 
social standard. Every individual is treated at an equal level, their 
interests are protected to build themselves and provide an opportunity to 
participate in nation building programme. No one is left behind to achieve 
this aim. This is only possible when opportunities are made available to 
all persons without any consideration based on caste, creed, race, 
language or religion. 
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Looking at the social history of India it may not be possible to 
strictly adhere to these constitutional parameters. Since ages India has 
remained to be a society of various races, tribes, communities and caste 
with each group following a separate religion language or culture, a 
breakthrough to achieve the goal of equality is therefore, to face major 
challenges. Socio-religious, geographical and ethnic factors are believed 
to be main reasons for the formation of social stratifications. In the social 
working each group is identified with supersensibility of one's religion, 
language, culture etc., and as such develops a prejudicial approach 
against one another. In this process not only an integrated social 
development is prevented, but a feeling of inequality is generated among 
the people of different castes and religions. 
A more sharp and sensitive feeling of inequality existed in Hindi 
social system ever since Hindu society came to be vertically divided into 
four divisions i.e. Vernas or castes. In this caste ridden social structure, 
each division treated the other caste with a spirit of separation. Each 
division alienated the other, both materially and religiously. An undying 
prejudicial feeling in the social relation developed with separate religious 
view. Since the whole society is vertically divided, the upper classes 
dominated the lower, and the lower most was oppressed by all the three 
upper castes. Not only this oppressed class was dominated but was 
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excluded from the social life only to be assigned the low graded menial 
work. This class continued to serve the upper classes and in the course of 
time came to be divided into two classes named as scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes. They were left much behind from the society in every 
respect viz, educationally, socially and economically because of their 
total alienation from the society and denial to enjoy the facilities of life. 
Along with this class another section of society became the victim 
of feudal way of life. It can be identified as socially and economically 
backward class of persons. This class was exploited at the powerful hands 
of the feudally ridden dominant section of the society who were big land 
holders or zamindars. The feudal class availed their services in the way 
they liked and even without paying them adequately for the services. So 
strong was the domination over them that they could not withstand these 
forces but to accept them. They were also not able to avail of any 
opportunity to ameliorate their social and economic conditions and thus 
remained backward. In this category, people of all communities and 
castes are included as they are the economic sufferers because of the poor 
economical conditions they were forced into and out of which they could 
never come to the standard of other economically classes. 
The cumulative effect of the social stratification, the division of 
Hindu society into four compartments and feudalism, led to the 
II 
disintegration of Indian society to perpetuate inequality in all the spheres 
of social life and social relations. Moreover, British Government took 
advantage of this situation and rigidly enforced the sources of inequality 
in order to consolidate its power. 
It is a social fact that the upper class constantly took advantage 
from a large chunk of society by exploiting them in the name of religion 
to serve the needs of a feudal agricultural society. They had their 
economic interest in maintaining the status quo by keeping them 
uneducated and allowing them to subsist with a limited economic 
resource which was starkly enough for their survival. 
SELECTION OF THE AREA: 
All men are created equal. In order to make the right to equality 
meaningful and purposeful, the Founding Fathers of the Indian 
Constitution made number of provisions to ameliorate the socio-
economic conditions of Backward Class besides the Schedule Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes so as to bring them to a level comparable with the 
advanced sections of our society. The Framers of the Constitution were 
well aware about the miserable and apathetic living conditions of this 
section which has remained segregated from national and social currents 
and has been economically oppressed for centuries. Consequently they 
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resolved in the preamble to secure to all citizens justice-social, economic 
and political, equality of status and opportunity and to promote among 
them fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual. 
In a caste-ridden, socially and economically unbalanced society, 
the doctrine of social equality ensuring socio-economic justice would be 
meaningful if protective discrimination in the form of reservation is given 
as an equalizer to those who are too weak-socially, educationally and 
economically. It tries to achieve equality in fact by giving preferential 
treatment to these classes, so that they join the main stream of national 
life. This is a policy devised for social reconstruction and to build a 
casteless and classless society and seeks the elimination of the existing 
inequalities by positive measures. It is a strategy developed as an 
aggressive response to the pervasive disparities of status and opportunity 
among Indian citizens. 
The undignified social status and sub human living conditions 
leave an indelible impression that their forlorn hopes for equality in every 
sphere of life are only a myth rather a reality. It is verily believed, rightly 
too, that the one and only peerless way and indeed a most important and 
promising way to achieve the equal status and equal opportunity is only 
by means of Constitutional justice so that all the citizens of this country 
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irrespective of their religion race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them 
may achieve the goal of an egalitarian society. 
The Supreme Court of India has handed down a series of landmark 
judgements in relation to social justice by interpreting the Constitutional 
provisions upholding the cherished values of the Constitution and thereby 
had often shaped the course of the national stream of social and economic 
justice. Notwithstanding a catena of expository decisions with 
interpretive semantics the naked truth is that on stretch of light or no ray 
of hope of attaining the equality of status of opportunity is visible. 
After the judgement of Mandal Case, providing 27% reservations 
in the Central Services and public sector undertaking to Other Backward 
Classes as per the recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report 
has created tension between meritarian principle and the compensatory 
principle (principle of redress). The recent political extension of policy of 
reservation at centre level for the first time to newer groups on the bases 
of'Caste' has created a lot of social tension. Many castes that have been 
left out of this protective net have started claiming that they are in no way 
economically socially and educationally better than those preferred on the 
basis of Mandal Commission Report. In the 50 years of constitutional 
experience in India in the post independence era, their position has also 
not improved under the conditions of scarcity. 
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In the original draft of the Constitution of India the Article 15 did 
not have sub clause (4) in its scheme. It is a later insertion by the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. On the other hand clause (4) 
of Article 16 is an original provision of the Constitution of India. 
Therefore, it appears from a micro examination of both the provisions 
that there is a noble and solemn mandate which have been caste upon the 
state under Article 340 of the Constitution of India wherefrom the 
mandate of clause (4) has been taken and added to the Article 15 of the 
Constitution. But judicial establishment at the highest level has not 
interpreted the Article 15(4) and 16(4) in the light of Article 340 of the 
Constitution. Consequently, it has created a dichotomy, which still 
remains to be obliterated by a judicial dictum. 
The package of reservations aims at removing the socio-legal 
disabilities of certain specified groups to facilitate their equal 
participation in the national mainstream, and to protect them against 
social injustice and exploitation. The entire mechanism of protective 
discrimination has been designed by Founding Fathers of our 
Constitution to be used as an engine of social engineering Reservation are 
meant for correcting historical injustice and finally bring out equality 
among" all castes and communities. The basic postulate is that 
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unprivileged is brought on at par with his fortunate fellow-brethren and 
then leave and then leave him alone to fend for himself. 
The reservation policy requires urgent restructuring so that the 
downtrodden get assibilated in the national mainstream. What is required 
therefore; is not to scrap the policy but to make it judicious. The major 
thrust at the moment should be to help the downtrodden on the economic 
basis. The fact that the benefits of reservation for 50 years have not been 
able to ameliorate the lot of the SCs and STs and other Backward Classes. 
An attempt has been in this work to study and analyses the 
Constitutional provisions relating to reservations in the light of political, 
social and economic conditions of the masses. There is a vast gap 
between judicial approach to the problem and ground realities. It has tried 
to examine these pronouncements in their overall context and in doing so 
has made certain practical suggestions to make the policy more viable, 
effective and result-oriented. 
METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology and employment thereof is an 
inevitable aspect of a research endevour. The realization of hypothesis 
can only be attained through research methodology in systematic, 
scientific and pragmatic manner. Primarily, the present study is a 
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doctrinal research work wherefor anthropological studies, constitutional 
philosophy and mandate constituent assembly debates, cases Laws, 
Reports of Commissions, thematic contributions on the subject published 
in various books, magazines, newspapers and journals have extensively 
been consulted and discussed. Consequently, the formulations envisioned 
in the hypothesis have been realized. 
THE PRESENTATION OF STUDY 
The presentation of research study is an intellectual adumbration 
and accomplishment of the hypothesis. The present study has been 
completed in six chapter dealing with different aspects of the research 
topic, which have been presented as under: 
The Chapter-I has been captioned as "Introduction" whereunder 
entire gamut of the research formulation has been introduced, cajoled and 
collated. 
The Chaptcr-II has been designated as "Socio-Economic Justice 
: Genesis and Development". The normative framework of justice has 
been visited de nova while discussing the various permutations and 
dialectics of justice based on social hierarchy, democratic norms and 
realities. It is the notion of justice in its different manifestations social, 
economic and political - which directs our attention to the fairness and 
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reasonableness of the rules, principles and standards that are the 
component parts of the normative edifice, formal social structure and 
institutional legal arrangements and their worth in terms of their 
contribution to human happiness and the building egalitarian societies 
and civilizations. Therefore, socio-economic justice and its genesis 
concept and development has been pondered over and analysed while 
taking into account the social compartmentalization in India in its various 
colours and connotations. 
The Chapter - III has been discussed as "Principles of Equality: 
Dimensions and Devices" Primarily, equality is a polymorphous concept 
which carries a number of different meanings. Its reference under the 
instant study is transnational. It includes in its scope the equality of legal 
treatment, equality of political participation, equality of opportunity and 
equality of basic human needs and how these notions of equality have 
been contextualised and reflected in the Constitutional philosophy of 
India wherein it is still eclipsed by a social segregation which has 
necessitated its critical examination under the present study. Equality is a 
very vital principle of social justice. One of the distinctive and pervasive 
features of Indian society is the division into castes. Thus, independent 
India embraced equality as a cardinal virtue against a background of 
elaborate, valued and clearly perceived inequalities. Equality in action 
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and reality with all its concomitant notions in and under different national 
jurisdictions and organizations of multilateral character has been put to 
test in this chapter. 
The Chapter -IV has been pursued as "Socio-Political Justice to 
the Weaker Classes" whereunder the object of justice in a land of social 
hierarchy like India have been examined. The main object of the framers 
of the Constitution was to ensure social, educational, economic and 
political equality amongst the peoples. An equitable social order through 
the rule of law securing to We, the People of India socio-political justice 
by an inter play of fundamental rights and the directive principles of state 
policy has been analysed in the instant chapter in the light of historical 
retrospect and post modern developments inter-alia constitutional dicta of 
reservation mechanism which has moved political democracy to social 
democracy. Socio-Political justice to the weaker section of the people and 
empowerment thereof through reservation of constituencies with all its 
ramifications have been examined in an era of political sabre-rattling 
The Chapter - V has been delineated as "Socio-Economic 
Policies And Constitutional Wisdom of Non-Discrimination" 
whereunder constitutional imperatives of non-discriminations viz-a-viz 
socio-economic policies pursued by the governmental establishment have 
been examined. Equality conceives that all who are alike in the eyes of 
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the law be treated in a fashion determined by law. The validity of a law is 
made subject to the requirement that equal persons and equality situations 
must be treated equally or at least similarly if they are in fact equal or 
similar under the prevalent standards of justice Thus, present chapter 
deals with Articles 15(4) and 16 (4) in the light of contemporary social 
metamorphosis dictated by a movement from equalitarianism to 
egalitarianism. The implementation of constitutional wisdom of non-
discrimination through socio-economic policies formulated by the 
governments while taking into consideration all lego-historical 
dimensions has been elaborately examined. 
The Chapter - VI has been evolved as "Philosophy And Wisdom 
of Protective Discrimination Under the Constitution VIZ -A-VIZ 
Judicial Dicta" whereunder the concept of protective discrimination 
based on classification for preferential treatment and emerging 
jurisprudence thereon have been analysed, examined and evaluated. The 
concept of creamy layer has given a new dimension to the entire 
philosophy of compensatory jurisprudence because it is the identification 
and determination of backward classes, scheduled caste and scheduled 
tribes and backwardness which have impelled the human wisdom to find 
true happiness wedded to a welfare state. The reservation and its 
continuation is res nova and therefore requires pragmatization in a nation-
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state which claims equality, social justice and human rights. The whole 
philosophy of and wisdom of protective discrimination are based upon 
social justice which seeks to promote equality of opportunity various 
walks of life. This chapter deals with concept of protective discrimination 
which in itself highlights the causes of backwardness and need of its 
elimination. The question of identification of backward classes of citizens 
other than Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes led to divergent judicial 
approaches since the expression "backward class" has not been defined in 
the Constitution. Even the judicial journey under taken from Balaji to 
Mandal - II has not been adequately sufficient to eliminate these 
perennial cleavages in the socio-political set-up of the country. In this 
conspectus, an attempt has been made to address these issues in this 
chapter in a cogent, convincing and conceived manner. 
The "Conclusion and Suggestions have discussed and evaluated 
the entire constitutional and governmental wherewithal in the realization 
of an Utopian state. Some plausible and pragmatic suggestions have been 
put forward to improve upon the existing conditions of the disadvantaged 
groups and sections of the people. 
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC JUSTICE : GENESIS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. AN OVERVIEW: 
It is a universally acknowledged and historically established fact 
that in a democratic system of governance, the political freedom is of 
no avail and becomes meaningless in the absence of full-fledged and 
complete socio-economic freedom. The socio-economic freedom, in 
nutshell, seeks to provide the common people, especially people 
belonging to socially and economically backward class including 
religious minorities, access to the economic justice as well as active 
participation with their reserved share in the national social upliftment 
scheme run through government and non-government organizations. 
The instant political philosophy of the national leaders finds expression 
in the preamble of the constitution, which is of course national solemn 
legal document. The preambulary message of socio-economic justice 
has been translated into several Articles dealing with the different facet 
in Part III and IV of the Constitution containing, respectively, 
fundamental rights of the citizens and directive principles of state 
policy. Granville Austin' has described both of them as conscience of 
our Constitution. It can well be said that the directive principles 
prescribe the goal to be attained and fundamental rights lay down the 
means by which that goal is to be achieved. In fact one cannot exist 
without the other. The state is required to take positive action by 
protecting the minimum of individual's rights and by reducing the 
number of those whose share of utilities of life fall below the minimum 
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level. This objective could be achieved by making improvement of 
socio-economic conditions of the weaker sections of the society. 
The Directive Principles of State Policies aims to at bringing 
about a non-violent socio economic and political uprising. Under the 
Scheme of Directive Principles, the Indian Constitution wish to 
introduce broad based structural change in our society. The 
Constitution visualizes that society as a whole and every member of the 
society should have enough and equal opportunity of participation in 
the governance of the country in a true democratic form of the 
government. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE - SOCIAL, POLITICAL 
AND ECONOMIC 
The idea of socio-economic justice finds full expression in the 
fundamental provisions of draft constitution in the name of 
fundamental rights and directive principles jointly. The concept of 
social and economic justice in the constitution originated by the 
thought that political freedom is impaired by the absence of social 
justice and without providing full protection to the social and economic 
rights, the constitutional guarantees known as classical individual 
liberties, such as rights to equality, liberty of person and freedom of 
speech and association, may lose much of their value. This close 
association between political freedom and social justice has become a 
common concept since the French Revolution. However, this concept is 
not new to the Indian social evolution. In the fourth century Kautilya's 
Arthshastra mentioned a specific injunction to the effect that "the King 
shall provide the orphan, the dying the infirm, the afflicted socially 
25 
was guaranteed to everyone and of all occupations; maintenance of 
health and fitness for work of all citizens; securing living wage for 
every worker. The report was presented to the British but nothing 
concrete came out of the Report. 
The historic session of Lahore 1929, of which Jawahar Lai 
Nehru was made the president passed a resolution declaring Purana 
Swaraj to be the Congress objective. The report of the committee listed 
a few political rights indicating thereby the general natural rights to be 
incorporated in the constitution. It emphasized the theme of socio-
economic reconstruction when it declared: 
"The great poverty and misery of the Indian 
people are due to not only foreign exploitation 
in India but also due to the economic structure 
of society, which the alien rulers support so that 
their exploitation may continue. In order, 
therefore, to remove this poverty and misery 
and to ameliorate the economic condition of 
mass. It is essential to make revolutionary 
changes in the present economic and social 
structure of society and to remove gross 
inequalities."3 
The Indian constitution is the supreme law of land that has 
provided us a sovereign, Democratic Republic, Committed to the 
concept of a welfare state based on egalitarian values in which people 
are masters through their representatives in parliament responsible for 
democratic government in the country. The draft Constitution was the 
result of the collective efforts of galaxy of great leaders, legal scholars 
and luminaries in the Constituent Assembly such as Jawahar Lai 
Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Patel. B.R. Ambedkar, Sir Alladi 
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Krishnaswami Ayyer etc. who successfully created the document under 
the stewardship of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as Chairman of drafting 
Committee. The law of the land was finally adopted on 26th November 
1949 and came into force on 26th the January 1950 which marked the 
begining of new era in the history of India. Handing over the historic 
document Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said." 
"If we wish to maintain democracy not merely 
inform, but also in fact, what we must do ? 
...we must hold fast to constitutional methods 
of achieving our socio-economic objectives 
where constitutional methods are open, there 
can be no justification for unconstitutional 
methods. These methods are nothing but the 
grammar of anarchy, and sooner we abandon, 
the better for us." 4 
In the year 1946 a Constituent Assembly was constituted which 
set-up a draft committee5 to prepare draft of a constitution for the 
emerging free India. On the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the 
aim to bring about social change and to reshape the society on the 
principal of socio-economic equality, found its manifestation in 
objective Resolution moved by Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru which said: 
"Where in shall be guaranteed and secured to all 
the people of India Justice; social, economic 
political, equality of status of opportunity before 
the law, freedom of thought expression, belief, 
faith, worship, vocation and action subject to 
law and public morality." 6 
The Objective Resolution laid down the foundation of India's 
Constitution, which purported to be an instrument of social change. 
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The framers of the Constitution declared India as a Sovereign 
Democratic Republic7 and the Preamble secures to all the citizens: 
JUSTICE- social, economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them 
all; 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the (unity 
and integrity of the nation). 
The first objective of the Constitution as stated in the Preamble 
is to secure justice, social, economic, and political, the basis of which is 
the Rule of Law. The second is defined as 'Liberty' — Liberty of 
thought, expression, belief faith and worship. This is the basis of 
secular democracy. The third objective is of 'equality of status and 
opportunity' based on Gandhian ideology and socialism, who 
persistently opposed untouchability and caste system. Although 
Gandhiji did not join. Constituent Assembly but his basic teachings 
like the abolition of untouchability, equality of women, the importance 
of village panchayats and rural cottage industry were incorporated in 
the constitution. The fourth objective is "Fraternity assuring the dignity 
of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation" which is 
again an embodiment of Gandhian idealism. 
The Preamble is the key that reflects the principle and spirit of 
the whole Constitution. The provisions enacted in the Constitution are 
to secure the objects enshrined in the Preamble i.e. to achieve the goal 
of equality : Social equality, economic equality, equality in 
opportunities, equality in status and human dignity. There are, 
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therefore, a number of Articles8 enacted in the chapters of Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy which secure to every 
citizen social, economic and political equality, liberty of thought, 
expression, belief, faith and worship. In order to consolidate 'equality' 
some of the anti-social practices such as 'untouchability' was abolished 
9
 and its practice in any form is forbidden and prohibited a colonial and 
feudal practice the conferment of any title of personal distinction 
except a military or academic distinction. Thus, the Constitution 
treats every individual equal, places religion on equal footing and 
prevents discrimination both in public and privates sectors. The 
Constitution can, therefore, be said to have been framed on the 
principle of equality of status and opportunity on the foundation of 
secular and democratic theories. The founding fathers set up new ideals 
before us which are inscribed in our Constitution. Since the 
enforcement11 of our constitution we have been in one way or the other 
deeply interested in preparing ourselves for a new India with its aim of 
economic and cultural progress. Looking at the social history of India 
we find that there has always been a sharp consciousness of caste, race, 
colour, in different kinds of human relationship. Moreover, the entire 
development of the social structure of Indian society seems to have 
grown out of the initial basis of caste. Caste feeling divided the Indian 
society into caste groups and assumed dominant role in their respective 
religious groups based on their respective ideology. Caste acquired a 
unique feature of Hindu social system. In the caste system people are 
ascribed group membership and status by birth rather than by their 
individual characteristics. Caste system is a close system and the 
boundaries of caste are maintained and defined as far as possible — 
Caste system indicates social stratification and pluralism. Ghurye 
observes that "In the caste bound society the amount of community 
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feeling must have been restricted and that citizens owed moral 
allegiances to their caste first, rather than to the community as a 
whole.12 This not only retards social development but altogether 
ignores the healthy social standard of justice, fair play, equity and 
universal brotherhood. The aims of the Constitution are, therefore, in 
constant conflict with the social facts putting strong resistance in the 
way of equality, unity and national integration. 
Therefore aspect of caste system which is spiritually oriented 
and the whole Hindu society is linked with this spiritual dimension i.e. 
the vertical divisions13 of society into four varnas or castes. The social 
working of which is identified to be vertically processed downward 
dominated and governed by the top superiors. In this process an 
integrated social development prevented and the base of this structure 
crumbled under the increasing domination of the upper classes. The 
lower strata was not only dominated but religiously excluded from the 
social life and was denied the necessities which deserve to be called the 
basic needs of life. This class in our social system is designated as 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribe. Because of total alienation they 
remained socially, educationally and economically much behind the 
rest of the society. 
Besides these classes, who are social sufferers for historical and 
spiritual reasons there is a large chunk in our society who, because of 
poverty could not catch the common social standard. Moreover, they 
were also denied the educational and economic opportunities and 
consequently a sizeable majority of Indian population has remained 
backward since many hundred years. They are socially and 
educationally backward too. This led to perpetuate social and economic 
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inequality and exploitation. For this section it was not possible 
withstand the forces exception of willfully accept the domination of 
upper classes of the society. 
The framers of the Constitution were well aware of this 
historical social background that perpetuated inequality had prevented 
an integrated social development. To bring them to the level of the 
society and to eradicate these social evils and provide opportunities of 
growth and development to every citizens and section of society 
besides their adoption of the principles of equality, justice and 
fraternity in the Preamble of the Constitution as its main objects they 
had strong conviction that the principle of equality would not be able to 
ensure the removal of inequality unless these classes of people are 
provided extra facilities even at the cost of equality, and as such special 
provisions were incorporated in the Constitution which cover almost all 
the area where these classes have to be protected and given special 
help. Under the provisions enacted in the Constitution, preferential 
treatment has been allowed. 
Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution are the provisions 
under which protective measures can be adopted in order to improve 
the educational and economic conditions of scheduled caste and tribe 
and other backward classes and as such policy of reservation of 'seats' 
and posts in educational and government services occupies an 
important place. The main object of reservation is to bring about a 
social change through a process of reducing educational and economic 
disparities. But it has been realized that there are, no doubt enormous 
difficulties in carrying on the policy of'reservation' and particularly on 
the extension of the benefits of reservation to other besides schedule 
31 
castes and scheduled tribes. On this issue several cases of anti-
reservation violence were reported from different parts of India mainly 
from Bihar and Gujarat. These instances of violence and unrest show 
that the implementation of the constitutional theory to do away with the 
inequality and injustice and also to provide legal means for the rapid 
upliftment of the depressed class of society came into direct conflict 
with the deeply entrenched norms of society. These are the root causes 
of social problems. How and to what extent the policy of reservation 
permitted under the Constitution has attained success in 
implementation of the constitutional provisions has been analysed 
through the court decisions and the recommendations of the 
Commissions find discussion in the pages to follow. 
C. SOCIAL COMPARTMENTLISATION IN INDIA 
Indian society is characterized by its long age stratification. 
Stratification emerges from different social values and survives so long 
the social values are not changed. Each strata can identified by its rigid 
social and religious practices. The rigidity in such practices is 
responsible for the continuance of social structure and external conflict. 
But in spite of it, Indian society is continuing without any obvious or 
vigorous conflict and is therefore very unique in these two respects -
social diversities and continuity. The Constitution of India, after the 
Independence, has been framed on the line of modern political and 
social theories. It is designed to tie them all as one nation and thwarts 
regionalism as well as check the disintegrating forces, resulting from 
diversity based on language, race, religion and the like. 
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The Constitutional concept of unity and integrity is embodied in 
secularism, equality, social justice and equality of status in every 
sphere of human development and realisation therefore is jettisoned by 
a welter of factors which are responsible for the formation of social 
stratification. The purpose is to evaluate the dominating social forces 
and realities. These forces are currently the disturbing factors in the 
corporate life of Indian people, which seek to retard the constitutional 
growth and functioning. 
(i). Socio - Religious Permutation 
Indian society, in the strict sense, is not, and has never been, one 
society. The people are divided not only in so many religious 
communities, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and others, 
each following its own religious code of conduct, but their social laws 
and customs are also different from each other. Moreover, among the 
Hindus, Muslim and Christians, there are further sub-divisions into 
various sections, each following particular different patterns of 
religious norms and social customs. Religious views and social 
customs are obviously the main elements for identifications of the 
Indian people. Therefore, when an attempt is made to review the social 
life of the Indian people, religious aspect cannot be excluded. Religion, 
although deals with man's relation to his God but it affects almost all 
the faculties of man. It puts its imprints upon the laws, philosophy, 
outlook, art, architecture, and literary activities of a man upon almost 
everything that he does. 
A brief account of important religions and their numerical order 
and also their distribution in India are given as under: 
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The bulk of India's population consists of Hindus i.e. 83 per 
cent.1"1 The Supreme Court of India in Yagnapimishadasi Vs Muldas, ' 
observed; 
"We find it difficult, if not impossible, to define 
Hindu religion or even adequately describe it. 
Unlike other religions in the world, Hindu 
religion does not claim anyone Prophet, it does 
not worship any one God, it does not subscribe 
to pay one dogma, it does not believe in any one 
philosophic concept, it does not follow any one 
set of religious rites or performances, in fact, it 
does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional 
features of any religion or creed. It may broadly 
be described as a way of life and nothing more." 
Hinduism has neither evolved at one instance nor by one 
Prophet. There is no founder of Hinduism. Hindu religion is sometimes 
described as 'Sanatan' that is without a beginning. However, 
Hinduism, grew as a concept of Dharma (religion) and since its 
inception that is, from ancient culture of Dravidian to the present time, 
has been subjected to reform from time to time. Great and spiritual 
personalities like Mahavira, Chaitanya, Kabir, Tulsidas, Raja Ram 
Mohan Rai, Vivekananda, Swami Dayananda appeared and devoted 
their lives to bring about reforms. Hindu religion has developed in 
various stages. 
The first stage was of Vedic periods which being about 1500 
BC.lf> During this period four Vedas were compiled which are (i) 
Rigveda, (ii) Samveda, (iii) Yajurveda, and (iv) Atharveda: They were 
all the compilation of Mantaras rendered by Rishis and religious 
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scholars of ancient India. The oldest and the most important of the 
Vedas is the Rigveda. It embodies socio-religious rules on which the 
Hindu religion is based. 
The second period is known as the epic or puranic period. It was 
during this period between 600 BC and 200 AD that the great epics of 
Hindus, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, were composed by Ved 
Vyas and Rishi Valmiki respectively. It was during this time that the 
two new schools of religious thoughts i.e. Buddhism and Jainism arose 
in north-eastern India. It is in this period that Hindu philosophy 
thoughts were thoroughly studied and commentaries on the Vedas, 
known as the Upanishads, were written. There are almost two hundred 
Upanishads. The Bhagwat Gita, considered to be the greatest piece of 
Hindu religious writing, is a chapter in the story of the Mahabharata. 
According to Rigveda, which is the oldest of all Vedas and is a 
Code of socio-religious conduct, Hindus are divided into four Varanas 
or four castes - Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras, the 
authority on which this view rests is the statement in Purushasukta in 
the Rigveda that the Brahman emerged from the head, the Kshatriya 
from the arms, the Vaishya from the waist and shudras from the feet of 
God. This division led to the formation of a distinct stratification of 
Hindus, Brahman being on the top and shudras at the bottom. Even 
since this division came to be recognized, it is continuing as a basic 
concept of Hindu religion. 
Verna or caste is the distinguishing feature of Hindu religion 
and its impact on the society has ever been felt. The sense of caste 
superiority created barriers, separation and inequality among the Hindu 
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community. With the division based on religious concept, the social 
and professional diversities automatically came to be operative in the 
Hindu society. Lower class Hindus were being subjugated and denied 
the rights and facilities of life and were treated almost as inhuman 
beings. On the social plans they were kept away from the mainstream 
only to be considered as untouchables. The Constitution of India no 
doubt embodies provisions to ameliorate their social, educational and 
economic conditions but because of the attitude of the high caste 
Hindus, the lower class people are not able to themselves of those 
provisions and feel increasingly subjugated and harassed from time to 
time. 
Muslim, the second largest community account for 61.42 
million population in 1971. they represented 11.20 per cent of the total 
population. The Union Territory of Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindive 
Islands (94.37) and Jammu and Kashmir (65.85) were predominantly 
Muslim populated areas. The States where the proportion of Muslim 
exceeds national average of 11.21 are Assam 24.56, West Bengal 20.46 
Kerala 19.50, Utter Pradesh 15.48 and Bihar 13.48, Sikkim has the 
lowest proportion of the community.18 
Christianity influenced Hinduism and through their missionary 
work were able to convert large number of the low caste Hindus to 
Christianity. Like their co-religionist i.e. Hindu and Muslims, they are 
also divided into many denominations, Roman Catholic, Syrian, and 
protestants. Christians come third in order of numerical strength with 
14.23 million or 2.60 per cent of the total population of the country. 
The Union Territory of Mizoram and Nagaland show high proportion 
of the Christian population in the country - 86.90 and 56.76 
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respectively. Meghalaya has 46.98 per cent followed by Goa, Daman 
and Diu with 31.77 per cent and Andaman and Nicobar Islands 26.35 
per cent, Manipur 26.03 per cent, Kerala 21.05 per cent, Pondicherry 
8.76 per cent, Tamil Nadu 5.75 per cent, Andhra Pradesh 4.19 per cent 
and Assam 2.61 per cent, indicate appreciable proportion of the 
Christians.19 
The fourth major religion in the country is Sikhism, constituting 
10.38 million and forms 1.89 per cent of the total population. The high 
concentration of Sikhs is in Punjab 60.22 and Chandigarh 24.45. The 
Union Territory of Delhi 7.16 and Haryana 6.29, Jammu & Kashmir 
2.29, Rajasthan 1.33 and Himachal Pradesh 1.30 also have sizable Sikh 
population.20 
Sikhism was founded by Guru Nanak, who was born near 
Lahore in 1469 A.D.21 He prescribed no caste rules or ceremonial 
observances and indeed condemned them as unnecessary and even 
harmful. Guru Nanak died in 1538 A.D.22 His teachings were carried 
on by ten Gurus23 in succession. Guru Gobind Singh (1675-1708 
A.D.) was the tenth and the last Guru, who is regarded as the founder 
of modern Sikhism. 
Out of the eight different religions that are practiced in India, 
Buddhism is one. Although Buddhism originated in India there are now 
very few followers of this religion. The followers of this religion 
outside India are large in number. In India there are only 3.87 million 
Buddishts,25 majority of whom are mostly converts from the low castes 
Hindus called as neo-Buddhist. To these neo-Buddhists their religion 
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provides them refuge from social subjugation and a chance to avoid 
friction in adjustment with their co-religionists. 
As a matter of fact, Lord Buddha did not start an altogether new 
religion, he only tried to reform the existing one.26 He gave a new and 
simple definition of Vedic religion which could be understood and 
followed by all people. Vedic religion had made the Hindu religion 
very complicated by various rituals, rites, yajanas and caste system. 
The teaching of Buddha cut across the barriers of castes, creed and 
status. The Brahmans and Sramanas were treated alike by the 
Buddha.27 He taught to do good to fellow-beings and practice 
compassion. The teaching of Buddha in a sense is the forbearer of the 
modern concept of human equality, social justice and universal 
brotherhood. Buddhism rejected the authority of Vedas, and broke 
away from the caste system. The Buddha stressed that true Brahman is 
not one who is born in the Brahmana family but he who behaves as 
Brahmana. "The station of Brahman, he says, is not due to birth but to 
abhorrence of the world and its pleasure". Buddha preached the 
oneness of mankind and there was no ban against the admission of any 
class or castes in the Buddhist franternity.28 
The preaching of Buddha, which had started around 598 BC, 
which continued for seven hundred years, was accepted as a new faith 
more by the people abroad than in India. There are the followers of 
Buddhism in greater number in China, Sri Lanka, Burma and Tibet in 
comparison to India. In India Budhist were only 3.87 millions in 197*. 
and ranked fifth in the country, constituting 0.71 per cent of the total 
population, Maharashtra has over 86 per cent of the total Budhist 
population of the country, though they constitute only 6.74 per cent of 
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the state population. They are mostly converts from the lower castes 
or untouchables in Hindus. 
There are other religions as well but their adherents are few in 
number such as Zorastrians or Parsis as they are knows in India. The 
central feature of their religion is worship of fire which is regarded as 
the earthly symbol of the great deity. The bulk of them are found in 
Bombay. Their importance is due to the fact that they are one of the 
most prosperous people in the country and control some of the biggest 
industrial enterprises. There are some Jews also but their numerical 
strength is still less. Jews are also mostly found in Bombay or in 
Cochin. 
The aforesaid discussion shows that India is a land of many 
religions. On the basis of religious and social practices distinct 
stratification is made and each section defends its religious freedom, its 
cultural and social values. As a result of this there are wide gaps 
between one section of people and the other. One section excludes the 
other on the social and religious lane. This feature was further 
highlighted by feudal way of life and strengthened by Britishers for 
their won administrative advantages and consolidating their rule. This 
situation fostered narrow considerations and precluded the Indians to 
form an integrated society or develop a sense of nationhood. 
Consequently, parochialism, regionalism and communalism were 
entrenched in the Indian people. To overcome all these problems the 
constitution endeavors to diminish the affect of divisive forces and also 
gives recognition to past religious heritage. The Constitution provides a 
well balanced solution by retaining religious, social and cultural 
heritage and by doing away the past wrongs done by religious or social 
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practices. The Constitution attempts to solve the problems by opting a 
way which infiises the spirit of secularism, and tolerance. It is designed 
to bring unity in diversity. 
(ii) Lingua-Cultural Permutation 
Looking into the history of India, we find that India came into 
contact with various peoples and cultures. The social cultural and 
linguistic life of India shows that it has always been multi-lingual. Its 
impact has been so great that India virtually came to be divided in 
linguistic basis. The impact of language and its consequences are 
revealed further when a constitutional study is made with reference to 
its origin, impact and the attitude of people towards other languages. 
The language and dialects, which are spoken by Indians, are 
numerous and it is very difficult to count them. However, Grierson, in 
his Linguistic Survey of India, says that approximately 872 different 
language and dialects are spoken in India."^ ** He records 179 languages 
as distinct fi"om dialects.^ ^ These languages and dialects have grown 
through the ages along with religion and culture, and in the course of 
their development they have built up synoptic spirit and boundaries. 
The State Re-Organisation Committee appointed in 1956, pointed out 
in its report that: 
"One of the major facts of India's political 
evolution during the last hundred years has been 
the growth of regional languages. They have, 
during this period, developed into rich and 
powerful vehicles of expression creating a sense 
of unity among those speaking them. In view of 
the fact that these languages are spoken in well-
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defined areas, often with historical background, 
the demand for unification of such areas to form 
separate states has gained momentum. 
Looking into the literature of medieval history, we find that 
scholars have described the existence of many languages. Abul Fazal, 
writes in Ain-e-Akbari: 
"Throughout the wide extent of Hindustan, 
many are dialects that are spoken, and the 
diversities of those that do not exclude a 
common inter-intelligibility, are innumerable. 
Those forms of speech that are not understood 
one of another are the dialects of Delhi 
(Western Hindu), Bengal (Bengali), Multan 
(Lahnada), Marwar (Western Rajasthan), Gujrat 
(Gujrati), Telengana (Telgu), Marahatta 
(Maratti), Kmataka (Kenarese), Sind (Sindhi), 
Afghan of Shal (Pasto), Beluchistan (Belochi), 
and Kashmir (Kashmiri).^' 
Except Tamil, he gives a complete catalogue of Indian 
languages, which are all confined to regions and differ from one 
another. Although there was no obvious conflict among them on 
linguistic basis, they were identified by their region and language. 
There has always been diversity in Indian people from the remote past. 
Being regionally and sentimentally attached to their language and 
dialects, a sense of superiority on the basis of language prevailed 
among them, and instances are numerous when language was the 
source of conflict. 
With the development of democratic trends in India after 
independence efforts were made through the Constitution to replace 
'old values by new ones'. The existence of different language and 
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cultures was recognized to the extent that various provisions,"''* under 
which all the languages and cultures could be safeguarded, we enacted 
in the Constitution. The primary object of these provisions as to bring 
unity in the nation by guaranteeing cultural and educational rights to 
the minorities and, on the other hand, linguistic autonomy to the States 
by recognizing 15 languages specified in the Eighth Schedule.''^ Under 
these provisions of the Constitution these languages are treated equally. 
Provisions have also been made for the preservation and promotion of 
language and culture of the Indian population as a whole on the 
principle of equality. 
But the diversity on the basis of language and culture continues 
and people of some states have demanded separate state on linguistic 
basis. Such trends, disastrous as they are to the spirit of the 
Constitution and the concept of national unity have been discouraged. 
As the 'caste', religion and culture are the sources of friction, so is the 
case with language. The Constitution, therefore, in various provisions 
of Fundamental Rights, lays down that 'on the basis of language no 
person should be discriminated. A principle of equality, economic 
justices and social status of all persons been given more importance 
over any other practice or sentiments sustained by Indian people from 
the remote past by reinterpreting the constitutional provisions in the 
context of modem values and aims. 
Cultural characteristic is also an important factor to identity 
Indian people. The history of Indian civilization bears testimony to the 
fact that the cultural, moral and social life and social organization were 
all deeply in influenced by religion in ancient past. Cultural of any 
society or nation is a key-note of its level of civilization and thoughts. 
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It is an image of its various characteristic features. Since the Indian 
population is an amalgam of various races and tribes, both native and 
foreign, present different way of life, spiritual belief, thought, language 
and habits and in the course of time all developed their own culture and 
each became a complex fabric of Indian culture. However, sharp 
cultural diversities are distinctly visible among Indians. Adherence to 
different cultures, language and way of life is not only sentimental but 
it acts as a source of friction in social relation. 
The history of culture of India begins with the culture of 
Harappan Civilization."'^  Although recent field researches, both in India 
and Pakistan have pushed back the antiquity of Indian Civilization 
beyond the recorded cultural history, still it remains a fact that 
Harappan (Indus Valley Civilization) is the landmark of Indian 
Culture."'^  In spite of the long gap from Harappan days to this day, 
almost all essential elements of that mighty culture are still visible in 
one way or the other in defused form in the present Indian society. 
The Indus Valley Society was cosmopolitan as deducted from the 
anthropological researches that not less than four different faces can be 
identified in the region - the Proto Austroloid, Mongolism. 
Medeteranian and Alpine. All these races were different in physical 
characters and they all would have contributed in their own way to the 
homogeneous growth of that culture and religion.^' 
The religion of Harappan people included worship of mother 
goddess as seen at Mohanjodaro and Harappa and some sort of worship 
as revealed at kalibangan"^" and phallus worship as well as that of trees 
and snakes in various parts of this country."*' From the point of view of 
contribution of each individual race to the complex fabric of Indian 
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culture, a clear stratification and level of civilization is found in the 
Indian society. It is generally presumed that the race which came first 
had less opportunity to improve its culture because of the domination 
of the race that followed. With the coming of new races, one father the 
other, the level of culture and civilization improve. From this point of 
view the race that came last is better placed, than those who came first. 
But raciologists claim that culture differences are determined by 
differential racial heredity and equipment. 
The superior race can create superior culture, have superior 
wishes and can be said to be creators of civilization"^^ for example, the 
Dravidians who are regarded by historians as the first inheritors of land 
build up a strong culture which was replaced by Aryans who followed 
them, A drastic cultural fusion took place and the Aryans superimposed 
their culture through Vedas so as to maintain their cultural superiority 
over other races."^ ^ We might say that the first great cultural synthesis 
and fusion took place between the coming Aryans and the Dravidians 
and out of this synthesis and fusion grew the Indian culture which has 
distinctive element of both. 
This brief description of the development of Indian culture 
shows that Indian culture today is a mosaic of different cultures. This 
led to cultural diversity, a sense of superiority, separation, and 
regionalism in the minds of Indian people. This aspect of cultural 
affinity and sensitivity come in the way of constitutional spirit, when it 
tries to bring the Indian into a close unity. The Constitution does not 
envisage to destroy different cultures but offers a procedure to narrow 
down the gaps among the people of different cultures. The aim is to 
generate a sense of cohesion and closeness ^mong the Indian people. A 
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historical review of Indian cultures and social life indicates that this 
problem of cultural disparity and social disintegration prompted 
various religious philosophers and social reformers to take up the task 
of uniting the Indians and abolishing the social distinction. Their 
attempts, however, could not bring positive results because of the 
vigorous impact of early socio-religious practices which exercise their 
influence over to this day. The Constitution of India undertakes this 
massive task to uproot such socio-religious practices which apart from 
constantly disturbing the social life of our country create great 
problems for the states to carry on socio-economic programmes on the 
principle of equality as embodied in Article 14 of our Constitution. The 
role of judiciary in this regard has been very significant by making 
quick responses to such problems and by narrowing down the cultural 
disparity and social prejudices. 
(iii) Ethno-Racial Permutation 
Indian population is racially very mixed. Since time immemorial 
numerous races have found their way into the subcontinent through 
gaps in the North-Western ranges of Himalayas. The country was large 
enough to absorb all those who entered her gate. Anthropologists and 
sociologists undertook the determination of racial elements in the 
India's population and classification. The first attempt of this kind was 
made by Sir Herbert Risley, whose work was published in 1882.'*'* He 
distinguishes seven distinct types of racial elements in India, based 
upon the considerations of language, history, geography as well as 
purely genetic factors. Risley's classification of Indian races under 
seven heads."** was - (1) Dravidian (2) Mongoloid, (3) Mongolo-
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Dravidian, (4) Arya Dravidian, (5) Deytho-Dravidian, (6) Indo-Aryan, 
and (7) Turko-Dravidian. 
The work of Risley was further carried on by J.H. Hutton 
under the directorship of Dr. Biraja S. Guha/' Hutton developed a 
classification that postulated a series of invasion of Indian and 
categorized Indian races under four heads i.e. (1) Negrito, (2) 
Australoid, (3) Australoids (traces), (4) Mongoloids Negrito (tiaces), 
and (5) Alpins."*^  
According to Guha the population of India consists of six main 
races and nine sub-types which are as under,"^ ^ 
1. The Negrito 
2. The Proto-Austroloid 
3. The Mongoloid, consisting of 
i. Palae - Mongooids of (a) long-headed and (b) broad-headed 
types 
ii. Tibeto-Mongoloids 
4. The Mediterranean, comprising— 
i. Palae - Mediterranean 
ii. Mediterranean, and 
iii. the so-called oriental type 
5. The Western Breachycephals, consisting of-
i. The Alpinoid 
ii. The Dinaric, and 
iii. The Armenoid 
6. The Nordic 
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These six races with their nine sub-types are so distributed that the 
most primitive and earlier of them are today found in most unattractive 
habitat, while the later, superior and advanced races occupy the real 
productive heartland of the country. Those elements of the older and 
primitive races were soon subjugated by the advanced races and were 
being exploited by the latter. Thus, the older races came to occupy the 
lower rung of the society and it became the vested interest of the 
advance race to perpetuate the vertical stratification of the society. The 
socio-economic discrimination, which has been so rampant and still 
exists in the Indian society, is because of this racial stratification. 
Thus it can be concluded that right from the down of the Indian 
proto-history, certain races who now constitute the racial and social 
substratum of society have been exploited and discriminated against, 
and social and economic justice have been denied to them. This social 
behaviour became rigid, moreover the western concept of democracy 
and social justice were alien to the Indian way of thinking. No the 
Constitution tries to do away with the injustice and provides a legal 
framework for the rapid upliftment of the depressed and exploited 
classes of the society. 
D. DEMOCRATIC NORMS & REALITIES: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The most famous dictum of Abraham Lincoln."*"' which 
embodies the principle and essential of democracy is - "A Government 
of the people, by the people and for the people". It is most familiar of 
all the known definitions of democracy. Although, Lincoln did not 
originate it. He modified a definition given by Theodore Pesker, an 
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abolitionist preacher, who had earlier said "Democracy is a 
Govemment of all the People, by all the people, for all the people". 
Lincoln dropped the word "all" from the three places.^' In a vast 
country like India, it would be impossible for all the people to take part 
in govemment or to hold office by turns. There cannot be direct 
democracy. That is why Rousseaue rejected it as a system except for 
very tiny states. "Rousseaue is adamant on the point that a 
representative system is not democratic, because one's will can never 
be represented by another". 
Today, the people's representatives in the name of the people 
and for the people must inevitably govern democracy. The people who 
are governed have to remain content with a small quantity or right in 
the shape of a vote exercised every five years. But this is not the whole 
parameter of the concept of democracy. Democracy, according to 
modem writers, means many things and its meaning is continuously 
assimilating modem theories and principle developing by conducting 
researchers into the system and practical knowledge. As Mclver says, 
"Democracy is not a way of governing, whether by majority or 
otherwise but primarily a way of determining who shall govern, and 
broadly, to what ends".^ ^ Democracy is way of life, and it must 
maintain human dignity, equally and Rule of Law. It requires strong 
public opinion, independence and fearlessness in the Press. When there 
is "independent curiosity, close inquiry", free constmctive criticism, 
and the Govemment is kept in check, democracy exists not only as a 
form of Govemment, but also as a state of society.^ '^  
Democracy is one of the three types adopted in the formulation 
of a Govemment. The others being Monarchy and Aristocracy. 
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Aristotile classified modem states into three classes - Monarchies, 
Aristocracies, and Democracies, corresponding to the exercise of 
governmental power by a single person, by some definite order, a few 
in number, or by the majority of the people themselves either directly 
or through representations chosen by them.^ ^ 
Democracies are of different kinds and so the world is divided 
into various of its sorts i.e. direct democracy, representative 
democracy, Parliamentary democracy or Presidential democracy. The 
Great Britain, India and U.S.A represent the Parliamentary and 
Presidential democracies. There are other forms of democracies also 
like People's Democracy, Basic Democracy and Guided Democracy. 
The word 'democracy' has become a fashionable word and is in 
currency whatever be the form of Government. The Government may 
be a rank dictatorship or it may be plain communism but it is called a 
democracy.^^ 
A democratic state for its proper function must follow certain 
requirements. Among many others, following four are important in this 
respect - firstly, a democracy is set up by the authority of the general 
people to give expression to the general will or in other words 
democracy is a state where authority at all levels proceeds from the 
people and is controlled by them. It must, therefore, ensure dignity of 
men; equality and Rule of Law that distinguishes it form authoritarian 
rule. Secondly, representation should be by the best persons available 
though it is difficult to make a correct choice due to "Party system". 
Prof Ross believes that party system of government is often destructive 
of the choice of the rights candidate. The choice is hardly that of the 
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voter who is under party discipline. Leaders of the party nominate the 
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candidates and all members of the party must vote for them. 
Thirdly, a free election is essential for a good government. A 
government is a representation of people, which is only possible 
through election. The responsibility of making a good government in 
any democracy falls on the people and that is only possible through 
election. Fourthly, there should be an independent authority to judge 
and decide election disputes as well as the exercise of the governmental 
powers. The doctrine of "judicial review" thus assumes significance in 
the democracies. Without the authority of court, free and frank 
elections, and also the election activities like discussions, party 
meetings and propaganda cannot make much headway. 
The opposition, which is formed by a party defeated at the 
elections to secure the required majority in order to form a government 
plays very important role in keeping the ruling party within its election 
manifesto, as well as, to govern the state according to the rule of law. A 
responsible opposition has always-corrective role to play in democratic 
system. With all these good aspects of democracy there are certain 
chances and reasons for the failure of democracy. Many causes for the 
breakdown of democracy had been noted in recent years. The few are 
noted as under: 
Concentration of power in a particular organ of the state is a 
great danger to democracy. In representative democracies of power 
gets centralized in the representative body then because of the size of 
the body it becomes unwieldy. Power is best exercised when a single 
person makes the decision and this is the reason why in the United 
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State he entire democratic process is geared to select a President, who 
to four years guides the nation and practically makes all the vital 
decisions. 
The concentration of power results into autocracy and whatever 
be the form of government, if carries to excess immediately provokes a 
reaction. Acton^" says that monarchy hardens into despotism, 
aristocracy contracts into oligarchy and democracy expands into 
supremacy of numbers. When government becomes intolerant of 
criticism they begin to move away from the true democratic instincts. If 
they manage to deliver the goods all goes well, but when they cease to 
do this, cliches about liberty, freedom, equally opportunity and equal 
rights begin to be heard and appear attractive. 
Legislation carried to excess is yet another danger, for it makes 
the common man desperate.''" The recent example of excessive 
legislation in 1976-77 makes it obvious when Indian Parliament 
introduced many amendments in the Constitution and enacted laws 
aimed at curbing the rights and liberties of individual. The Parliament 
was in a sense involved in satisfying the needs of the government 
without giving any heed to democratic principles or traditions. This 
resulted into mass provocation and the then Congress Government led 
by Late Mrs. \\]dm Qan4hi, was tP^jly cj^ fe^ fec} by J^ rif^ tft Party af the 
hustings in 1977. 
Democracy is a government of compromise and survives on 
everyday consciousness. This is a sort of contract for a fixed term 
between the peoples and political parties to govern them. Any political 
party having definite political programme and standing is entitled to 
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seek the consent of the people. Abraham Lincoln gave the right clue 
when he said that no man is good enough to govern another without the 
other's consent.^' The Government is the manifestation of consent 
obtained by a party in majority. Democracy, thus, is a total discipline 
and a political equation between public and government. The 
government always endeavors for the general welfare, safeguard liberty 
and help create conditions for the social, educational and religious 
freedoms, along with the other legitimate demands. If the Government 
is not run for the benefit of common man and he losses faith in it, the 
democracy is deemed to be a failure. Democracy, thus, is the resultant 
of manifold and diverse activities. Functionally, democracy is a 
proximate solution for many a difficult problems. The principle of 
democracy includes these basic concepts. However, the foremost 
essential value of democracy is the recognition of individual 
personality whose development potentials are safeguarded as individual 
rights. These values and the principles of democracy are the 
foundation upon which the modem constitutions operate. 
The democratic system of government does not have very deep 
roots in Asia. Though it is claimed hat in Ancient India, and elsewhere 
there were the beginning of democratic institutions and ideas.^ '•^  The 
Government of States by the elected representatives of the people is a 
modem institution, which developed mainly in Europe and America. 
Besides, it is only in our time that democracy has come to include the 
totality of the people in the machinery of government and in the 
exercise of power. The great European State themselves reached that 
stage of fiill democracy only by slow and measured steps but in Asia 
the prestige of this from of government is so great, and the democratic 
idea is so much cherished that following the victory of the democratic 
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nation over Fascism, every country which became newly independent 
accepted at once the principle of a full-fledged democracy. 
India readily accepted the democratic principle as the basis of 
governmental functions on acquiring independence in 1947. Before 
independence the Britishers ruled India. Besides the reign of Britishers 
of over two hundred years the Moghul rulers governed India for about 
seven hundred years. During this long period the Indian people lived in 
an atmosphere devoid of any thought or action about the government 
much less about the concept of Rule of Law. The whole society was 
divided on the basis of social values and status, which led to the 
prevalence of separatism and prejudicial approach between each other. 
These practices became more rigid by feudal norms due to which 
authoritarianism of British Government was enhanced to the extent of 
basic values particularly of equality of status and opportunity and 
justice. Democracy, as we have noted from the preceding discussion is 
the embodiment of human dignity, liberty, maintenance of rights, 
justice and equality of opportunity and status, which distinguish it from 
authoritarian rule. 
Another social problem, which is of more serious nature was 
that India, had always group or institutionalized socio-religious 
segments in her social structure. Each segment was identified by 
religion, culture, region, language, caste and sub-castes. Each group on 
the basis of their distinctive features alienated the other group and 
developed a prejudicial approach against each other, In this social and 
political environment an integrated social development ever suffered a 
set back. It was due to this disunity and hostility of various groups 
against each other that the British Raj succeeded in consolidating its 
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powers in India and ruled for more than two centuries. The policy of 
'divide and rule', '*'' adopted by the British Government fully highlights 
Indian's political disunity. The grant of separate electorate for the 
representation in legislature based on religious consideration (Muslim, 
Sikh and Christian), backward classes and schedule caste was aimed to 
keep these communities divided and hostile with each other.^ ^ In view 
of such social and historical experiences, political leaders after the 
independence, seriously struggled to adopt such a principle one which 
the whole edifice of the Constitution could be built up and all the evils 
could be banished out of the society so that in future each individual 
could live in dignity, with sentiments of brotherhood, nationalism, and 
freedom of thought, equality of status and is able to avail oppoitunity 
equally. 
The multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-lingual Indian society 
and furthered the issues of exploitation which were fought on social, 
economic, and political planes by the Indian leaders in their struggle 
for emancipation against an alien rule. The political struggle of Indian 
leaders culminated into the passing of the Indian Independence Act in 
1947, it is the land-mark in the constitutional history of India for it 
brought a great change. A new sovereign state was bom on August 15, 
1947. No doubt the objective of freedom struggle was attained but the 
objective was not freedom only, it was 'swaraj' or freedom froiri social 
restrictions and disunity. The Karanchi Session of the Congress in 1933 
had already defined it thus: 
"In order to end the exploitation of the masses, 
political freedom must include real economic 
freedom of the starving millions."'''^  
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Soon after acquiring independence the first important step was 
to frame the Constitution for the people of independent India. The 
Constitution was framed by Constituent Assembly. Pandit Jawaharlal 
Nehru seeking on the Resolution regarding the aims and objects before 
the Constituent Assembly observed : 
"the fu^ st task of this Assembly is to free India 
through a new Constitution to feed the starving 
people and clothes to naked masses, and give 
every Indian fiiUest opportunity to develop 
himself according to his capacity."^' 
The Constituent Assembly started its work from its first meeting 
on December 9, 1946, under an atmosphere of limitation. But it had 
become clear from the political developments outside the Assembly, 
that the decision for the partition of India has already been outlived. In 
spite of the problems, which arose due to non-participation of the 
Muslim League, the Congress went ahead with its programme of 
business. One of the first task to which the Constituent Assembly 
addressed itself was the formulation of the objectives and the guiding 
principles that were to be the basis of the Constitution and reflect the 
democratic spirit of the constitution. 
The Indian National Congress during its course of activities had 
been sfressing that no Constitution should be imposed by any outside 
authority and no Constitution, which did not sustain the sovereignty of 
the Indian people, would be acceptable to the country. The objective of 
freedom was always equated with the realization that it would be the 
responsibility of free India, with a Constitution based on democratic 
traditions, to bring about a just social and economic order, to remove 
V r _ > T' r-62o/^ 
poverty and ignorance and generally to beror-iig^let-^ the common 
man. These primary responsibilities were emphasized in the "objective 
resolution" which was drafted by Pandit Nehru and moved by him in 
the Assembly on December 13, 1946.^ * The Resolution, which was 
moved by Nehru in an inspiring speech, be later adopted as the 
Preamble of the Constitution. The 'Resolution' covered eight pledges 
but for the purposes of this work two are being written, (1) The 
Constituent Assembly declared its firm ad solemn resolve to proclaim 
India as an 'Indian Sovereign Republic' and to draw up for her future 
governance a Constitution; (2) wherein shall be guaranteed and secured 
to all the people of India, Justice, social, economical and political, 
equality of status, or opportunity, and before the law, freedom of 
thought, expression, belief, worship, vocation, association and action, 
subject to law and public morality.^^ The resolution was debated on 
December 13, 16, 17, 18, and 19,1946, with most of the Speakers 
enthusiastically supporting it.^ " The Assembly accepted the suggestion 
to embody the objective resolution in the Preamble. But some basic 
modifications in the early draft of the Preamble i.e. 'Resolution' were 
felt necessary in view of the British Government's intention^' to 
partition the country into two dominions of India and Pakistan. 
The original draft of the Preamble was considered by the 
Drafting Committee at a number of its meeting in the light of the 
changed political situation resulting from partition. The Drafting 
Committee felt that the Preamble should be restricted to defining the 
essential features of the new State and its basic socio-political 
objectives and that the other matters dealt within the resolution could 
be more appropriately provided for in the substantive parts of the 
Constitution. Accordingly, the Preamble was modified and 'Indian 
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Sovereign Republic' was replaced by 'Sovereign Democratic Republic' 
and a new clause about 'fraternity' was added as in the opinion of the 
Committee, the need for fraternal concord and good-will in India was 
never greater than that time and this particular aim of the Constitution 
required to be emphasized through a special mention in the Preamble. 
The sentiments expressed in the Preamble were those described 
by Jawaharlal Nehru in the 'Objective Resolution' which he moved in 
the Constituent Assembly adopted unanimoudly.^^ But Nehru's 
resolution had itself the manifestation of the ambitions of Mahatama 
Gandhi which he once expressed to a newspaper correspondent, while 
going to London to attend the Second Round Table Conference in 
1931. Gandhiji's ideas for his new India are worth reproducing here ": 
"I shall strive for a Constitution, which will 
release India from all thralldom and patronage 
and give her, it need be, the right to sin. I shall 
work for an India, in which the poorest shall 
feel that it is their country in whose making they 
have an effective voice, an India in which there 
shall be no high class and low class of people; 
an India in which all communities shall live in 
perfect harmony. There can be no room in such 
an India for the curse of untouchability or the 
course of intoxicating drinks and drugs. Women 
shall enjoy the same right as men. Since we 
shall be at peace with all the rest of the world, 
neither exploiting nor being exploited, we 
should have the smallest army imaginable. All 
interests not in conflict with the interests of the 
dumb millions will be scrupulously respected, 
whether foreign or indigenous. Personally, I 
hate distinction between foreign and 
indigenous. This is the India of my dreams."'''* 
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Mahatama Gandhi's ambitions and ideas in fact found 
expression in the Preamble as well as in other detailed provisions of the 
Constitution. 
India has chosen the democratic pattern of the government and 
republican form is just unavoidable and therefore the citizens elect the 
head of tlie State who governs the State as its President. The other 
important elements of the preamble are the main objectives of the 
State, which stand on the foundation of the democratic principles of 
justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. 
Justice. In common sense, means 'giving according to law or 
popular opinion'. Justice is not only done for the good of the person to 
whom it is dispensed but the aim of individual justice is common good 
or welfare of the society. It embraces, as the Preamble proclaims, the 
entire social, economic and political sphere of human activity. 
The terms 'liberty' and 'equality' are both used in the Preamble. 
Both are complementary to one another. Liberty is a safeguard of the 
individual against those who rule them.'^ Democracy is the first 
requirement for liberty as without democracy there cannot be liberty.^ ^ 
Liberty is our comprehensive notion and therefore, it signifies not only 
the absence of arbitrary restraint on the freedom of individual action 
but also the creation of conditions which provide essential ingredients 
necessary for the fullest development of the personality of the 
individual. Since in a State the governing class, which exerts power, is 
tempted to abuse the power the State has to work out ways and means 
to protect the governed. In India Muslims, Christians, and other 
minorities have to protect from the majority who assumes power to 
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rule, as groups enable them to maintain their identity. Freedom, 
therefore, does not mean individual freedom only but it involves also 
the freedom of groups, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic and the 
like. 
Equality, is proclaimed by a French revolutionary in three 
words, 'Men are bom and remain free and equal in rights. Social 
distinctions are based only upon public utility". Equality therefore, 
should remain there in the society in its natural form. If it is touched for 
social motives, values, values of different dimensions would crop up 
and society would be divided according to those values. 
Ours is a country where for historical reason never has been 
equality. The present concept of equality, which is a foreign one, has 
been brought into our laws and life by the framers of our Constitution 
in a conscious and ambitious way in order to emancipate common man 
and give a crushing blow at all forms of exploitation practiced to 
perpetuate inequality. The Constitution provides conditions through 
which the arbitrariness and favourtism are done away with for the over 
all development of man in the street and the citizens' rights and offices 
are shared on the basis of equality and brotherhood. 
The provisions enacted in the Constitution are to promote the 
objectives embodied in the Preamble. Therefore, a number of articles 
enacted in the Chapters of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles 
of State Policy that secure to every citizen equality - social'' ecomic'" 
and political,'^ liberty of thought and epression,**" belief, faith and 
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worship. In order to consolidate 'equality', the social evil of 
'untouchability'," is abolished and its practice in any form is 
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forbidden. To promote equality the conferment of any title of personal 
distinction except a military or academic distinction is prohibited. 
The Constitution thus, treats every individual equal, places every 
religion on equal footing and prevents discrimination both in private 
and public sectors. But the constitutional principles are often seen 
clashing with the social practices on various grounds such as race, 
language, cultural and religion. These grounds have always been the 
factors of identification of various classes, groups and castes in the 
Indian society and have shown strong resistance in the way of unity 
and national integration. It is a historical fact that Indian polity 
provides unique example of social diversity not found anywhere in the 
world. It is due to these diversities, that one finds social stratification. 
The Indian society has been operating since time immemorial, on the 
basis of this social stratification, which has nurtured prejudices and 
thwarted attempts for unity among various classes. The Constitution 
attempts to do away with this rigid and long established social 
stratification and feeling of diversity on the basis of race, culture, 
language, religion and region. The Constitution in fact offers a solution 
for inequality, caste consciousness and regional prejudices, by 
preserving cultural heritage of people professing different faiths 
following different customs and speaking different languages. The 
Constitution attempts to achieve 'unity in diversity' by promoting 
mutual respect and toleration, trust and good-will, sacrifice and service 
to humanity. 
In the beginning there are always possibilities of the 
constitutional principles being overshadowed by racial, cultural and 
socio-economic considerations. Moreover, it is not desirable to blow up 
traditional values by revolutionary change, as there are apprehensive 
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that other sharper issues may crop up. A change in society is brought 
out by a change in ideology and personality by offering simple, clear 
and rational models of both law and moral. Another reason for delay in 
transformation of Indian society is that the constitutional principles of 
equality, rule of law, democracy, secularism all are of western model 
and have been introduced in India for the first time after independence 
which lack appreciation in its right respective That was perhaps the 
reason that Mahatama Gandhi never used the word democracy as he 
knew that the vast majority of Indian People were incapable of 
understanding the meaning of democracy. Instead of democracy he 
used the phrases such as 'Ramraj' or 'swaraj'^'' which also has a 
religious fervour. He considered these phrases to be best suited in the 
context of socio-religious society and to arouse the sentiments of 
Indian people. He wanted his message to be understood by eveiy one 
and prevail everywhere and hence never attempted to use any foreign 
doctrine or principle. 
Accordingly, constitutional principles based n western model 
and transplanted in India are bound to be checked by the age long 
traditional thinking and socio-religious practices. But this does not 
mean that the constitution is a weak document. The Constitution was 
framed to redesign the Indian society, to reform social life, to remove 
economic disparities, and to check the exploitation of man by man for 
material gains in the name of caste and classes. It embodies outstanding 
constitutional principles based upon the doctrines of rule of law and 
socialism and make it a workable source to adjust such conflicting 
interests that may arise between the citizens or between the citizens or 
between the citizen and state. Apparently one may find that the 
Constitution contains such provisions as run counter to the theme of 
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equality but in essence these are meant to provide special facilities to 
those weak and backward entities in the society who have suffered due 
to socio-religious prejudices and also on account of economic 
inequities. Because of the absence of a policy of social justice. These 
provisions disclose the avowed policy of improving the social., 
educational and economic standard of a sizeable majority of India's 
teeming millions, but at times the efforts get themselves into direct 
clash with the vested interests leading to sharp social and political 
conflicts. 
E. EGALITARIAN NORMS 
These are few terms in political science and law which have had 
so long a life and as important a role to play in the making of modem 
history as the idea of equality. Form the start equality was a subject 
approached from several different points of view. In time these 
differences crystallized into three distinct concepts which are known as 
Liberal, conservative and Socialist - belonging to the nineteenth 
century. The liberal concept of equality may be traced to the belief of 
certain stoic philosophers in the universality of human reason. The 
conservative concept of equality may be found as early as Plato's 
Republic, where the demand for equality is said to be derived from the 
promptings of envy and the call for the leveling of all distinction in 
society. In socialist concept of equality, the essential elements were to 
design a new breed of society with emphasis on equal status and 
opportunity.*'' 
At first these three concepts of equality appeared in religious 
terms, and towards the end of eighteenth century they acquired certain 
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distinct concepts, which rested almost on secular philosophic premises. 
In the nineteenth century the three concepts got into conflict with one 
another and it became easy to identify each point of view. The socialist 
camp was mainly composed of those who believed 'collectivism' to be 
the true expression of equality. The liberals wanted to extend the 
principle of equal freedom to more and more areas. By the middle of 
nineteenth century liberals questioned whether the doctrine of laissez 
faire served or inhibited 'equal freedom'. Those who shared the 
conservative view of equality proposed a variety of alterations to the 
leveling tendency and suggested efforts to modify democracy. By the 
end of the 19''' century the three camps were superseded by political 
philosophy based on scientific analysis and the philosophic discussion 
of equality reached the point of utter disappearance. Philosophic 
liberalism because liberal, political economy, the conservative impulse 
passed into historical sociology and psychology, and scientific 
socialism virtually displaced the more speculative versions. 
The brief discussion sketched so far shows the stages through 
which 'equality' passed in different ages with different nations, and 
there is still the possibility of it to run through more stages, with 
different meanings in future. An English historian suggests that 'in the 
course of iiisloiy equality seemed (o have been extended gradually 
from the sphere of ethics to that of law, then religious belief, politics, 
and society and finally in the twentieth century to economics.^^ 
Towards the end of nineteenth century American Constitution 
was framed i.e. 1879 and during its infancy, 'equality' was the first 
subject of controversy among the American intellectuals. The 
American founding fathers wrote in the Declaration of Independence 
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the words, 'all men are created equal, they are endowed by their creator 
with certain unalienable rights" such as "life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness". But this did not prevent later generations of Americans 
from developing conflicting interpretations, when the issue of equality 
became the subject of profound moral and political disagreement over 
slavery. The principle of Equality did not occur in any constitutions, 
drafted by several states except the state of Virginia, which framed a 
declaration of rights knows as the Virginia Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1776. But after the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen 
by National Assembly of France followed by French Revolution in 
1789, the principles of equality and other inalienable rights drove the 
Americans to demand for their place in their Constitution too. As Prof 
Robert Harris observed that the Declaration of Independence succinctly 
and eloquently summarized the major elements of western democratic 
thought which gave birth to the American Revolution.^* Equality was a 
consistent theme in the works of those men who made the major 
contributions to western political theory upto the time of the 
Revolution. The writings of John Locke particularly influenced the 
men who led the American Revolution. The concept of equality of men 
was an important part of Lock's theories of the social compact and 
natural law, which influenced in the re-making of American 
Constitution by adding amendments on the principle of equality. 
Madison one of the most distinguished architect of American 
Constitution, pledged himself to help secure every amendment that 
would give satisfaction and was not harmful.*^ in effect the constitution 
was amended and the Ten Amendments that are known as Bill of 
Rights were added to Constitution in 1791.^ The most important part 
of the Fifth Amendment provided that no person would be deprived of 
his life liberty or property without due process of law. Due process of 
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law was guaranteed debates or an opposing vote and Madison 
conceived this to be the most valuable amendment in the whole list. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: 
"No State Shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law". 
This constitution guarantee was added to protect individuals 
against state action. Schwartz has said, "the Fourteenth Amendment 
was the most important of the post helium addition to the Constitution 
themselves, the first change in the organic text in over sixty years". '^ 
The thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery; the Fifteenth 
Amendment gave the emancipated race the right of suffrage. 
In American Constitutional Landscape the clauses - the "due 
process clause", the "equal protection clause" and the Fourteenth 
Amendment have completely transformed the constitutional structure. 
The Fourteenth Amendment rather than the original Bill of Rights 
covers a vast majority of cases brought to vindicate individual rights. In 
the landmark case of Brown V Beard of Education^ the 'separate but 
equal' doctrine was overruled and 'segregation rules', violative of the 
'equal protection' guarantee. This decision has caused a social 
revolution by its enduring impact. In the field of political rights, the 
key decision was Baker V Carr , which ruled that the federal courts 
were competent to entertain an action challenging legislative 
apportionments as contrary to the equal protection clause. 
In addition to racial and political equality, the Supreme Court 
has moved to ensure equality in criminal justice "^* with the 
instnimentality of Fourteenth Amendment. In many cases the 
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Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process has been held to 
demand adherence by the States to most of the rights guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights. These included the right to a jury trail, '^^ confrontation 
of witnesses,'^ speedy trials,^^ and that against self incrimination/ with 
the result, Fourteenth Amendment was deemed to include all the 
specific rights safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.''^ '* Fourteenth 
Amendment, as Schwartz, observes, therefore, emerged out to be a 
great unifying theme, interpreted by the Supreme Court, I matters of 
equality as between races, between citizens, between rich and poor, 
between prosecutor and defendant.'"" 
(i). In England 
In England, the principle of equality is contained in one of the 
canons of English Constitution that is. Rule of Law as enunciated by 
Prof. A.V. Dicey. Dicey gave to the Rule of Law three meanings.'"' It 
means, in the first places, the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and 
excludes the existence of arbitrariness of prerogative, or even of wide 
discretionary authority on the part of the Government. Further, a man 
may be punished for breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing 
else. The second meaning is of "equality before the law or the equal 
subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by 
the ordinary law courts".'"'^ In this sense the rule of law conveys that no 
man is above the law; that officials like private citizens are under a 
duty to obey the same law and that there are no administrative courts to 
which claims are referred by the citizens against the state or its 
officials.'"-* 
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Dicey further elaborating it said that "with us every official from 
(he Prime Minister down to a constable or collector or taxes, I under 
the same responsibility for every act done without any legal 
justification as any other citizen.'""'' Today in England all are subject to 
law and thus in the eye of law everyone is treated as equal. Finally, the 
rule of law means that the constitution is the result of the ordinary law 
of the land. 
Going back to the first meaning the supremacy of law in 
England has resulted fi^om the concept that there was a universal law 
which ruled the world. Bracton writing in the first half of the Thirteenth 
century deduced from this theory the proposition that rulers were 
subject to law. This theory created an historical dispute between the 
Crown and the Parliament in the middle Ages. Coke and his followers 
fought for the supremacy of Parliament.""^ Medieval Lawyers never 
denied the wide scope of the royal prerogative, but the king could do 
certain things in certain ways.'"^ It was not until the seventeenth 
country that Parliament established its supremacy. Fortenscue C.J., 
writing in the reign of Henry VI, had applied what later became the two 
major principles of the Constitution, Rule of Law and the Supreme 
Court of Parliament, and relied upon the 'Rule of Law' to justify the 
constitution that taxation could not be imposed without the consent of 
the Parliament. The rule of law meant the supremacy of all parts of the 
law of England, both enacted. The supremacy of the law together with 
the Bill of Rights in 1689.^ "" In England, therefore, the birth of modem 
democracy was due to the protest against the absolutism of an 
autocratic executive. The English people in their fight for freedom 
against autocracy agreed with the establishment of the supremacy of 
law and the Parliament as the sole source of that law. 
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The Bill of Rights is an important landmark in the history of 
constitutional government of England. It is a triumph of Parliament 
over the claim of the king's to rule by prerogatives. The Magna Carta, 
which contained for the first time, the concept of equality and the Bill 
of Rights and the supremacy of Parliament are the foundation on which 
the whole structure of the government is based and individual liberty is 
secured. 
(ii). In U.N. Charter 
United Nations being an international organization obviously 
designed to embrace innumerable activities of international nature. Of 
these, the two of vital significance in the present context of 
international problems are first, "the welfare of mankind", and 
secondly, "maintenance of peace and security in the community of 
nations". The United Nation was prompted to tackle these two 
problems with a fresh zeal, after the second world was during Hitler 
pursued the policy of extermination of Jews on racial ground. Racial 
discrimination is most dangerous evil for it not only denies freedom 
and equality to members of certain groups, but it develops into 
genocide, worst of all its forms. 
Beside, the protest against the barbarities during the second 
world was, the other factors were the fast changes in the political face 
of the world brought about in the name of the right of the peoples to 
self-detennination. The de-colonization which began with India, was 
not merely the signal for widespread towards the emancipation of 
peoples, of peoples, but il nlso enabled the newly independent States to 
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become member of the United Nations as equal with older or more 
powerful states. Such are the main factors common to mankind as a 
whole, which have worked, in favour general evolution of human rights 
towards a greater goal of liberty and equality. Impelled by these factors 
the United Nations, in pursuance of one of the commands of its 
Charter, appointed Commission on Human Rights.'"' 
The Commission on Human Rights was obviously designed to 
provide a common standard to protect and respect human beings and 
recognize their inalienable rights without distinction as to race, caste, 
and language. The Commission after discussion and debates presented 
a draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was 
adopted and approved by the Committee of the General Assembly in 
1948. Article 1 of Declaration of Human Rights reads as follows: 
"All human beings are bom free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are ended with reason 
and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood". 
Introducing the Declaration to the plenary session of the General 
Assembly Mr. Charles Malik (Lebanon), the Chairman of the Third 
Committee, wjiich pfepared the draft, recalled that the members of the 
UnitefJ Nations \}^i already solemnly pledged themselves, under the 
Cll^fter, fo promote respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, but that it was the first time that human right sand 
fundamental freedoms had been set forth ia. detail. Hence every 
Government knew, at present, to what extent exactly it had pledged 
itself, and every citizen could protest to his government, if the latter did 
not fulfill its obligation. The Declaration would thereafter provide a 
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useful means of criticism and would help to bring about changes in 
present legal practice/^" 
Mrs. Roosevelt stressed that the Declaration was first and 
foremost a declaration of the basic principles to serve as a common 
standard for all nations. It might become the Magna Carta of all 
mankind. Mrs. Roosevelt thought that its proclamation by the General 
Assembly would be of importance, comparable to the 1789 (French) 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, the proclamation of the rights of man 
in the Declaration of Independence of the Untied states of America, 
and similar declarations made in other countries.'" When the General 
Assembly approved the Declaration unanimously, the President of the 
General Assembly, Mr. Evatt of Australia, stated that the adoption of 
the Declaration by a big majority without direct opposition was a 
remarkable achievement. It is a step forward in a great evolutionary 
process. He added that this document was backed by the authority of 
the body of opinion of the Untied Nations as a whole and millions of 
peoples, men, women and children, all over the wodd would turn to it 
for help, guidance and inspiration""^ 
The Declaration has been applied constantly in the practice of 
United Nations and even States. The Declaration was relied on by the 
General Assembly in several resolutions relating to the treatment of 
people of Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa, "^ and in other 
related issues. Gradually, the United Nations succeeded in enforcing 
more vigorously the obligations of member states to observe Human 
Rights and fundamental freedoms, and almost all members have 
accepted this extension of United States powers in this area. In a 
relatively short period, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has 
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thus become a part of the constitutional law of the world community 
and together with the Charter of the United Nation, it has acquired a 
place of world law higher than all other international legal nonns and 
domestic laws. Today, therefore, there is no state in the world, which 
has not adopted the principle of equality for its government. The 
significant thing is that even the States, which were traditionally 
monarchial like Nepal, Japan had to modify their monarchial systems, 
radically enough to permit their governments to function on the basis of 
principle of equality and democracy. 
(ill). In Indin 
Equality principle in India was in fact adopted after the 
independence and is contained in the Constitution framed therefore. In 
India, besides the problem of equality before the la, discrimination and 
social segregation on the basis of caste existed and denial of 
opportunities in education and employment was prevalent. To 
comprehend these issued separate provisions were enacted in detail 
besides the guarantee of 'equality' in Article 14 in general tenn. The 
quality principles include rights contained in provisions 14 to 18. 
Besides these, the constituent has also other provisions which embody 
the concept of equality, such as Article 325 secures to all citizens 
irrespective of religion, race, caste or sex, a right subject to other 
conditions enumerated in Article 326 to contest election o either 
Houses of Parliament or other Houses of Legislature of a State. 
Equality principle in the modem age has exerted an enduring 
influence upon the traditional pattern of an unequal society. The 
equality movement is thrashing out the distinctions, diversities. 
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economic imbalance and social intolerance. That society deserves to be 
called good and balanced in which social relations are organized on the 
principle of equality, and where opportunities are available to all 
equally and justice prevails. In the words of Prof Laski, "the idea of 
equality, so regarded, seems to me inescapably connected with 
freedom. For equality, so regarded, seems, in the first place, to mean 
the organization of opportunities, and, in the second place, it means 
that no man's opportunities are sacrificed to the claims of another. The 
idea of equality, in a word, is such an organization of opportunity that 
no man's personality suffers frustration to the private benefit of others. 
He is given his chance that he may use his freedom to experiment with 
his powers. He knows that in his effort to attain happiness no barriers 
impede him differently from their incidence upon others. He may not in 
his objective, but, at least, he cannot claim that society has so weighed 
the scale against him as to assure his defeat."'* 
In India there is a mosaic of races, religions, languages, cultures 
and social norms, which have generated an unspoken rivalry and 
antagonism in the life style of the people and has severely affected the 
formation of integrated society. The Constitution has attempted to 
clinch all these problems by incorporating the principle of equality, as 
explained by Laski to foster a fellow feeling. 
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PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY : DIMENSIONS 
AND DEVICES 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
Equality is the only true and central premise from which 
constructive ideas can radiate freely and be operated without prejudice.' 
Equality springs from a divine dictate which is available in every system 
of temporal authority pervading all the geo-political demarcations in the 
world. Since the inception of humanity on this planet, movements were 
initiated, struggles were spearheaded and battles were fought for 
accomplishing and realizing a World Human Order founded upon the 
principles of equality such as equality of status and of opportunity in 
every civil society wedded to a desiderata of justice - social, economic 
and political; liberty- of thought, expression belief, faith and worship; 
fraternity, human rights with all the manifestations of human dignity 
backed by rule of law. Hinduism, Christianity and Islam presented an 
order of equality, which is distinct from each other in letter and spirit. 
However, Hinduism has presented such a social compartmentalization of 
humanity, which is alien to the basic principles of equality and human 
rights. 
Islam not only recognizes absolute equality between men and 
women irrespective of any distinction of colour, race or nationality but 
makes it an important and significant principle, a reality. The Almighty 
God has laid down in the Holy Quran: 
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"O mankind. We have created you from a male 
And female. And we set you up as nations and 
Tribes so that you may be able to recognize each 
Other" (49:13) 
In other words, all human beings are brothers to one another. They 
all are the descendants from one father and one mother and the division 
of human beings into nations, races, groups and tribes is for the sake of 
distinction, so that people of one race of tribe may meet and be 
acquainted with the people belonging to another race or tribe and co-
operate with one another. 
This division of the human race is neither meant for one nation to 
take pride in its superiority over other nor is it meant for one nation to 
treat another with contempt or disgrace, or regard them as a mean and 
degraded race and usurp their rights. The Almighty God has laid down in 
Sura AI-Hujrat: 
"Indeed the noblest among you before God are 
the most heedful of you". (49:13) 
In other words the superiority of one man over another is only on 
the basis of God-Consciousness, purity of character and high morals, and 
not on the basis of colour, race, language or nationality and even this 
superiority based on piety and pure assume airs of superiority and pure 
conduct does not justify that such people should play lord assume airs of 
superiority over other human being. Assuming airs of superiority is in 
itself a reprehensible vice which no God-fearing and pious man can ever 
dream of perpetrating. Nor does the righteous have more privileged rights 
80 
over others, because this runs counters to human equality, which has been 
laid down in the beginning of this verse as a general principle. From the 
moral point of view, goodness and virtue is in all cases better than vice 
and evil. 
This has been exemplified by the Prophet (PBUH) in one of his 
sayings thus: 
"No Arab has any superiority over a non-Arab, 
nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an 
Arab. Nor does a white man have any superiority 
over a black man, or the black man any 
superiority over the white man. You are all the 
Children of Adam, and Adam was created from 
clay." (Sahih Muslim: English Translation) 
In this manner Islam established equality for the entire human race 
and truck at the very root of all distinctions based on colour, race, 
language or nationality. According to Islam, God has given man this right 
of equality as a birthright. Therefore no man should be discriminated 
against on the ground of the colour of his skin, his place of birth, the race 
or the nation in which he was bom. Today, a number of non-Muslim 
thinkers, who are free from blind prejudice, openly admit that no other 
religion or way of life has solved this problem with the some degree of 
success with which Islam has done so. 
B. THE NOTION OF EQUALITY IN ENGLAND 
Hath not a Jew eyes ? 
Hath not a Jew hands, 
Organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions, 
Fed with the same food, 
Hurt with the same weapons. 
Subject to the same diseases, 
Healed by the same means. 
Warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer. 
As a Christian is ? 
If you prick us, do we not laugh ? 
If you poison us, do we not die ? 
And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge ? 
These couplets^ supra make it crystal clear that in every society 
including English society principles of equality have been accepted and 
flourished in all its manifestations and instances. In the same view Dr. Sir 
Mohammad Allama Iqbal ^ siad : 
Sultan and slave in single file stood side by side, 
then no servant was nor master, nothing did 
them divide. 
The spirit of equality is axiomatic and abundant in the couplet 
supra and establishes a concept of egalitarianism. In a civil society on this 
colourful planet, the concept of equality is pervading all the geo-political 
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entities. Magna Carta is often cited as one of the early documents 
upholding principles of equality and human rights in crude forms 
although this opinion however, has been contradicted. Davidson says: 
"While Magna Carta (1215) is often 
erroneously seen as the origins of the liberties 
of English citizens (it was in reality, simply a 
compromise on the distribution of powers 
between king John and his nobles, the language 
of which later assumed the wider significance 
which is attributed to it today), it is was not 
until the Bill of Rights (1689) that rules directed 
towards the protection of individuals rights or 
liberties emerged. But even the development 
must be seen in context. The Bill of Rights, 
which is described in its long title as "an Act 
Declaring the Rights and liberties of the Subject 
and setting the Succession of the Crown," was 
the outcome of the seventeenth century struggle 
of Parliament against the arbitrary rule of the 
Stuart monarchs." 
Ever since the beginning of civilized life in a political society, the 
shortcomings and tyranny of ruling powers have led people to seek higher 
laws. The concept of a higher law binding human authorities was evolved 
and it came to be asserted that here were certain rights anterior to society. 
These were superior to rights created by human authorities, were 
universally applicable to people of all ages in all regions, and are believed 
to have existed prior to the development of political societies. These 
83 
rights were mere ideologies and there was no agreed catalogue of them 
and no machinery for their enforcement until they were codified into 
national conditions, as a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights/ From the 
very beginning of human history, man struggled for his existence against 
nature and his fellow men. The concept of the survival of the "highest 
caused conflicts among human beings that paved the way for the framing 
of rules and regulations for the safeguard of the weaker sections. 
Before considering the development of equality it is necessary to 
consider the beginning of inequalities in the social relationships of men. 
Without the development of just inequalities the demand and struggle for 
equality can not arise. For millions of years human race lived in primitive 
communist societies, without any social inequality. In such societies, 
private property was absent and people lived a simple life. But gradually, 
with the development of forces of production, private property emerged 
and together with this, society was divided into unequal classes and this 
gave birth to inequalities. Inequalities of different kinds and degrees 
emerged with the division of society into the property owners and the 
propertyless.* 
In the ancient period, in Greek philosophy, two different traditions 
emerged. One, represented by Plato and Aristotle, supported inequality; 
and the other - represented by Pericles, the Sophists, Antiphon, 
Lycophoron, Euripides and the Stoics—supported equality among men. 
But during that period the issue of equality near became a fundamental 
one and women and staves were regarded as inferior by birth. Plato 
classified men into men of gold, silver and icon and the Greeks were 
regarded superior to other races. Aristotle justified slavery and 
maintained the superiority of masters over-salves.* 
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During the ancient period, Stoic philosophers (Zeno, Cicero and 
Seneca) gave the idea of universal brotherhood and citizenship which was 
based on national law and reason and which corresponds to the modem 
idea of equality. They opposed slavery and pleaded for natural equality 
among men. The revolutionary struggle for equality during the Roman 
period was waged under the leadership of Spartacus, the great leader of 
slaves, and the blood drenched sword of Spartacus gave the bottle cry that 
the blood of all men is of the same colour. Two centuries before Christ, 
another leader of slaves, Aristonicus declared the establishment of "The 
State of Equals."^ So in the ancient period the struggles for equality took 
place, but equality in the modem sense of the term was missing. 
During the medieval period Christianity raised the voice for 
equality in the beginning but soon it got converted into equality before 
God. The Church had long since recognized the equality of all men; but 
this equality was to be realized in hearven.^ During this period feudalism 
emerged in Europe and unequal mles of aristocracy developed. Under 
feudalism social inequality was consolidated by law, all of society was 
divided into estates: the clergy was the first estate: The nobility the 
second; and all the other people, the third one. The first two estates had 
all the rights, the third estate had only duties.' Thus, during the medieval 
period social inequalities got legal recognition and legal privileges 
available to clergy and aristocrats were widely extolled. Against these 
legal privileges based on birth emerged the modem concept of equality 
before law. 
The concept of equality was backed by rationalism and 
enlightenment of the 18"^  century especially in England and France; the 
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emerging capitalist class raised a voice of protest against the special 
privileges of aristocracy and demanded legal, social and political 
equality, "the powerful and recently encircled middle classes, especially 
in England and France, were anxious to achieve social and political 
equality with nobilite —Reason and faith both showed men to be 
identical at birth, if they were now unlike, the cause must be sought in 
something outside them - their enironment.'" Equality before law, and 
equality by birth were the main features of this demand for equality. It 
was associated with social justice and "it is only since the eighteenth 
century that these inequalities (in wealth, prestige and power) have 
become widely questioned and criticized from the standpoint of social 
justice," Various thinkers of enlightenment, like D. Diderot, Alembert, 
Mantesqien, Rousseaun, Voltaire, Dante, Babenf, Hume, Hutcheson, 
Ferguson, Adam Smith, Gibbon, Bentham, Shaflesbury, Beccaria, Peitro 
and Verri, raised the voice for equality. Ronssean in his essay, "Discourse 
on the Origin of Inequality", 1754, strongly pleaded for equality and 
maintained that inequality have emerged due to the rise of private 
property and civilization. Liberal Condorect and revolutionary Babenf 
emphasized the economic aspects of equality. The great American and 
French Revolutions raised slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity. 
These slogans wee hardly realised in practice. Even when French 
National Convention proclaimed "natural equality of people" it did so 
half-heartedly. The Haitian Negroes demanded emancipation from 
slavery and in reply French Republic sent several expeditions to quell the 
rebellions slaves who demanded neither more nor less than equality. 
However, the 18"' century concept of equality was that of legal and 
political equality - abolition of special privileges - rather than of 
economic and social equality. "The special characteristic of the class 
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system in France and Germany had been, in fact, that inequality was not 
primarily economic, but juristic, and that, in spite of gross disparities of 
wealth, it rested on difference, no merely of income, but of legal status."'"' 
Thus, the issue in France was not economic equality, it was only the 
uniformity of legal rights, and the French movement for equality set the 
new aristocracy of wealth on a footing of parity with the old aristocracy 
of land. 
It was in the IS"* century mainly that the voice for legal and political 
equality was raised. But in the 19'*' century the emerging working class 
raised a more vigorous demand for socio-economic equality. Because of 
the development of capitalism in the 19"^  century, economic disparities 
increased and the demand for economic equality and justice came from 
many quarters. Humanists, Utopian socialist, Marxists and positive 
liberals raised the demand for economic equality. 
The 20' century witnessed many revolutionary struggles for 
equality. Various movements of the black people against the white race 
developed and black people won their rights for equality of opportunity 
and equal treatment in all socio-economic affairs. 
The quarantine of equality before the law is an aspect of what A.V. 
Dicey calls the "rule of law" in England.''* It memo that none is above the 
law and every person, whatever be his rank and Howsoever high he may 
be, is subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. Equality before the 
law means that among equals the law should be equal and should be 
equally administered, that like should be treated alike. The right to sue 
and be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted for the same kind of action 
should be same for all citizens of full age and understanding without 
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distinctions of race, religion, wealth, social status or political influence.'^ 
Thus, Dceian doctrine of rule of law contains three main attributes of 
equality i.e. firstly; absence of arbitrary power and supremacy of the law, 
secondly; equality before the law be there and thirdly; the constitution is 
the result of ordinary law of the land. 
C. THE NOTION OF EQUALITY UNDER U.N. CHARTER 
The experience of the League of Nations greatly helped in the 
formation of the United Nations and buying down its charter. In the 
course of time, the United Nations evolved into the most important 
organization the world so far has, and with its 180 nations membership at 
present, it is truly universal in character. Like the league of Nations, the 
United Nations is also the result of war, i.e. the Second World War. 
While the war still continuing, attempts had been started by the Allied 
nations to have an international organization, which should be devoid of 
the weaknesses of the league and should place the international peace and 
security on the firmer footing. The first step in this direction was the 
"Declaration of St. James Palace, London of June 12, 1941, in which the 
exiled governments of Greece, Belgium, erstwhile Czechoslovakia, 
Luxembourg, the Netheriands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia and the 
representatives of Britain Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa 
and General De Gualle of Frances participated and expressed their desire 
to establish peace. It was soon followed by the "Atlantic Charter" of 
August 14, 1941, between the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
and Franklin Roosevelt, the President of the United States, in which they 
undertook to end Nazism and subscribed the "principles of equality" of 
nations, universal peace and collective cooperations.'^ 
There were 26 nations including the United States, Great Birtain, 
erstwhile Soviet Union and China which signed the "United Nations 
Declaration" on January 1, 1942, and, for the first time, used the words 
"United Nations." States also pledged for cooperation amongst 
themselves, and not to enter into treaty relationship with the enemy. It 
was, however, the "Moscow Declaration" of October 30, 1943, between 
the governments of the United States, Britain, Soviet Union and China 
that emphasized the need for establishing a world organization based on 
the principle of sovereign equality of States, which should be open to all 
peace-loving nations and be able international peace and security. The 
Tehran Conference of December!, 1943, between Churchill, Roosevelt 
and Stalin further emphasised the urgent need for the establishment of 
such an international organization. In 1944, at Dumbarton Oaks, form 
powers met and Draft Proposals for such an organization were prepared 
by China, Great Britain, United States and the Soviet Union. The 
proposed organization was given the name of "The United Nations", 
which was to have four principles organs: The General Assembly, the 
Security Council, The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and 
Secretariat. However, there were no clear cut proposals on the future of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, the mandate system of the 
league of Nations (Art.22) and the initial membership of the 
organization.'^ The Yalta conference of February 11, 1945, between 
Great Britain, United State and the Soviet Union finally decided to 
convince a general conference of about 50 nations to consider the 
constitution of the proposed world organization based on the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposal, to be held on April 25, 1945, at Yalta, the voting 
procedure and arrangements of the proposed Security Council was also 
agreed between the three participating nations. 
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The final shape to the proposed Charter was given at the San 
Francisco, attended by 51 nations, and held between April 25, to 26 June, 
1945. The conference succeeded in adopting the Charter of the United 
Nations with 111 Articles, along with the Statute of the ICJ, though 
serious differences arose over the voting procedure in the Security 
Council and the "Veto" power of the permanent members. The 
Dumbarton Oaks proposal was adopted on this aspect after making 
certain significant changes. The Charter was signed on June 26, 1945. 
The Charter was to come into existence only after the ratification of the 
five permanent members, namely, China, France, United Kingdom, 
United States and Soviet Union along with ratification by a majority of 
other signatory States (Art. 110(3). After the fulfillment of the 
requirement, the Charter become operative fi-om October 24, 1945, and 
the General Assembly held its first session on January 10, 1946. 
Article 1 of the Charter sets out the purpose of the United Nations. 
The first and the foremost purpose of the United Nations is "to maintain 
international peace and security" and to that end "to make effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of 
the peace, and to bring about by peaceftil means —adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace."" 
The additional purposes are as follows: 
1. To develop friendly relations among nations based on the respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of the 
peoples;^" 
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2. To achieve international cooperation in economic, social, cultural 
or humanitarian matters;^' 
3. To promote and encourage respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all; 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing international actions in the 
attainment of these ends.^ ^ 
These general objective of the United Nations are quite wide in scope 
and ambit which bind the organization and its members to direct their 
actions in the attainment of these purposes. 
Article 2 of the Charter sets out the principles on which the United 
Nations is based. They are as under: 
1. The principle of sovereign equality of all its members; 
2. The principle of good faith to be followed by all members to fulfill 
their obligations; 
3. The principle to settle their disputes by peaceful means; 
4. The principle to refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State; 
5. The principle to give every assistance to the United Nations in any 
action it takes in accordance with the Charter; 
6. The principle to refrain from giving assistance to any State against 
which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement 
action; 
7. The principle to ensure that State which are not members of the 
United Nations, act in accordance with these principles for the 
maintenance of international peace and security; and 
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8. Tfie principle of non-intervention. 
The general Assembly is one among the working organs of the 
United Nations (U.N.). It consists of the representative of all member 
State. The Assembly can discuss any matter within the scope of the 
charter and any matter relating to peace and security brought to its 
attention. 
One of the important organs" of U.N. is economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). It has been establish to handle international 
economic, social, cultural, health and other ancillary and incidental 
maters. The main functions of the ECOSOC may briefly be summarized 
as under: 
1. To make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international 
economic, social, cultural educational, health and related matters;^ '* 
2. To recommend measures to promote respect for the human rights 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom; ^^  
3. To prepare draft conventions for the submission to the General 
Assembly with respect to matters falling within its competence. 
4. To call international conferences on matters falling within its 
competence.^' 
It also coordinates the activities of the specialized agencies of the 
UN. It functions through 12 commissions - international and regional. 
The ECOSOC has three sessional committees - the economic, social and 
coordination committees. The ECOSOC has set-up the Commission on 
Human Rights in 1946.^ ^ Both the ECOSOC and the HRC adopted a 
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report to the ECOSOC on the important question of the implementation 
of the Charter." 
Of late, various governments in the world countries have urged 
the Secretary General to exercise his powers in the field of human rights. 
Besides, the policy making organs, the ECOSOC, the General Assembly 
and the Commission on Human Rights have also stressed the importance 
of the role of the Secretary General in the field of human rights. Much 
concern is being shown on the violation of human rights and how they are 
to be treated. The ECOSOC's resolution 75 provides the exact rules to be 
followed by the Secretariat in dealing with the matters related to human 
rights and their violations. The resolution underwent many amendments 
from time to time. As such in 1967, to examine the actual 
communications received. The HRC recommended a new revolutionary 
course, which was approved by the ECOSOC. That is the famous 
prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. In 1967, 
the ECOSOC recommended for the establishment of a UN Rights.^" The 
ECOSOC also strives to strengthen international co-operation and to 
achieve it, the ECOSOC brings to the ioiowledge of the organs concerned 
by furnishing technical assistance. The ECOSOC is the controlling 
agency of the Covenants on Economic, social and cultural rights. 
It may now be asked to what extent, so for, are principles of 
equality and human rights and fundamental freedoms internationally 
protected under the United Nations Order ? The answer to this question is 
that these rights and freedoms are safeguarded, though imperfectly, under 
the scheme of the Organisation. The Charter imposes an obligation on 
member states to preserve these rights. It also obligates the organization 
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to take reasonable and effective measures to protect these rights and 
freedoms. 
D. THE NOTION OF EQUALITY IN INDIA 
Equality is a very vital principle of social justice. While it is a 
boon to the poor, the oppressed and the downtrodden, the rich and 
prosperous section of the society dreads it, because it can be stretched 
beyond the limits of justice. As Hobhouse has observed: 
"Justice is a name to which every knee will 
bow. Equality is a word which many fear and 
detest." 
The problem of equality has baffled political thinkers and social 
reformers from the earliest time. Aristotle defined equality as treating 
equals equally and unequal unequally. The modem idea of equality on the 
contrary focuses attention on its substantive aspect and seeks correction 
of inequalities in so far as they are unjust and alterable according to 
prevailing social consciousness. The French declaration of the rights of 
man and citizen envisioned: 
"Men are bom and remain free and equal in 
rights. Social distinctions can be based only 
pubic utility." 
Law is the expression of the general will. It must be the same for 
all whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in its eyes, 
are equally eligible to all public dignities, places and employments 
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according to their capacities and without any other distinctions then that 
of their virtues and talents. More formal equality is not enough for 
oppressed and exploited sections of the society which not only need to 
protection but in substance it requires removal of unjust and oppressive 
conditions which are capable of alteration. The principles of equality 
demands that we may concede to only such discrimination as is based on 
rational grounds. What is rational depends on the level of prevailing 
social consciousness. 
Indian society has been described as a "compartmental" society; 
within it a vast number of groups maintain distinct and diverse styles of 
life. The system by which these groups are related and mutually 
accommodated is so complex as to defy general description."'' However, 
to understand the principles of equality and its dimensions and their 
setting the legal developments, it is also necessary to sketch some of the 
principle features of India's social order and its recent history. 
One of the distinctive and pervasive features of Indian society is 
the division into castes. The word caste is not an indigenous Indian term 
but a graft via English (from the Portuguese "Casta"). It is used to 
correspond to several Indian terms, but has no exact equivalent in Indian 
language. Caste in the narrower sense applies primarily to the Hindus, 
who make up 85% of India's population. Many features of caste are also 
formal among non-Hindu groups, and the term "Caste" as used here 
applies to these groups as well as to Hindus. There are exceptions to 
almost any statement that can be made about caste, but only the most 
prominent exceptions will be noted here. The term "Caste" itself has a 
variety of meanings. It takes on different shadings in the context of 
village locality, region, and nation." 
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To begin with, a caste may be taken to mean a "Jati" —an 
endogamous group bearing a common name and claiming a common 
origin, membership in which is hereditary. Limited to one or mere 
traditional occupations, imposing on its members certain obligations, and 
restrictions in matters of social intercourse and having a more or less 
determinate position in a hierarchical scale of ranks."''* It has been 
estimated that there are 2,000 or 3,000 such castes (or sub castes, as they 
are sometimes called) in present day India.^' Although most castes have a 
traditional occupation, in only a few —especially the skilled artisans —is 
it followed by most members to day. In many cases, caste tradition pre-
cludes entry into certain occupations, while the network of caste ties 
provides access to others. The caste is held together by ties of kinship, by 
a cycle of group observances, by bonds of mutual assistance and support, 
and finally by the powers of the groups to exact obedience to its rules."'^  
Therefore, independent India embraced equality as a cardinal 
virtue against a background of elaborate, valued and clearly perceived 
inequalities. Her constitutional policies to offset these proceeded from an 
awareness of the entrenched and cumulative nature of group 
inequalities. The result has been an array of programmes that can be 
addressed collectively as a "policy of compensatory discrimination. 
"Which is being pursued with remarkable persistence and generosity but 
without vigor and effectiveness. 
The compensatory discrimination policies entail systematic 
departure from norms of equality (such as merit, evenhandedness, and 
indifference to ascriptive characteristics). These departures are justified in 
several ways: fast, preferential treatment may be viewed as needed 
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assurance of personal fairness, a guarantee against the persistence of 
discrimination in subtle and indirect forms. Second, such policies are 
justified in terms of beneficial results that they will presumably promote: 
integration, use of neglected taken, more equitable distribution, etc. With 
these two — the anti-discrimination theme and the general welfare 
theme—is entwined a notion of historical restitution or reparation to 
offset the systematic and cumulative deprivations suffered by lower 
castes in the past. These multiple justifications point to the complexities 
of pursuing such a policy and of assessing its performance."*' 
India's policy of compensatory discrimination is composed of an 
array of preferential schemes. These programmes are authorized by 
constitutional provisions that permit departure fi-om formal equality for 
the purpose of favouring specified groups.'*" The benefits of 
"compensatory discrimination" are extended to a wide array of groups. 
There are three major classes. First, there are these castes designated as 
Scheduled Castes on the basis of their " untouchability." They number 
nearly 80 million (14.6 percent of population) according to the 1971 
Census. Second, there are the Scheduled Tribes who are distinguished by 
their tribal culture and physical isolation and many of whom are residents 
of specially protected Scheduled Areas. They number more than 38 
million (6.9 percent of the population in 1071). Third, there are the 
"Backward Classes (or, as they are sometimes called, "other Backward 
classes") a heterogeneous category, varying greatly from state to state, 
comprised for the most part of castes (and some non-Hindu communities) 
low in the traditional social hierarchy, but not as low as the Scheduled 
castes. Also included among the Other Backward Classes are a few tribal 
and nomadic groups, as well as converts to non-Hindu religions ft"om the 
Scheduled Castes and in some areas the notified Tribes. It has been 
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estimated/* that here were approximately 60 million persons under the 
Other Backward Classes population at that time (64 millions). Today the 
portion of the population designated under this heading is probably 
larger. 
The equality clauses in the Constitution have been incorporated in 
various Articles from 14 to 18. All these articles have to play a vital role. 
Even in American Constitution, amendments 4 and 14 provided full-
fledged equality among the public at large although a little was realized in 
implementation of these equality provisions in America. Then the 
following provision was added: 
"No state shall demy to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
'Equal protection of the laws' is a phrase born with the I'ourteenth 
Amendment, the first specific recognition dictum of the Declaration of 
Independence that " all men are treated equal," which was effectively 
used in the antislavery campaign, had a somewhat different import. 
Charles Summon came closer to the equal protection notion with his 
phrase "equality before the law" which he developed in 1949 in 
contending before the Massachusetts Supreme Court that separate public 
School for black children would be unconstitutional. Later, he sought to 
get the principle of equal rights into the constitution by way of the 
thirteenth Amendment.'*^ 
Within a decade the Supreme Court '*'' in America decided that 
Congress had been completely wrong on both these point. In the Civil 
Rights Cases of 1883, the drafted the Fourteenth Amendment and which 
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had provided for its enforcement by major enactments in 1871 and 1875, 
had not understood the amendment or congressional power under it. By 
means of what system Harban in his dissenting opinion called "a subtle 
and ingenious verbal criticism," the court proceeded to sacrifice "the 
substance and spirit of the Amendment. The defeat of the Harlon position 
meant that Congress was stripped of any power to correct or to punish 
individual discriminatory action. In other words, Congress was limited to 
the correcting of affirmative state action. The Civil Rights Act was not a 
corrective legislation. It was "primary and direct." It was a code of 
conduct which ignored state legislation, and assumed that the matter is 
one that belongs to the domain of national regulation." '^* 
The due process and equal protection concepts are closely related. 
The development of the due process clause was even more portentous. As 
a limit on substantive legislation, it developed into a freewheeling, open-
ended doctrine, which judges used to "circumscribe" legislative choices 
in the name of newly, articulate values that looked clear support in 
constitutional text and history. The battle of strict constitution was fought 
and lost in ISIP.**^  The battle for judicial activism was fought and won 
even earlier in 1803."*^  The best modem defence of the activist role is to 
be formal in Justice Stone's famous "Carolene Products Co. which 
defined three '*'' situations in which judges should curb their normal 
deference towards legislatives and subject legislative action to a "More 
searching judicial inquiry." These three situations were as under: 
i. When legislation appears on its face to violate a those of the 
Bill of Rights; 
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ii. Where legislation restricts those political processes that 
ordinarily can be relied on to prevent undesirable legislation; 
and 
iii. Where "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities. 
The idea of "(iindamental right" as a justification for protective 
judicial activism can be traced to Skinner V Oklahama.'*^ The case 
involved a state habitual criminal sterilization act, under which persons 
convicted two or more time of felonies involving moral turpitude could 
be rendered sexually sterilized. Court disagreed with the law on ground of 
fundamental right of equality. 
In India, hence, Article 14 is a mixed provision of American and 
English, one phrase " equality before law has been taken from English 
law" and other phrase "equal protection of laws from American Law. 
Thus, Article 14 uses expression to make the concept of equal treatment 
binding principles of State action. Both clauses guarantee to the people 
the some thing. The right to equality finds place in the report drawn up by 
Motilal Nehru as Chairman of the Committee appointed to determine 
principles of the Constitution for India in 1928. the Karachi Resolution, 
March, 1931 reiterated, inter-alia, this right in the resolution on 
fundamental rights and economic and social change.'*' Patanjali Shastri, 
C.J.*" has aptly observed that second expression is a corollary of the first. 
Equality before law is a negative concept while the equal protection of 
law is a positive one. The Supreme Court in Keshvanand Bharti V State 
of Kelrala^^ through Justice Jagmohan Reddy has clearly discerned 
concept. Hence, the doctrine of equality must be interpretated in broad 
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sense, so that the principles of equality, rule of law, human rights and 
social justice can easily be enforced under the brolly of equality clauses 
and ail the confrontations may be avoided for once and ail. 
In Vishewar Nath V Income Tax Commissioner,^^ it has been 
upheld that in all democratic setup, the concept of equality is supreme 
and without observing it, no democratic government can flinction. 
Actually, the enforcement and application of concept of equality depend 
upon trinity of time, place, and circumstances. The deviations and 
divagations arc possible due to change of time, place and circumstances. 
Supreme Court has also taken this kind of stand in the case of Kedarnath 
Gejoria V State of West Bengal:'^ The court was of the view, that article 
14 does not rule out classification for purposes of legislation. This power 
is not without limitation. The classification must not be arbitrary. It must 
always rest upon some real and substantial distinction bearing reasonable 
and just relation to the needs in respect of which the classification is 
made. 
The Article 14 has come p for interpretation and adjudication 
before the Supreme Court in a catena of cases. These pronouncements 
have established certain important principles which further elucidate the 
scope of permissible classification. These may be stated as under. '^' 
1. a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single 
individual if, on account of some special circumstance, or reasons 
applicable to him may be treated as a class by himself. 
2. There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of 
an enactment. 
3. it must be presumed that the legislature understand and correctly 
appreciates the need of its own people. 
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4. The legislature is free to regulate and recognize the harm and may 
confine its restoration to those cases where the need is deemed to 
be clearest. 
5. to presume the constitutionality of an enactment, the court may 
take into consideration matters of common knowledge, common 
report, history etc. 
6. a classification need not be scienfifically perfect or logically 
complete. 
7. the validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its over all 
effect and not by picking up exceptional cases. 
The category of cases and ratio thereunder which are important 
and evolved, developed and nourished the concept of equality may be 
quoted so follows: 
a. Special circumstances may validly justify "single persons 
laws.^ ^ 
b. Classificafion of special court may be valid if it is 
reasonable.^^ 
c. Classification based on race and denial to innocent person 
of equal right of opportunity is unconstitutional. 
Classification based on language is valid.^ ^ 
d. Classification of morality is not elevant.** 
e. Classification of fixing a date- It can always be dubbed as 
arbitrary even if no particular reasons forthcoming.*' 
f Article 14 is to be understood in the light of Direcfive 
principles of state policy.^" 
g. Supreme Court's direction to the state to pay to all the 
pensioners whether retired before January 1980 or 
thereafter the benefit of new rules of pensions.*' 
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h. Classification based on educational qualification is valid." 
i. Classification based on historical and geographical reasons 
is valid." 
Hence, it is submitted that in a secular country like India, we have 
to secure justice social, economic and political with liberty of thoughts, 
expression, faith and worship, equality of status, opportunity and 
fraternity assuring a dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. 
Thus, these provisions have been added to maintain equality in 
furtherance to the object of Constitution itself There were many kinds of 
discriminations on ground of religion, caste, race etc. at the time of 
commencement of the constitution. For instance, there were separate 
wells in villages for schedule castes and Tribes. Their entry to public 
shops, market and restaurants was prohibited. Their entry to other places 
of public resort and even to temples was prohibited although they were 
Hindus.'''' There is nothing wrong between Article 14,15 and 17. These 
provisions have been enacted for the advancement of socially and 
educationally backward classes so that the principles of equality, human 
rights and social justice could be upheld. 
Article 16 is another branch of the great tree of the concept of 
equality. It applies the universal principle that there should be equality of 
opportunity for all citizens in maters relating to public employment to any 
office of the state. And there should not be any discrimination on ground 
of religion, castes, race, sex and residence. Two decisions*' of Supreme 
Court have operated a new yardstick for determining the concept of 
equality in public employment. The first case was with regard to 
reservation of jobs to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The 
provisions were upheld and various arguments for alleged discrimination 
103 
were struck down. The other case was with regard to legibility for 
recruitment of airhostesses and their service conditions. Several service 
conditions were struck down to maintain the human rights and to secure 
the social justice to the members of weaker sex of the society at large. A 
classification of employees can, therefore, be made for first identifying 
and then distinguishing members of one class from those of another. 
In the case of State of Kerala V N.S. Thomasf"^ it was observed 
that classification, however, is fraught with the danger that it may 
produce artificial inequalities and, therefore, the right to classify is 
hedged in with salient restraints or else the guarantee of equality, will be 
submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws meant to govern 
well marked classes characterized by different and distinct attainments. 
Classification, therefore, must be truly founded on substantial difference 
which distinguish persons grouped together from those lefl out of the 
group and such differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation 
to the object sought to be achieved. But sub-section 4 of Article 16 
enshrines the principle of promotion to socially backward to secure social 
justice, to Scheduled castes and tribes and to other weaker sections of the 
society. It amounts to reasonable classification. In the case of Balaji V 
State of Mysore, it was propounded that reservation of more than half 
seats for being filled from members of backward classes was 
unconstitutional and invalid. 
In the case of P. Devdason V Union of India ^^ it was provided that 
the carry forward rule is unconstitutional and if no suitable candidate 
from weaker section is available then these posts should be filled up 
from the general candidates and then reservation should not be carried 
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forward next year for recruitment. Article 16(4) does not mean that the 
reservation should be provided ignoring the efficiency and merit. 
In the case of Stale of Kerala VN.M. Thorns *" it was observed that 
it must not be overlooked that efficacy and efficiency of administration is 
of paramount importance and that it would be unwise, retrograde and 
impermissible to have any reservation at the cost of administrative 
efficiency and efficacy. 
The contextualisation of principle of equality in Indian perspective 
would not be complete unless the relationship between fiindamental 
rights and directive principles of state policy in our constitutional order is 
understood, appreciation and extolled. Justice P.N. Bhagwati in the case 
of Minerva Mills V Union of India 70 in the following lines has aptly 
explained this relationship: 
"The genus of both is to be found in the freedom 
struggle which the people of India waged 
against the British rule. The leaders realized the 
supreme importance of the political and civil 
rights of the individual because they knew from 
their experience of the repression under the 
British rule that these rights are absolutely 
essential for dignity of men but at the same time 
they were conscious that in the socio-economic 
conditions that were prevalent in the country 
only as small fraction of the people would be 
able to enjoy these rights. There were millions 
of the people who were steeped in the poverty 
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and destitution and for them these civil and 
political rights had no meaning. It was realized 
that to the large majority of the people who are 
living almost under sub-human existence and 
for whom life is one long unbroken story of 
want and destitution, notions of individual 
freedom and liberty would sound an empty 
words banded about only in the drawing of 
bridge and well-to-do and the only solution for 
making these rights meaningful to them was to 
remake the material conditions in a new social 
order where socio-economic justice will inform 
all institutions in public life so that the 
preconditions of fundamental liberties for all, 
may be secured. The national leaders, therefore, 
laid the greatest stress on the necessity of 
insurance and economic justice." 
This is a re-statement of views of the members of the 
Constitutional Assembly who envisioned an India of and wedded to the 
principles of equality and rule of law. Even Franklin Roosevelt, way back 
in the year 1944, urged that: 
"Basic essential to peace is a decent standard of 
living for all individual men and women and 
children in all nations. Freedom from fear is 
eternally linked with freedom from want— 
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We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual 
freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. 
"Necessitous men are not free man. People who are hungry and out of a 
job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made.''' 
In the same view Justice V.R. Krishnan Iyer has sanctified the 
basis of equality in the lines below: 
"Economic foundations of human rights have 
always been emphasized as emerging from faith 
in the dignity of man and equality among men 
and women without which civil and political 
rights are but balderdash."^^ 
Now, it is a basic precept of a just legal system that we should 
compensate those who are not responsible for what has happened to them. 
Moreover, members of the Dalit community lack access to land because 
of the practices of discrimination that others have unleashed upon them. 
They may have been, for example, bom into a Dalit household that has 
been systematically denied access to any resource to the basic conditions 
that make a life of dignity possible.^^ The reasons for their poverty and 
lack of social status lie outside their control. 
This, we make the move from formal to substantive equality, from 
equalitarianism to egalitarianism. And it is this feature of equality that 
makes it a desirable principle for any society claiming to be an egalitarian 
democracy. Therefore, we accept the principle of historical compensation 
or reservation as an integral feature of our polity. However, historical 
compensation is fraught with three ''' problem, all of which have come to 
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bedevil contemporary societies, particularly India. First, there is always 
the danger that the concept will be hijacked both by political groups and 
by political parties for various purposes, notably for inclusion in 
reservation by the former and consolidation of vote banks by the later. 
The problem here is that the concept of reservation has been stripped of 
its normative concerns and has acquired have and colour only in terms of 
political strategy. And that political strategies can prove profoundly 
amoral has been repeatedly shown by our recent history, particularly the 
history of electoral politics. The transformation of reservation from a 
politically normative concept to pragmatic politics carries its own 
problems, of which the main one is that society loses confidence in the 
normative desirability of preferential policies. They become both 
contentions and a cause for some resentment. The second problem is that 
our society has come to be overcome by what is known as the "cult of the 
victim." In fact, most of us are somewhat dumbfounded by the eagerness 
with which communities are this point needs to be attended to, narratives 
of victimization can be easily appropriated by any group to argue that it 
has been swindled by history. Third, therefore, the concept of justice is 
reduced to juggling between particular interests. And in a parallel 
process, the holders of power as they juggle between competing claims of 
victimization. In effect, the politics of reservation has bestowed enormous 
power on the state to divide people, align certain of these groups with 
power structures, and neutralize the claims of those who should be heard. 
It has simply aided the holders and potential holders of power to forge 
political constituencies in ways that have nothing to do with the 
normative claim of preferential treatment. 
It is axiomatic from the on going discourses on the principles of 
equality that equality is a human entitlement since time immemorial, it is 
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inherent, and it is inalienable. Every human struggle, every human 
movement, every human culture and every human inquisition has always 
been in quest of equality in every period of human history. Rule of law in 
England, peace under U.N. Charter and equality clauses in the 
constitution of India are the manifestations of equality principles. The 
classifications, if any, have been made on reasonable ground must not 
only be reasonable to maintain the harmonious relations between 
fundamental rights and directive principles of equality with all its 
dimensions, human rights and social justice as enshrined in the Preamble 
to the Constitution of India. The fundamental rights of equality principles 
must be enforced while keeping in view the mandate and constitutional 
obligations provided under part fourth of the Constitution. 
Although, fifty years ago at the time of the framing the 
constitution, there was genuine shame among the upper castes at the way 
the Scheduled Castes had been treated for thousands of years. For that 
reason, special privilege were enshrined for them in the Constitution. 
That goodwill the Scheduled Castes commanded, that concern for their 
welfare, has now eroded. It is sad to say but it must be said that poverty is 
big business. There is much money to be made, much power to be 
required by being active on poverty issues. That makes poverty a 
resources; removing it a loss of capital. So, for India's politicians 
Scheduled Castes votes are valuable but not their welfare. All Scheduled 
Castes and other weaker sections will enjoy social mobility when they are 
treated not as a caste but as people on the basis of the principles of 
equality, rule of law, human rights and social justice. 
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SOCIO-POLITICAL JUSTICE TO THE 
WEAKER CLASSES 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
The constitution of India through the various principles laid 
down in it covers all most every aspect of life. The main object of the 
framers of the constitution was to ensure social, educational economic 
& political equality amongst the peoples.' Though the constitution aims 
to create the impartial treatment to all citizens but even then a large 
portion of citizens are far behind to the advanced segment of the 
society. 
The citizens who are behind in the race of development 
basically belong to the Scheduled Cast, Scheduled Tribes and 
Backward classes. The different provisions are given in the constitution 
especially Art. 15(4) & 16(4) are there to protect their educational, 
economic and political interest by according them a preferential 
treatment in above-mentioned fields. The word socialism brought into 
the preamble and its sweep was elaborately considered by the apex 
court in several judgements that the meaning of the word socialism in 
the preamble of the constitution was expressly brought in to establish 
an egalitarian social order through the rule of law as its basic structure 
and means to crystallize a social state securing to its people socio-
economic & political justice by interplay of Fundamental Rights and 
the Directive Principles.^ Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in his closing speech on 
the draft Constitution on 25"' Nov. 1949 stated "What we must do is 
not to be attained with mere political democracy; we must make out 
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political democracy a social democracy as well. Political democracy 
cannot last long unless there lies on the basis of it a social democracy.. 
Social democracy means a way of life which recognizes liberty, 
equality, fraternity as principles of life considering the historical 
perspective confronting the framers of the Constitution in drafting the 
constitution, it was stated that one of the important objective to be 
translated into action was to take special care of the backward classes 
and the members of scheduled caste and scheduled tribes by bringing 
them to the fore through pragmatic approach and providing adequate 
opportunities for their amelioration and development. The main 
objective was to provide social & political justice to them in its true 
spirit. 
B. GENESIS OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL JUSTICE 
Historically, what stated as social upliftment measures for the 
down-trodden amongst Hindus in some princely States gradually 
developed into foundation of various association in different States 
encouraged by the social demonstration of backwardness for claiming 
preferential treatment injected in the society by communal 
representation. Consequently, Mahatama Gandhi adopted the outcasts 
of the system as "Children of God" but took long years to shed his 
advocacy of the "Varna System" scheme. In the same manner C. 
Rajgopalachari, who spearheaded the Dalits temple entry movement 
sponsored an educational experiment that seemed to promote the 
system of hereditary occupations and thus elicited a strong protest in 
his home state. 
"It is easier to give power but difficult to give wisdom". Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar quoted this Burke's thought in the Constituent 
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Assembly Debate and exhorted let us prove by our conduct that we 
have not only the power but also the wisdom to carry with us all sectors 
of the country which is bound to lead us to unity, integrity, stability and 
prosperity. In pre-Independence India the Acts of 1909, 1919, & 1935 
introduced separate electorate system for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, 
Anglo-Indians and Scheduled Caste. But this system was against the 
equality and national unity and was rejected and a concept of universal 
adult franchise was developed in national interest with reservation for 
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes only under Article 330, 332, 
334, 335, 338 and 339 of the Indian constitution. 
The Constitutional history of India discloses that the history of 
representation of the depressed classes in the Indian legislature is of 
recent origin. It appears that the Government of India Act, 1858, 1861, 
and 1892 did not bring any relief whatsoever to the Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. They never figured any where nor was there 
anyone to put them on the map of political representation. They were 
so far unheard and unsung.^ The depressed classes again did not find 
any representation nor any safeguard in the Government of India Act, 
1909. But the peoples were not satisfied with the arrangements made 
under abovementioned enactments. 
It was, however, for the first time in the political history of India 
in 1917 that the move to give representation to Scheduled Caste in 
Indian legislature was initiated by some of the associations such as 
Panchama-Kavli Abhivarthi-Abhimana Sangha a Madras presidency 
untouchable association.* After the famous declaration in the House of 
commons on Aug. 20, 1917, Montague, the then secretary of State for 
India came to India to study the different shades of political opinion. 
All sort of organizations, all sorts of interest, all sorts of demands 
16 
gushed forth among them, appeared before him in Nov. and December 
1917, the demand of giving representation to the depressed classes in 
the Indian legislatures. The result was that Franchise Committee 
(Southborough Committee) 1918-19 recommended for each provincial 
council the nomination from depressed classes.' Sir C. Shankaran Nair 
said, "The Non-Brahmans and the depressed classes have awakened to 
a sense of their political helplessness and to their wretched condition, 
and no longer content to rely upon the Government which has left them 
in longer content to rely upon the Government which has left them in 
this condition for the past hundred years, claims powerftil voice, in the 
determination of their future. It is enough to say that they want half the 
members of all the Executive councils, including the viceroy's to be 
Indians, and an elected majority in all the legislative councils, without 
the checks provided by the Grand Committees and state councils, their 
interest being adequately protected by what is called communal 
representation.* 
The impact of the statement made by Sir, C.Shankaran Nair in a 
minute dissent to First Dispatch on Indian Constitution Reform, March 
5, 1919 was that there was wide spread awakening in the depressed 
classes and consequently they started clamoring for adequate 
representation.' 
The result of the First Dispatch on Indian Constitutional Reform 
was that the existence of depressed classes was recognized for the first 
time in Indian History under the Government of India Act, 1919 with 
the result that among the fourteen non-official members nominated by 
the Governor-General to the Central Legislative Assembly, one was the 
representative of the depressed classes. In the provincial Legislature 
four nominations in the central provinces two in Bombay, two in Bihar 
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and one each in Bengal and united provinces represented the depressed 
classes. In Madras ten members were nominated to represent nine 
specified depressed classes. 
(i). Simon Commission: The British Policy 
The Act of 1919 could not solve the constitutional problems. 
The Indian National Congress at its annual session in 1919 condemned 
the reforms as inadequate and unsatisfactory. The political activities of 
Indian leaders became more vigorous. It led to further deterioration of 
the working of the governmental machinery. Realizing the situation as 
serious the British Government in pursuance of the provision contained 
in the Act of 1919 announced the appointment of the India Statutory 
Commission better known as the Simon Commission after the name of 
its Chairman, Sir John Simon. In November 1927, the Commission was 
appointed. It landed at Bombay on February 3, 1928, to commence the 
work of re-examination of the Indian problem as declared in the Act of 
1919. The Commission consisted of seven Englishmen as members. Its 
non-India character was not acceptable to almost all the Indian parties. 
The Congress party decided to boycott the Commission at every stage 
and in every form. The Commission was shown black flags with 
slogans 'Go back Simon'. In order to seek cooperation the Central 
Government appointed a committee for British India, and every 
Legislative Council elected its provincial committee to work with the 
Simon Commission. Dr. Ambedkar along with other members was 
elected by the Bombay Legislative Council on August 3, 1928,'' to be 
on the Provincial Committee. Several memorials and representations of 
various depressed classes associations and organizations all over India 
were addressed to the Simon Commission highlighting the fact that 
these unfortunate brethren were leading a miserable lie. The Madras! 
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Adi Dravida in a manifesto explained that a very high percentage of the 
lower orders of the people in India had no habitation of their own. It 
was expressed openly that they were allowed by sufferance to live on 
the lands of the land-owing higher classes and were regarded no better 
than a chattels.'^ The representations made by various depressed 
classes organizations to the Simon Commission show that these classed 
had virtually lost patience to tolerate injustices. These organisations 
fearlessly explained that they had not even the right to safeguard their 
individual lives. The organizations of the depressed classes reminded 
the Simon Commission of the fact that the depressed class all over 
India have awakened to the point of asserting themselves and 
displaying boldness never shown by them in the history of India. To 
quote B.G. Mandal, 
"The jugglers talk of equality and fraternity but their sympathies 
are lip deep. They have been giving us bluffs for the last five thousand 
years. The so-called patriots of India demand political rights, but they 
are not ready to give social rights to their own country men.'^ 
All these pressures, exerted by the different depressed classes 
organizations compelled the Simon Commission to suggest lO(Ten) 
reserved seats for depressed classes. Dr. Ambedkar, however, was not 
satisfied and hence he said, "the safety of depressed classes lay in being 
independent of government and the congress. We must shape our cause 
ourselves."''* 
He laid down emphasis on the improvement of social manner 
and habits by the depressed classes. He was firmly of the view that 
political power could not be a panacea for the ills of the depressed 
classes. He believed that their solution lies in their social elevation. 
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They must clean their evil habits. They must improve their bad ways of 
living. They must be educated. All these will result in the emancipation 
of the depressed classes and establishment of such a society in the 
country of ours in which one man will have one value in all domains of 
life, political, social, and economic.'^ 
After the condemnation of Simon Commission by the people of 
India, the British Government called the First Round Table Conference 
in London. The Conference failed, as it was not attended by the Indian 
political leaders who were mostly in jail, due to Civil Disobedience 
Movement launched by Mahatama Gandhi. The British Government 
did not consider it proper to proceed with the framework of ftiture 
constitutional reforms without participation of Indian National 
Congress. It was then thought to call Second Round Table Conference. 
In the meanwhile efforts were made to bring about reconciliation 
between the Congress and the government. The efforts of Sir Tej 
Bahadur Sapru and Sir M.R. Jayakar succeeded and resulted into the 
famous Gandhi-Irwin Pact, which was signed in 1931. The government 
released all the political prisoners and Mahatama Gandhi withdrew the 
Civil Disobedience Movement. Mahatama Gandhi then went to London 
to attend the Conference as the sole representative of the Congress. 
Besides a number of issues the communal problem was specifically 
discussed but the conference ended without any definite conclusion. 
Dr. Ambedkar who was representing the interest of untouchable 
wanted Gandhiji to make a clear-cut commitment for safeguarding the 
special representation of the depressed classes. Gandhiji spoke on two 
occasions before the Committees'^ which were constituted, to work 
out the issues to be taken up by the Round Table Conference. 
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Ambedkar was disappointed when Gandhi referred the problem of 
special representation claimed by the different communities who said: 
'The Congress has reconciled itself to special 
treatment of the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh tangle. 
There arc sound historical reasons for it. But the 
Congress will not extend that doctrine in any 
shape or form."'^ 
From this extract of Gandhiji's speech it became clear to 
Ambedkar that Gandhiji was not prepared to give any political 
recognition to any community other than Muslims and Sikhs. He was 
not prepared to recognize the Anglo-Indian the depressed classes and 
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the Indian Christians. Ambedkar then declared that if the depressed 
classes were not to be recognized in the fliture Constitution of India as 
was done by the minorities sub-committee during the first session of 
the Round Table Conference, he would neither join that particular 
committee nor whole-heartedly support the proposition for 
adjournment.'^ Gandhiji's reluctance to support Ambedkar's demand 
came to light. That followed a reaction in the quarters of depressed 
classes all over India. The All-India Depressed Classes Conference, 
under the Presidentship of Rao Bahadur M.C. Rajah at Gurgaon session 
declared that Gandhiji was misrepresenting the case of the 
untouchables and strongly denounced the claim made by Gandhiji that 
the Congress had taken care of the untouchables from the beginning 
and had championed the cause of the untouchables. I say, said Rajah, 
the President of the Conference, 'that these statements are untrue'.^ "^ 
The Conference supported the demands put forth by Ambedkar 
and declared that no Constitution would be acceptable to the depressed 
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classes which did not include in it the system of separate electorates for 
the depressed classes/' However, when the British Premier noticed that 
there was no unanimous solution of the minorities problem, he asked 
all the members of the Minorities Committee to sign a requisition 
authorizing him to settle the communal problem and to pledge for 
acceptability of his decision. Gandhiji signed this pledge along with 
other members. Ambedkar did not sign this requisition. The Prime 
Minister then adjourned the Conference on December 1. Gandhiji left 
for India and reached Bombay on December 28, 1931. 
The depressed class people were totally unsatisfied with the 
developments of Gandhi-Ambedkar dialogue with the result hostile 
demonstrations were resorted to. Ultimately, it was clear that nothing 
could be expected from an agreement in such a way for the disposal of 
the communal issue and the British Government decided to give its 
won formula regarding the same. Ramsay MacDonald, thereafter gave 
his famous 'award' known as the 'communal award' on August 17, 
1932.^ ^ 
(ii). The Communal Award: Divide & Rule Policy 
Keeping in view the pressure from all comers, the 'Communal 
Award' of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald was announced. The most 
important part of the award relating, to the depressed classes was, 
"Members of the depressed classes qualify to vote will vote in a 
general constituency. In view of the fact that for a considerable period 
those classes would be unlikely by the means alone, to secure adequate 
representation in the legislature, a number of special seats will be 
assigned to them. These seats will be filled by election from special 
constituencies in which only members of 'depressed classes', 
122 
electorally qualified, will be entitled to vote. Any person voting in such 
a special constituency will, as stated above, be also entitled to vote in a 
general constituency. It is intended that these constituencies should be 
formed in selected areas where the depressed classes are most 
numerous, and that,-except in Madras, they should not cover the whole 
area of province."" 
His Majesty's Government did not consider that these special 
depressed classes constituencies would be required for more than a 
limited time. They intended that the constitution should provide that 
they should come to an end after twenty years if they had not 
previously been abolished under the general powers of the electoral 
revision. Perhaps Macdonald Award was a singular victory for Dr. 
Ambedkar and the politicians in the country can't ignore recognition of 
the fact that the depressed classes shall have to be taken into 
confidence, for a fiiture set-up or constitution of India and in future 
their existence. To quote Ramsay Macdonald, "We felt it our duty to 
safeguard what we be believed to be the right of the depressed classes 
to a fair proportion of representation in the legislature, we are equally 
careful to do nothing that would split off their community from the 
Hindu world."^ "^  The Macdonald award was a great Shock to Mahatma 
Gandhi and when this communal award was announced, granting 
separate, electorates to the depressed classes, Gandhiji declared his 
resolve to fast unto death. If the separate electorate for depressed 
classes were not abolished. Ultimately, an historic agreement known as 
Poona Act was reached on September 24, 1932. The man text of the 
Poona Act *^ was as follows: 
1. There shall be seats reserved for the depressed classes out of the 
general electorate seats in the provincial Legislatures. 
123 
2. Election to these shall be joint electorates subject however to the 
following procedure: 
All the members of the depressed classes 
registered in the general electoral role in a 
constituency will form an electoral college, 
which will elect a panel of four candidates 
belonging to the depressed classes for each of 
such reserved seats by the method of single 
vote. The four persons, getting the highest 
number of votes in such primary election, shall 
be candidates for election, by general electorate. 
3. Representation of the depressed classes in the Central 
Legislature shall likewise be on the principle of joint electorate 
and reserved seats by the method of primary election. 
4. In the Central Legislature, 18% of the seats allotted to general 
electorate of British India shall be reserved for the depressed 
classes. 
5. The system of primary election of a panel of candidates for 
election for central provincial legislature shall come to an end 
after the first ten years, unless terminated sooner by mutual 
agreement under the provision of clause 6 below. 
6. The system of representation of the depressed classes by 
reserved seats in the provincial and central legislatures as 
provided for in clause 1 & 4, shall contribute until determined 
by mutual agreement between the communities concerned in the 
settlement. 
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The Poona pact was in fact of manifest material advantage to the 
depressed classes, which formed the basis of their representation in the 
Government of India Act, 1935. 
By the end of 1940's the preferential treatment of the depressed 
classes through the policy of reservation had become a hard reality, the 
nation's politico-constitutional life and the nation could not afford to 
divert the beneficiaries of the reservation policy. What could be done at 
the time of the framing of constitution was a compromising approach 
with ultimately goal of assimilation of all the classes of the people into 
the mainstream of national life. By the end of independence, 
consciousness had given way to equalitarian humanism. '^' 
After Independence the Government of India Act, 1935 was 
replaced by Constitution of India 1950, it incorporated the concept of 
equality upon which the governmental machinery was to be carried on. 
The Constitution discarded many such things which were in 
contradiction to equality and the system of separate election under the 
communal award was the one which the Constituent Assembly 
replaced with the 'Universal Franchise'.^^ A right to vote was conferred 
on every adult citizen irrespective of caste, religion, statute and sex etc. 
But in view of the sequence of events that took place in the past, 
regarding the protection of depressed classes, the framers of the 
Constitution could not avoid to give them better and secured position 
and had to reserve seats for the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes in 
Lok Sabha under Article 330 and Vidhan Sabha under Article 332 in 
proportion to their population. 
The reasons being that the scheduled castes and tribes had been 
in a position of disadvantage. They were not in a position to compete 
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with the advanced sections of the society on a footing of equality. 
Under the Article 334 the reservation were originally subjected to a 
time limit of 10 years i.e. only upto January 25, 1960. But this period 
was extended to 20 years by the Constitution (English Amendment) 
Act 1959 and again to 30 years by the Constitution (Twenty Third 
amendment) Act 1969 and still further extended to 40 years by the 
Constitution (45* Amendment) Act 1979, enforced from January 26, 
1980. Initially it was thought that the 10-year time limit would be 
enough to bring those communities to the level of others, but 
continuous extension of the period indicates that the results of 
reserving seats were quite positive and perhaps this period may be 
extended further if the situation does not improve satisfactorily. The 
scheduled castes and tribes come to the Legislatures through election 
whereas Anglo-Indian community is nominated by the President to the 
Lok Sabha seats (Article 331) and by the governor in the case of state 
(Article 333). The Constitution only guarantees that seats would be 
reserved for them in such number as would be commensurate with their 
population. 
Tlie Constitution, therefore, ensures that the interests of these 
people are appropriately protected and thus it enables them to 
participate in the national life. Some new castes in the list of those 
getting reservation benefits have been added which led to increase in 
the population of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. Thus the 
number of reserved constituencies has to be increased by decreasing 
the general constituencies. For example in 1976, the scheduled caste 
population was 14. per cent of the total population and they had 78 
seats reserved in the Lok Sabha and 540 seats in the various Vidhan 
Sabhas. Likewise, the scheduled tribes population was 6.09 per cent of 
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the total population and had 38 seats reserved in the Lok Sabha and 282 
scats in the Vidhan Sabhas. After the 1976 amendment of the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act, their respective 
population became 15.5 per cent and 7.5 Percent of the total 
population. Accordingly the seats reserved for them ere 79 and 40 seats 
in the Lok Sabha and 620 and 302 in various Vidhan Sabhas 
respectively. This trend has often been resented by anti-reservations. 
The Constitution provides for allocation of seats in Lok Sabha 
and to the several states upon the completion of each decennial census. 
Articles 82 provides that upon the completion of each census the 
allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha to the states and the division of 
each state into territorial constituencies, shall be readjusted by such 
authority and in such manner as Pariiament may determine by law. 
Clause (3) of Article 170 makes similar provision in regard to the seats 
in the State Legislative Assemblies and the division of the states into 
territorial constituencies. In pursuance to these provisions Pariiament 
enacted, on the lines of an earlier Act of 1952 although with a some 
important difference, the Delimitation Commission Act 1962. 
C. THE DELIMITATION LAW: ITS ROLE AND WORKING 
Delimitation Commission^* is not a permanent body but is only 
appointed for determining and demarcating constituencies before the 
election. The body is appointed by the Pariiament and submits the 
report to it. The functions of the Commission under the Act are: 
1. To determine, on the basis of the latest census figure and having 
regard to the provisions of Articles 81, 170, 330, and 332, 
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(a) The number of scats in Lok Sabha to be allocated to each 
state and the number of seats, if any, to be reserved for 
the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes of the states 
and 
(b) The total number of seats to be assigned to the legislative 
assembly of each state and the number of seats, if any, to 
be reserved for the scheduled castes and for the scheduled 
tribes of the state. 
2. To divide each state into territorial constituencies and delimit 
them. 
The constituencies for the Lok Sabha in 1977 and 1980 were the 
same. For the 1977 elections, Delimitation Commission constituted 
under the Delimitation Act 1972 determined the constituencies. The 
Delimitation Commission divided the country into 542 single number 
parliamentary constituencies including 78 reserved for scheduled castes 
and 38 for scheduled tribe and allocated them to the 22 states and to 9 
union territories. Subsequently seats reserved for scheduled castes were 
increased from 78 to 79 and 38 to 40 for scheduled tribes, in 
accordance with the provisions in the Schedule Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act 1976. It is not necessary to delimit 
constituencies afresh due to the formation of a new state or the transfer 
of areas from one state to another. In such cases the Parliament 
invariably vests the delimitation power in the Election Commission." 
At the time of elections the Election Commission prepares detailed 
rules which provide important guidelines in conducting the affair 
pertaining to elections. The general as well as scheduled castes and 
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schedule tribes constituencies for the 1984 General Elections continued 
to be the same as were under the 1980 Elections. 
(i). Election Commission and Rules Thereunder. 
The most striking feature of the Indian Constitution is its 
adoption of democracy on the basis of adult franchise. Undoubtedly it 
has implications far beyond its political significance i.e. break down of 
feudal traditions and system of separate electorate. Many social groups 
who had no right to vote or were unaware of their strength are now able 
to chose their representatives. The Constitution undoubtedly puts the 
process of political system into the hands of every adult through which 
they are not, only able to enforce their rights but can also seek to affirm 
their right to equality. These aspects are the very foundation of 
democracy. The success of democracy, therefore, rests upon fair and 
free elections. The Constitution establishes the democratic form of 
government both at the centre and in the states and has made suitable 
administrative arrangements to ensure free and fair elections. Part XV 
of the Constitution (Articles 324 to 329) deal with the matters of 
elections. Article 324 has created a centralized agency in the shape of 
the Election Commission, which has an overall charge of all the 
matters pertaining to election. 
The Constitution protects the issues of delimitation of 
constituencies from judicial scrutiny and ensures elections at the proper 
time. Article 329 (a) provides that the matters concerning the validity 
of any law relating to delimitation of constituencies will not be 
questioned in any court. This is done with a view to ensuring that 
elections are held at the proper time and are not required to be 
postponed because of judicial interference."'" Clause (b) or Article 329 
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takes away the jurisdiction of the courts between the commencement of 
the polling and the final election."'' The judicial power merely decides 
whether a person has a right to get his name included in the electoral 
list or whether he is subject to one of the prescribed disqualifications." 
In view of the above, no significance can be attached to any challenge 
which affects the 'election' and any irregularity committed while it is 
in progress. Earlier, the election disputes were submitted to the 
Election tribunals through election petitions but the Nineteenth 
Amendment to the Constitufion in 1966 abolished these after having 
deleted certain word from Article 324(1), which resulted in speedy 
disposal of election cases. Representation of the People act, 1951 has 
elaborate provisions for ensuring fair elections and the practices, which 
may vitiate the validity of the election, are mentioned therein. Thus, the 
matters relating to elections to the Parliament and the States are 
controlled and supervised by the Central Government in view of the 
vast diversities existing in India from one state to another state and 
regions, on the basis of various factors like language, religion and 
culture. Centralized election machinery could be the only agency to 
conduct the elections fairly and ensure adult suffrage. It was indeed 
proposed in the Constituent Assembly that there should be separate 
Commissions for the states and the centre but the proposal was not 
accepted because it was brought to the notice both of the Drafting 
Committee as well as of the central Government that in provinces the 
executive government is instructing or managing things in such a 
manner that those people who do not belong to them either racially, 
culturally or linguistically, are being excluded from being brought on 
the electoral rolls. Since franchise is a most fundamental thing in a 
democracy, no person who is entitled to be brought on the electoral 
130 
rolls, should be excluded merely as a result of the prejudice of a local 
government, or the whim of an officer."'^  
The centralized election agency was thus envisaged as a national 
necessity to curb and thwart any intention of any state government to 
push the regionalism through the preparation of electoral list.'''* The 
Constitution thus provides for a permanent agency headed by the Chief 
Election Commissioner who is a whole-time official. The reasons as to 
why the office of the Election Commissioner should be a permanent 
office is 'that the skeleton machinery would always be available' which 
may also meet the need in the event of a bye-election that may take 
place at any time. Furthermore, an assembly may be dissolved before 
its period of five years has expired. Consequently, the electoral rolls 
will have to be kept up-to-date all the time so that the new election may 
take place without» any difficulty. These agencies were deemed 
sufficient to have permanently the office of the Chief Election 
Commissioner. 
The Election Commission consists of the Chief Election 
Commissioner, and such number of other Election Commissioners as 
the President may from time to time fix. The Chief Election 
Commissioner is a whole-time official to be appointed by the 
Parliament. He acts a Chairman of the Election Commission. To enable 
him to function impartially and fearlessly, he enjoys security of tenure, 
in as much as he cannot be removed from his office except in like 
manner and on the like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court, and 
the conditions of service cannot be varied to his disadvantage after 
appointment. He, thus, enjoys all the appurtenances of a Supreme Court 
judge. Further, any other Election Commissioner or a regional 
Commissioner cannot be removed from office except on the 
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recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. His salary as 
well as the expenditure on the staff of the Election Commission is a 
charge on the Consolidated Fund of India, thus, not subject to the vote 
of Parliament. 
The Election Commission performs the following functions: 
a. It undertakes proper preparation and maintenance of the 
electoral rolls. It directs and controls the annual 
preparation or revision of electoral rolls in all states and 
fixes programmes connected therewith. 
b. It appoints Chief Electoral Officer for each State in 
consultation with the government concerned. Electoral 
Registration Officers, Returning Officers, and Assistant 
Returning Officers, for each assembly and parliamentary 
constituency. The Revising Authorities are appointed by 
the state governments with the approval of the 
Commission to decide claims and objections during the 
preparation of the electoral rolls. 
c. It superintends elections to fill vacancies occurring from 
time to time in Parliament as well as state legislatures. 
d. The commission receives election petitions challenging 
the validity of elections. The Commission appoints 
Election Tribunals for their hearing, can withdraw the 
petition pending before the Tribunal and transfer to other 
tribunal at any stage after notice to parties and for reasons 
to be recorded. 
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e. The Commission decides whether a contesting candidate 
has failed to lodge his account of election expenses 
within the time or in the prescribed manner. The decision 
is announced in the gazette, and the candidate is informed 
about it, 
f. It advises the President or the Governor (as the case may 
be) in deciding whether a member of Parliament or a 
member of the state legislature (as the case may be) has 
incurred any of the disqualifications. 
g. It is the duty of the Commission to re-determine the 
number of seats to be reserved for scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes in Lok Sabha and state legislatures, and 
to amend the former Delimitation Commission's final 
order wherever necessary as provided by the Act. 
h. The Chief Election Commissioner is an ex-officio 
member of the Delimitation Commission, which is an 
independent Commission, set up fi-om time to time, is 
more or less judicial in character, and is entrusted with 
the task of readjustment or delimitation of constituencies. 
i. The Election Commission has the authority to order the 
production and inspection of election papers while in the 
custody of returning officers. This was done, in April 
1962, by the Central Government through an amendment 
of the Conduct of Election Rules. Till recently, only a 
competent court or tribunal was authorized to pass orders 
in this regard. As a result of difficulties experienced 
during the third General Election, it became necessary to 
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vest these powers in the Election Commission also. The 
election papers include packets of unused ballot papers, 
packets of used ballot papers whether valid, tendered or 
rejected, packets of the marked copy of the electoral roll, 
and the attestation of signatures of electors. 
Besides, the above functions of Elections Commission the 
Constitution provides for appointment of other officers to assist the 
Chief Election Commissioner. Setting up organizational units at state 
level and district level and constituency level carries on the electoral 
machinery. The central authority issues instructions, directives, 
circulars and exercises general supervision and control over the 
preparation and revision of the electoral rolls. The election of a big 
country like India is not an easy task. It involves a huge army of skilled 
and efficient persons on whom the responsibility is placed. 
(ii). Rotation of the Reserved Constituencies 
The reservation of seats for scheduled cases and scheduled tribes 
seeks to gives them sufficient representation in the Union and State 
Legislatures. The reservation provision is temporary and originally it 
was to be enforced for ten years. It was expected that during this period 
often years they would progress and would be able to compete with the 
rest of the society on a footing of equality. But it was felt that ten years 
time was insufficient and that the schedule castes and scheduled tribes 
needed reservation for a longer period of time. The period often years 
was extended to twenty and afterwards to thirty years which has fiirther 
been extended by ten years.^ ^ The extension of time thus automatically 
maintains the reservation policy of seats. Since reserving any particular 
seats permanently could be undemocratic and might foster vested 
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interests and perpetuate separatist feelings causing hindrance to the 
growth of nationalism. Thus the principle of rotation was suggested. 
No constituency would thus remain earmarked forever for the 
scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes. On the other hand the 
principle of rotation will lead to diffusion and disposal of beneficent 
influences that radiate from the reserved seats. This may enable the 
members of the scheduled castes and tribes residing at different places 
in the state to get an opportunity of being trained and participate in the 
political leadership. Viewed from the angle of democratic principle the 
making of a constituency as 'reserved' for all the time makes the 
meaning of at least democracy redundant to the bulk of those voters in 
that constituency, who are outside the category of the reserved classes. 
The right to vote would be of less value unless accompanied by a right 
to seek election, which a reserved constituency obviously debars. The 
system of rotation has the advantage of removing a disability, which is 
not of a permanent nature. 
(iii). The Concept of Double-Membership Constituency 
The adoption of principle of rotation helped abolishing the 
double-member constituency with the enactment of the Two-member 
Constituencies (Abolition) Act, 1960, which was necessitated as a 
result of the Supreme Court decision m V.V. Giri v D.S. Dora}^ 
Earlier in the first two elections, there had been double-member 
constituencies but after the Act of 1960, the concept of single member 
constituencies operates. 
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D. THE RESERVATION OF SEATS: AN 
UNPRECEDENTED STEP 
Indian being democratic state adopted the system of 'adult-
franchise'. The Constitution initially conferred on every person who is 
not less than twenty-one years of age, the rights to vote. There is to be 
one general role for every territorial constituency and no person is to be 
ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or can claim to be included in 
any special electoral roll on grounds only of religion, race, caste and 
•JO 
sect or any of them. The Constitution guarantees equality and 
prohibits discrimination which according to Laski is the crux of 
democracy. But a rule of equality enforced without taking into account 
the existing inequalities in social life would cause injustice and 
negation of democracy. As has already been discussed that Indian 
society is unequal and stratified. The lower straits of this social 
stratification have suffered politically. The Constitution undertook this 
great task and under different provisions provides assistance to remove 
their political backwardness by adopting the method of discriminating 
others in their favour. The groups of people who are to be assisted in 
political matters are the same i.e. scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 
These groups are given political assistance by reserving seats in 
Parliament and Legislative Assemblies. The reservation of seats in 
legislative forums was necessary since it is in the nature of a 
guaranteed representation and not a separate electorate. It primarily 
meant their representation and participation in the democratic 
flmctioning to make them aware of their political rights, which have 
been the main object of democracy. The reservation of seats or political 
assistance is a temporary arrangement and as such involves two 
important issues i.e. (a) what should be the basis of reservation of seats 
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in the legislatures, and (b) the extent of reservation. Both these issues 
are discussed below: 
(i). Reservation Criterion. 
The Constitution provides different basis for purposes of 
protective discrimination. Clause (4) of Article 15, the Constitution 
provides for making special provisions for the advancement of any 
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The identification of socially 
and educationally backwardness thus form the basis for the purposes of 
protective discrimination. Article 16(4) permits reservation of jobs in 
the state services for those who are backward and are inadequately 
represented in the state services. Accordingly, there are two bases 
firstly, backwardness and secondly, inadequate representation in the 
state services. In the absence of any definition of scheduled caste and 
scheduled tribes the Constitution authorizes the President,''" in 
consultation with the Governor of State, to specify the castes or tribes 
which are to be called as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Under 
this power the President has promulgated a number of orders giving 
lists of the castes and the tribes.**' The discretion of the President to 
designate castes as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is subject 
only to the power of Parliament under Article 341(2) and 342(2). The 
courts have so far not encouraged attempts to get such discretion 
judicially reviewed.''^  But the judiciary has the power to do so^ ^ as is 
done by it in cases of backward classes. 
The competency of a person to contest a reserved seat has 
frequently been questioned on the ground that the person does not 
belong to a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. The matter apparently 
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does not involve any dispute provided the caste on the basis of which 
the person is contesting the election is included in the Presidential 
Order. But when such a question is raised the court generally tries to 
find out whether the caste to which the person belongs is a sub caste or 
is only a different name for one of the castes mentioned in the 
Presidential Order or the law passed by the Parliament. The Supreme 
Court determined the issues involving 'caste' question in various 
cases'*"* wherein the court determined the right of a person to 
reservation on changing his religion and thereafter converting to his 
original one. The issue thus, is whether such a person would be entitled 
to the benefits of reservation. The Supreme Court has dealt with this 
issue in two cases.'*"'* 
The first case i.e. Arumugam's case"*^  involved the electoral 
issues. The appellant and the respondent had been opponents in 
electoral contest since long time as candidates from 68 KGF'*^  
constituencies for election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly. The 
constituency later became a reserved one for the members of scheduled 
castes and therefore, only such members could contest the election 
from this constituency. One of the castes that were included in the list 
was Adi Dravida for purposes of election from this constituency. 
Rajgopal filed his nomination as Adi Dravida and won the election. 
Arumugam challenged the election of Rajgopal on the ground that he 
was not an Adi Dravida on the date he filed the nomination. The 
Mysore High Court sustained the objection by taking Rajgopal as 
Christian. Rajgopal while sfill a minor became Chrisfian in 1949 to 
secure admission to high School and he asserted that he subsequently 
got reconverted into Hinduism. By an order dated 30"' August, 1949, 
the Mysore High Court held that the first respondent was converted to 
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Christianity in 1949 and on such conversion he ceased to be an Adi 
Dravida and, therefore, at the material date, he could not be said to be a 
member of scheduled caste, and was consequently ineligible for being 
chosen as candidate for election from a reserved constituency/^ 
On appeal the Supreme Court considered four basic questions; 
out of them two are relevant for our purposes. These are: 
1. Whether on conversion to Christianity he ceased to be an Adi 
Dravida 
2. Whether on reconversion to the Hindu fold he once again 
became a member of the Adi Dravida caste. 
As regards the first question the Supreme Court held that 'when 
once he became Christian he ceased to be a member of Adi Dravida 
caste.'*' As regards the second question i.e. reconversion to Hinduism 
fold, the court referred to a number of decisions of various High Court 
which laid down the principle that: 
"On reconversion to Hinduism a person can 
become a member of the same caste in which he 
was bom and to which he belonged before 
having been converted to another religion."'* "^ 
The Supreme Court did not pronounce any opinion on this point 
as Rajgopal had failed to establish that he subsequently became a 
member of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste after he embraced the Hindu 
caste religion.^' 
Again in 1972's elections to the Mysore State Assembly, Rajgopal and 
Arumugam both filed their nominations for reserved constituency. 
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Arumugam objected to the nomination of Rajgopal on the ground that 
he was not an Adi Dravida of Hindu religion at the date of filing 
nomination and he was therefore not qualified to stand as a candidate 
for the reserved constituency. Arumugam contended that Rajgopal was 
Christian, Rajgopal by saying that he was never converted to 
Christianity and even if it was held that he had become Christian, he 
got reconverted to Hinduism since long, and was accepted by the 
members of the Adi Dravida caste as belonging to their fold. He was, 
therefore, an Adi Dravida professing Hindu religion at the material date 
and hence qualified to stand as candidate. The Returning Officer, by an 
order dated 9"^  February, 1972, upheld Arumugam's objections and 
rejected the nomination papers of Rajgopal that on conversion to 
Christianity Rajgopal ceased to be an Adi Dravida and he could not 
claim the benefit of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 on 
his reconvesion. Arumugam obtained the highest number of votes in 
the election and was declared elected. 
Rajgopal challenged the election of Arumugam on the ground of 
improper rejection of his nomination paper. Rajgopal put forward 
twelve important circumstances subsequent to February 1972 as an 
authentic proof that he was accepted by the Adi Dravida caste as their 
member and as such he was, on the material date and Adi Drvida 
professing Hindu religion as required by the Constitution (Scheduled 
Castes) Order, 1950. The Mysore High Court accepting the contentions 
of Rajgopal, observed: 
"It is settled law that reconversion to Hinduism 
does not require any formal ceremony or rituals 
or expiatory ceremonies, that a reconvert to 
Hinduism can revert to his original Hindu caste 
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on acceptance that the quantum and degree of 
proof of acceptance depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case, according to the 
established customs prevalent in a particular 
locality amongst the caste there." 
The High Court held that Rajgopal's nomination was improperly 
rejected by the Returning Officer and accordingly declared the election 
to be void. 
Arumugam then came to Supreme Court in appeal. The 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court Bhagwati J. (as 
he then was) who delivered the judgment of the court referred to the 
definition of caste. He accepted the definition of caste given by the 
High Court of Madras in Coopoosami Chetty v. Duraisami Chetty as: 
"As caste is a voluntary association of persons 
for certain purposes. It is a persons governed by 
their own rules and regulations for certain 
internal purposes." 
Renunciation of a religion for another one and re-embracing the 
former faith often occurs in a society. What are then the legal and 
social consequences of such occurrences? The learned judge explained 
that it does not follow as an invariable rule that whenever a person 
renounces Hinduism and embraces another religious faith is 
automafically ceases to be a member of the caste in which he was bom 
and to which he belonged prior to his conversion. The court accepted 
the observations of Madras High Court in G. Michael's case"'''' that the 
general nile is that a convert ceases to have a caste as it is 
predominantly a feature of Hindu society, but that ultimately depends 
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upon the structure of the caste, its rules and regulations. Whether a 
person ceases to belong to the caste on his renunciation of Hindu faith, 
the able judge said: 
"It cannot, therefore be laid down as an absolute 
rule uniformly applicable in all cases that 
whenever a member of a caste is converted 
from Hinduism to Christianity, he losses his 
membership of the caste. It is true that 
ordinarily on conversion to Christianity, he 
would cease to be a member of the caste, but 
that is not an invariable rule. It would depend 
on the structure of the caste and its rules and 
regulations. There are castes, particularly in 
South India, where this consequence does not 
follow on conversion, since such castes 
comprise both Hindus and Christians'''* 
The court was convinced by the evidence adduced by Rajgopal 
in support of his contention and accepted that he was Adi Dravida, 
Bhagwati, J. referred all the important decisions of Madras High Court 
since 1886^* and asserted that the consistent view taken in this country 
has been that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again 
become a member of the caste in which he was bom and to which he 
belonged before conversion to another religion, if the members of the 
caste accept him as a member. The learned judge said "there is no 
reason either on principle or on authority which should compel us to 
disregard this view which has prevailed for almost a century and lay 
down a different rule on the subject. If a person who has embraced 
another religion can be reconverted to Hinduism there is no retrial 
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principle wiiy he should not be able to come back to his caste if other 
members of the caste are prepared to readmit him as a member. The 
Supreme Court accordingly sustained the views of the High Court.^ ^ 
For availing the benefits of the rule as contained in the Constitution 
Scheduled Caste Order 1950, the Supreme Court established that 
converts would be entitled for protective discrimination. 
The other case^^ in which similar issue was involved. The facts 
of the case are that one Johnson Tao was bom to Christian parents, 
originally belonging to the Mediga caste a schedule caste in Andhra 
Pradesh. He applied to seek admission to the Guntur Medical College 
on the basis of his belonging to a backward class, since in Andhra 
Pradesh the Christian coverts from untouchable have been recognized 
as such. He was refused admission on that basis. He then reconverted 
to the Hindu fold and changed his name to Mohan Rao, and obtained a 
certificate from the Tehsildar; certifying that he was Mediga by caste to 
apply for admission as a scheduled caste candidate. The Medical 
College admitted him but thereafter, cancelled his admission on the 
ground that he was not a Hindu by birth. This was done on the basis of 
note (b) Rule 2(c) of the Selection Rules which read : 
No candidate other than Hindu including Sikh 
can claim to belong to a scheduled caste. No 
candidate can claim to belong to the scheduled 
caste except by birth. 
Mohan Rao challenged the rule and the government counsel 
conceded that the rule was repugnant to paragraph 3** of the 
Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order 1950. A single judge of the 
Mysore High Court admitted the contentions of Mohan Rao on the 
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ground that his application for admission was rejected on the sole basis 
that he was not a Hindu by birth and not on the ground that he was not 
a Madiga by caste. The issue was considered to be of vital legal 
importance and was reheard by a division bench in appeal, which also 
upheld the decision of the single judge. The important socio-legal 
question that emerged out of the case is 'whether a person who was not 
a Hindu by birth can regain the caste of his parents on his reconversion 
? This aspect of the matter was touched upon in this case by the 
Supreme Court on appeal which stated that a candidate in order to be 
eligible for a reserved seat should be a member of scheduled caste by 
birth went beyond the provision of clause (3) of the Constitution 
(Scheduled Castes) Order 1950 and was rightly condemned as void. 
But the court observed that there was no absolute that a person would 
lose his caste on reconversion. It would depend upon the structure of 
the caste and its rules and regulation.^' The court following Arumugam 
case stated that the reasoning therein was equally applicable to a case 
where the parents were converted from Hinduism to Christianity and 
the child is bom after their conversion. On his becoming Hindu, if 
members of the caste to which his parents belonged before their 
conversion accept him as member of their fold, then he would be 
deemed to belong to that caste. The only condition for admission of a 
person as a member of the caste is the acceptance by other members of 
the caste. 
The conclusive effect of the decision is that a person who was a 
Christian on his conversion to the Hindu fold c^n regain the caste of his 
parents if other members of the caste accepted him. The outcome of the 
Supreme Court decision is that a person, acquires caste by his birth, can 
no longer be regarded as absolute, which is in consonance with the 
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approach already adopted by Bhagwati, J., in Arumugam's case. It is 
obviously a departure from the Madras decision in Mechael Pillai v. 
Barthe^^ wherein it was expressly held that 'caste is based on birth'. 
However, both these cases i.e. Arumugam and Guntur Medical College 
pose a problem for those who convert themselves to another religion 
and then reconvert to the original one in order to avail the benefits of 
protective discrimination. It also poses problem for the sate to identify 
them for the same purpose. The desire to have benefits arising out of 
reservation policy is manifested on wider plane. At point of time a 
large number of conversion took place. Many backward people 
embraced Buddism but after conversion they demanded that 
reservations available to scheduled castes should be extended in their 
favour also. There are instance where high caste people have declared 
themselves to be either scheduled caste or Harijan. A survey conducted 
by Civil Rights Enforcement Cell of the Government of Kamataka 
reveals that 'every year thousands of caste Hindus get themselves 
declared as Harijans to secure admission in professional colleges, jobs 
and promotions.^' Such practices are also prevalent in other state.^ ^ 
In an unreported case, " the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutional validity of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 
1950, as amended and ruled that it did not discriminate against 
Christians who earlier belonged to scheduled castes by excluding them 
from the benefits of reservation. In this case the Movement filed two 
writ petitions for Protection of Human Rights of Marginalis Committee 
and a Christian - convert. One of the petitioners who challenged the 
order was Mr Soosai, a Cobbler from Tamil Nadu, who belonged to the 
Adi-Dravida community (a scheduled caste community) before he 
embraced Christianity. He challenged the order as he was not given a 
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free 'bunk' because he was a Christian while others belonging to his 
caste who had continued to be Hindus were allotted such bunk by the 
Khadi and Village Industries Board under a central scheme. 
The other petition challenged a circular of the Tamil Nadu 
Government to the state public service commission stating that 
Christians reverting to Hinduism to obtain appointments against 
reserved quotas would lose them on reverting back to Christianity. 
A division bench of the court comprising the Chief Justice, Mr. 
P.N.Bahgwati, Mr. R.S. Pathak and Mr. Justice A.N. Sen, dismissed 
the two petitions and ruled that "it is not sufficient to show that the 
same caste continues after conversion.' The judges pointed out that 
under paragraph 3^ "* of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950, 
it must be shown that they suffer from a comparable depth of social and 
economic disabilities and cultural and educational backwardness and 
similar levels of degradation within the Christian community 
necessitating intervention by the state under the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
From this study of the decisions of the Supreme Court, it can be 
derived that the caste is a ftinctional aspect of the society and not 
related to birth. As such, the other important issue, which comes out of 
this approach of, the apex judiciary that if caste is not related with the 
birth then in the name of caste people would draw benefits through 
manipulation and also caste will perpetuate in the society. The 
Kamataka Civil Rights Cell indicates that the 'benefits' of reservation 
were not going to weaker sections but were being grabbed by the caste 
Hindus, so called, Neo-Harijans or well placed Harijans.** Moreover, 
conversion cases should be discouraged where the purpose of 
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conversion is only to acquire new claims or rights. A motivated 
conversion is not associated with faith. Conversion affects change in 
one religions belief, which is available to every individual under our 
Constitution. No doubt, upon conversion, it is not only the religious 
faith that changes but the personal law of the individual changes too, 
and as such new rights and privileges are bound to accrue. But where 
the conversion is totally motivated to secure 'reservation' benefits such 
conversion is not inspired by religious views but contains an element of 
motive. Dushkin points out that reservation in favour of untouchable is 
not aimed to eradicate untouchability but as a means of recompense for 
the past injustices suffered by them and for social and economic 
betterment of these groups.*** 
The object of 'reservation' for backward or scheduled castes 
people is multi-dimensional. The aim is to raise them from their 
existing backwardness and provide the opportunities to participate in 
the political life of the country. Backwardness or the status of 
scheduled caste is determined on social norms not on religious views or 
faith. If the religious factor would become criteria for backwardness, 
then 'conversion' might be phenomena of social life to attain some 
ulterior aim. It is quite possible that who are economically well off 
might change their religion for availing the benefits of reservation. 
Moreover, this approach would be in contradiction to the secular nature 
of our Constitution. Although the scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes, persons are those who have been the victims of the Hindu caste 
system, and as such they belong to a particular religion and to a defined 
group of persons who are designated by a caste. 
In deciding the caste disputes the judiciary generally proceeds 
with two basic concepts i.e. 'Hindu' and 'caste', whereas in judging the 
147 
eligibility of a person for a reserved seat the judicial approach would be 
more in consonance with the secularism if the test is based upon 
whether the person was bom in castes or tribes and has suffered social 
handicaps.*' Birth and social victimization could be the two tests which 
would not only discourage conversion but ensure representation of 
those who belong to scheduled castes and tribes in the legislatures as 
envisaged by the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees 
representation of all the sections of people in the legislature is 
necessary and inevitable for the democratic functioning of the 
government so that every individual and sections of people may realize 
their rights and is able to enforce them. Secondly, in order to achieve it 
or to have the participation of every section of people it becomes 
necessary to assist that section of people who are weak in the society 
and are not competent or not politically aware. Scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes and Anglo-Indians being in a position of disadvantage 
are not capable to compete with advanced sections of the society due to 
their poor economic conditions, the lack of education and political 
awareness. In view of their problems the Constitution has adopted the 
system of reservation of constituencies for these people. 
(ii). Reservation Extent and Scope 
The matters pertaining to the safeguards of for minorities, the 
scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes were exhaustively discussed 
by the Constituent Assembly through the advice and assistance of 
Advisory Committee and sub-committee. A meeting of the Advisory 
Committee was held on May 11.1949. The report on the question of 
reservation of seats in Parliament and Legislative Assemblies for 
scheduled castes stated that: 
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"The resolution for the abolition of all 
reservation for minorities other then scheduled 
castes found whole-hearted support from an 
overwhelming majority of the members of the 
Advisory Committee. So far as the scheduled 
castes were concerned it was recognized that 
their peculiar position would make it necessary 
to give them reservation for a period of ten 
years."^' 
Vallabhai Patel explained this important decision to the 
Assembly on May25, 1949 and said that the proposal of the Advisory 
Committee to provide reservation only to scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes was due to the backward position of these 
communities, which made it necessary that their representatives should 
be members of the legislatures and actively participate in the political 
life of the country/^ 
When the Article 295A relating to reservation of scheduled 
castes and tribes laying down the period of ten years from the date of 
the commencement of the constitution was introduced in the 
Constituent Assembly, there was a great deal of anxiety expressed by 
some members representing scheduled castes that the period of ten 
years would be quite an insufficient period and that reservations might 
be necessary even thereafter.''" Dr Ambedkar himself was prepared to 
press for longer period, but the ten years period was the result of 
general agreement among the parties accepted by the Assembly. The 
opinion of the Assembly was that if at the end of ten years the 
condition of the scheduled castes and tribes had not improved or they 
wanted a further extension of the period it would not be beyond their 
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capacity or their intelligence to invest new ways of getting the same 
protection, which they were promised here. Inspite of the willingness 
of Ambedkar to give a far longer time the Assembly had been specific 
that reservation should end after ten years.^' The Article was adopted 
by the Assembly and in the final draft of the Constitution the 
corresponding Article was numbered as 334. 
Article 334 has now been amended three times in order to 
extend the reservation period of ten years already fixed by the 
Constituent Assembly. It was considered at the time of expiry of ten 
years that this period was insufficient to enable the scheduled castes to 
attain adequate social status experience and resources to enter into open 
competition for participation in the polifical process. 
In order to make the Parliament aware about the position and 
progress. Article 338 of the Constitution authorizes the President to 
appoint an special officer or Commissioner of scheduled casts and 
scheduled tribes to submit a report annually to the Parliament. On the 
basis of the report the Parliament is kept in touch with the progress of 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes so as to enable it to take decision 
either to extend the period or limit the same. 
(Hi). Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs: Special 
Measures under Constitution. 
Article 338^ "^  of the Constitution eariier provided for the 
institution of the high office of a 'special officer'. After constitution 
(Sixty fifth) Amendment Act, 1990. The Commission for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes consists of a chairperson, Vice-
Chairperson and five other members Entrusted with the duty of 
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investigating all matters related to the safeguards provided for the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and also for reporting on the 
working of the measures to the President. All such reports are laid 
before each Houses of Parliament. It was Dr. Ambedkar 's proposal to 
the minorities Sub-Committee which was accepted by the Constituent 
Assembly that an independent officer be appointed by the President at 
the Centre and the Governors in the Provinces to report to the Union 
and Provincial Legislature respectively on the working of the 
Minorities safequards.^ '* Article 299 of the Draft Constitution provided 
for the appointment of a Special Officer for Minorities for the Union 
and one for each state, who would be charged with the duty of 
investigating all matters relating to the safeguards provided by the 
Constitution and were required to make periodic reports to the 
respective governments. These reports are to be placed before the 
appropriate legislatures." In this Article (Article 229), Drafting 
Committee introduced two important amendments. Firstly, the 
jurisdiction of special officers was limited to scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes, Anglo-Indians and other backward classes. Secondly 
that there was to be only one special officer to be appointed by the 
Union Government who would flinction for the Centre as well as for 
the states. The amended Article was moved by K.M. Munshi on 
October 14,1949.^ '^  On the issue of jurisdiction of the 'special officer', 
the demand of few members was that the jurisdiction of the officers 
should extend to matters pertaining to all minorities including Muslims, 
Christians and Sikhs. K.M.Munshi replying to the debate emphasized 
that what the special officer was to investigate would be the political 
safeguards for the protection of certain well-defined sections of 
citizens, and since specific political safeguards were not confined to the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and Anglo-Indians and certain 
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backward classes. The amendments demanded by the members were 
negatived and the article as proposed by Munshi was adopted. The 
final adoption in November, 1949, was set forth as Articles 330-342 in 
Part XVI of the Constitution. Article 338 deals with the appointment of 
special officer for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to watch 
and see implementation of the safeguards. 
The officer of the special office i.e. Commissioner was created 
in November 1950 and since then many reports have been submitted. 
So far the successive commissioners^' have presented 26 repots 
on 
containing over 5000 recommendations to the government. These 
reports are helpful in implementing the welfare programmes and 
exploiting the various governmental schemes. The forth Lok Sabha had 
appointed a Parliamentary Committees on the welfare of the scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes to study the action taken on the reports 
submitted by the Commissioner. The office of the 'Commissioner' is a 
constitutional fiinctionary and the annual reports could be valuable to 
know the social and economic problems of schedule castes and tribes 
and to solve them gradually, the Commissioner is, adequately, assisted 
and cooperated by the governmental machinery both at the union as 
well as state levels. The reports would provide valuable data of 
achievements of the programmes implemented and would enable to 
manage for future planning for their economic, educational and 
political prosperity. The report of the Commissioner is significant and 
is of vital importance to take decision relating to the need for further 
extending the time, which has been given to them under Article 334 of 
the Constitution. 
The very object of reservation of seats in the legislature is to 
make the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes conscious of their 
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rights and enable them to participate effectively in the political process. 
This object can well be achieved those who are educated and 
economically well ofT. For their active participation, education and 
economic base is essential otherwise their participation in the political 
process would be just a physical or numerical participation. It is also 
expected from them to articulate the interests of the communities they 
represent. But it has been noted that scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes members are less articulate and independent than others. They 
participate less in the debates and except few they remain silent. They 
are less influential in shaping the policies. On two occasions, however, 
they have been effective. In 1965, they opposed the Lokur Committee's 
report which called for the de-scheduling of some castes and tribes and 
in 1967 their motion that the constitutional safeguards for the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were not being fully 
implemented ultimately brought the then government's first defeat in 
the Lok Sabha. Since then they have managed to become more 
effective and have their say in formulation of policies for the 'weaker 
sections'. 
The problems of scheduled castes and scheduled tribe are 
primarily, social segregation and educational backwardness. Unless 
they are educated and poverty among them is removed, the policy of 
reservation in legislature would continue for the time to come. Political 
reservation may have been a historical and political necessity but the 
objectives for which the constitutional provisions were framed would 
be defeated by the pressure of other problems in which the scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes are involved viz., poverty, lack of education 
etc., and as such their backwardness is bound to perpetuate and they 
would not be able to attain that standard and position which is 
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necessary to compete independently in the contests on political level. 
The ultimate necessity, therefore, is to tackle this problem on economic 
and educational front so as to utilise the advantage of reservation to 
improve their social status. 
On the other hand, political reservation is a political necessity to 
provide political justice and is essential for the proper functioning of a 
democracy. But it is not desirable that it does not become a permanent 
feature nor that it seeks to be a source of complacency for political 
gains on account of political reservation. Political reservation is prima 
facie unconstitutional being based on inequality and is obviously 
incompatible to the basic concept of homogeneity, fraternity which are 
essential attributes of nationhood. Many members of the Constituent 
Assembly discarded the idea of reservation. It has been accepted as a 
temporary measure, i.e. till the backwardness is either minimized or the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are able to develop confidence. It 
was conceded to secure their adequate representation in the democratic 
functioning of the country, but if this policy is continued the other 
serious problems might arise and other minorities would try to avail the 
benefit of 'reservation'. It would, therefore, in the interest of the state 
as well as for the weaker section to come out of such policy measures. 
But it is necessary, before the state takes any step to eradicate this 
policy, that the scheduled castes and tribes or other backward classes 
have gained reasonably and satisfactory educational and economical 
progress. 
It is submitted, keeping in view the opinions of the members of 
the Constituent Assembly, that there were two objectives for providing 
reservation provisions. Firstly, to help backward sections of society in 
improving their social, educational, economic and political status, so 
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that they may compete with other well off sections of the society. 
Secondly, to withdraw, as early as possible, the safeguard extended to 
the weaker sections of the society. Unless we achieve the former 
objective, the later one cannot be achieved. Unless both the objectives 
are fulfilled a classless society, which is essential for unity and 
integrity of the nation, cannot be formulated. With this approach it can 
be hoped that the opinions of the members of the Constituent Assembly 
would be guiding source to achieve beneficial result. 
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICIES AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL WISDOM OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
At the time of drafting the Constitution, the drafting committee 
was in the position to examine the development, which had occurred all 
around the world and had the experience of English legal system. They, 
therefore, adopted useful and important parts from them. The Universal 
human Rights Charter, which was almost adopted by the General 
Assembly of the united Nations, was an additional progress that drew 
their attention most in framing the Constitution. These were the ready 
material for their reference, but they had to be used in context of the 
problems of people of India. The first and most crucial problem was the 
Caste system, which divides the entire population into different 
sections and communities. This evil not only divided the people but 
also developed disunity and hatred amongst the people to prejudice one 
against the other. The second problem before them was that of 
safeguarding the religion, language and culture of various sections of 
the society. The last but not the least problem was the question of 
removing the discrimination, a major source of social suffering. These 
problems resulted in a fragmented society marked with intolerance, 
hatred and class distinctions together with the exploitation of weaker 
sections of the society. In these circumstances, the framers of the 
Constitution visualized that the principle of equality can alone serve as 
an important and desirable principle for being incorporated in the 
Constitution. This would enable to prevent discrimination and uproot 
many of these evils. Before discussing the constitutional provisions 
dealing with equality or non-discrimination it would be pertinent to 
give a brief account of British policy and the national movement. 
Besides those general factors, which resulted in persistent 
diversities in Indian way of life, the British policy towards the Indians 
was the most vital factor for creating inequality. 
Under the British Government the Indians were mostly excluded 
from the administration. They were denied rights and privileges 
enjoyed by the ruling sections of the society. An atmosphere of 
'equality' did not exist. Moreover, they scrupulously made efforts to 
divide' Indians amongst themselves. The 'reforms' introduced by them 
added to the separatist tendency. The reforms enlarged the size of the 
legislature and adopted principle of giving separate representation to 
the Muslims.^ This principle was gradually extended to other 
communities and the Government of India Act, 1935, gave separate 
representation to Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans and 
Harijans.^ The British thus segregated the people and provoked the 
other classes with the result that Indians were wholly divided amongst 
themselves. This policy was vigorously denounced but could not be 
totally checked and it ultimately resulted into the establishment of a 
separate independent state known as Pakistan. 
The Indian Council's Act, 1909, had the merit of securing 
change in the legislature but failed in its effort to check the propagation 
of self rule by the National Movement by Indian National Congress.'* 
The Act of 1909 was followed by strong political activities for the 
realization of self rule in India. The Briti.sh, in order to suppress the 
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political upheaval, passed important legislations,^ and in 1914, during 
the first world war, Britain wanted India's fiill cooperation in terms of 
man and money. This policy absolutely changed the stand of Indian 
Nationalists and consequently Indian Nationalism rose very high under 
the impact of the First World War. In 1916 Indian National Congress 
urged the British Government to declare its future policy regarding the 
self-rule in India. The British Government realizing the seriousness of 
the demands, decided to introduce changes in the Act of 1909, and 
declared its future policy in India. Consequent to that Montague, the 
then Secretary of State for India, came to Indian. He studied all the 
problems and finally, in consultation with Lord Chelmsford, drew up a 
report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, which came to be known as 
Montague Chelmsford Reforms, and were embodied in the 
Government of India Act, 1919. 
The reforms introduced by the Act of 1919 failed to satisfy the 
India political leaders for various reasons. The main cause for the 
failure was the defect in the system of'Dyarchy'.^ The Indian National 
Congress at its annual session in 1919 condemned the reforms as 
inadequate, unsatisfactory and disappointing and consequently there 
was persistent demand for further reforms. As the Act of 1919 began to 
be implemented, the National Movement gained strength when 
Mahatama Gandhi gave a call to offer Satyagrah against the oppressive 
laws passed by the legislature in spite of the opposition by the people. 
Jallian Wala Bagh tragedy of April 13, 1919, in which 400 people ere 
killed and 1200 were wounded and other inhuman attitudes of the 
British Government resulted in violent resentment against the 
Government. The Government then appointed a Commission, known 
as Simon Commission in pursuance of a provision of Government of 
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India Act 1919 to enquire and submit report to the Crown of the 
working of the Government of India. In its reports the Commission 
made many recommendations for constitutional reforms, out of which 
one recommendation was the constitution of the communal electorate. 
The Commission was criticized and boycotted by Indians for having no 
Indian as its member and unsatisfactory recommendations. Lord 
Birkenhead, while justifying the exclusion of Indian from the 
Commission, suggested to Indian to draft constitution and submit the 
same to the British Parliament for consideration. The Indians accepted 
the suggestion and an All Parties Conference was held in Bombay on 
May 19, 1928.* It was presided over by Dr. M.A. Ansari. This 
Conference appointed a Committee' under the Chairmanship of Pandit 
Motilal Nehru to determine and consider the principles of a 
Constitution for India. The Committee produced a report, which has 
gone down in the history by the name of Nehru Report. It contained for 
the first time in the vast history of India, the principle of equality under 
a separate heading of fundamental rights. This report provided 
guidelines to the framers of the Constitution after independence. The 
report contained almost all these rights, which are embodied in the 
Preamble and set out in Chapter III under the heading of Fundamental 
Rights of the Constitution. The Nehru Report enumerated nineteen 
fundamental rights. One of these was all citizens shall be equal before 
law and shall possess equal civil rights. The same is reproduced in 
Article 14 of the Constitution in a modified form. 
The Nehru Report pressed the British Government to include 
those rights in newly drafted constitution but the Simon Commission 
rejected the idea. The matter was discussed by the first conference in 
1930, and therefore on the occasion of Second Round Table 
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Conference held in 1931, a memorandum circulated by Mahatama 
Gandhi at the second session of the Conference, inter-alia, demanded 
that the new Constitution should include a guarantee to the 
communities concerned of the protection of cultures, languages, scripts, 
education, profession and practice of religion and religious 
endowments and protect personal laws; and that the protection of 
political, and other rights of minority communities should be the 
concern of the Federal Government.'" Prime Minister Ramsay 
MacDonald expressed his opinion in favour of their inclusion in the 
Constitution of India with a view to safeguard the interest of the 
minorities. But before this could be implemented the attitude of the 
Government changed with the formation of National Government in 
England. Lord Reading ridiculed the idea of fundamental rights." Sir 
John Simon gave three reasons for not including fundamental rights in 
the future Constitution of India. He contended that since the British 
Constitution did not recognize any fundamental rights, there was no 
necessity of these rights in the case of India as well. He further argued 
that the necessity of fundamental rights arose only when there was 
autocracy and that was not the case in India. India was going to have 
Parliamentary form of Government and there was no necessity of any 
fundamental right and it gives a false sense of security, which was not 
desirable. The result as that the Government of India Act, 1935, did not 
contain Bill of Rights.'^ 
During the Second World War, the British Government imposed 
all kinds of restrictions on the people of India, and there was no remedy 
or legal protection against the exercise of those arbitrary powers. 
Special courts were constituted to try people for their political 
involvements. It was this experience, which compelled the people of 
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India to incorporate fiindamental rights in the present Constitution. The 
subject of fundamental rights figured prominently in the deliberation of 
Conciliation Committee." The Committee was of the opinion that, 
however, inconsistent with British law it might be, in the peculiar 
circumstances of India, fundamental rights were necessary, not only as 
assurance and guarantees to the minorities but also for prescribing a 
standard of conduct for the legislatures, government and the courts. 
The Committee felt that it was for the constitution body first to settle 
the list of fundamental rights and then to divide them into justiciable 
and non-justiciable purpose of their enforcement.''' The British Cabinet 
Mission in 1946, recognized the need for a written guarantee of 
fundamental rights in the Constitution of India. In paragraph 19 and 20 
of its statement of May 16, 1946, envisaging a Constituent Assembly 
for framing the Constitution of India, it recommended the setting up of 
an Advisory Committee for reporting, inter-alia, on fiindamental 
rights.'^ 
The objective resolution, submitted by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, 
was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, on January 22, 1947. It was 
solemnly pledged to draw up, for India's future government, a 
Constitution wherein "shall be guaranteed and secured to all people of 
India justice, social, economical and political, equality of status, 
opportunity and freedom of thought... and wherein adequate 
safeguards would be provided for minorities backward and tribal areas 
and depressed and other classes.'^ 
Two day af^ er its adoption the Assembly elected an Advisory 
Committee for reporting on minorities, fundamental rights, and on the 
tribal and excluded areas. The Advisory Committee, in turn, 
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constituted on February 27, 1947, five sib-committees, one of which 
was to deal with fundamental rights. The problem faced by the sub-
committee on fundamental rights was related to the selection of rights 
which were to be regarded as fundamental and the creation of 
institution to safeguard them. After an initial reaction against the 
bifiircation of the fundamental rights, they were further classified into 
justiciable and non-justiciable rights. Part III which is entitled 
'fundamental rights contains justiciable rights like equality, life, liberty 
and property" and were made enforced in a court of law. Part IV, 
entitled 'The Directive Principles of State Policy', contains non-
justiciable rights, such as, rights to employment and education etc. The 
citizen has no judicial remedy if he is denied the enjoyment of these 
rights. 
The chapter on fundamental Rights enumerates several rights " 
and the Right to Equality is one of those rights contained in Article 
14, of the Constitution. The article embodied the principle of equality, 
which was first included in the draft submitted to the sub-committee on 
Fundamental Rights by Shri K.M. Munshi and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. 
Subsequently it was discussed modified and finally approved by the 
Constituent Assembly and incorporated in the Constitution of India. 
Being well acquainted with political social and economic inequalities, 
which existed the country, the fi-amers of the Constitution tried to 
incorporate the principle of equality in various forms in the whole of 
Constitution. Although the Preamble reflects the spirit of equality but 
they did not consider it enough to state this principle only in the 
Preamble. A part of the Preamble reads that the Republic" shall secure 
to all its citizens: 
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Justice— social, economic and political., 
Liberty— of thoughts, expression, belief, faith 
and worship, 
Equality— of status and opportunity and to 
promote among the all. 
Fraternity— assuring the dignity of the 
individual and the (unity and integrity of the 
nation)." 
Besides the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, there 
are other rights guaranteed by the Constitution which secure socio 
political equality for all citizens. Under Article 325^ "* elections to the 
House of the people, the lower House of the Parliament, and to the 
Legislative Assembly of every state shall be on the basis of adult 
suffrage. Every citizen, twenty-one years of age shall be entitled to be 
registered as a voter at any such election. There are no special electoral 
rolls. No person shall be ineligible for inclusion in the general electoral 
roll on grounds only religion, race, caste, sex or any of these. The 
Indian constitution is not a mere framework of government. It is a 
forward-looking statute, which visualizes profound social and 
economic changes. The Constitution emphasizes that such changes 
must come through constitutional methods and without the sacrifice of 
the dignity and liberty of the individual. The chapter on fundamental 
rights and directive principles of state policy contain enumeration of 
basic values and aspiration of Indian society.^ ^ 
B. RIGHT TO EQUALITY: SOCIO-LEGAL DIMENSIONS: 
There are five Articles dealing with numerous dimensions of 
equality under this head. Article 14^ * deals with equality in general, 
Article 15^' deals with legal equality and non-discrimination. Article 
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16 deals with equality for public (government) employment. Article 
17^ *' and 18,"'*' deal with social equality. It may be noted that in this 
group of Articles, there is no mention of economic equality, that is, 
equal remuneration for equal work. This aspect has been covered by 
Article 39(d)^' of the Directive Principle of State Policy under which a 
state may strive to secure through suitable state legislation is equal pay 
for equal work for both men and women. But it is not available to 
citizen as a matter of right. It does not become enforceable in case state 
fails to implement to these provisions or any provision contained under 
the scheme of Directive Principles of State Policies". Article 14 
declares that; 
"the state shall not deny to any person equality 
before the law or the equal protection of the 
laws within the territory of India". 
Pantanjali Shastri, CJ, while explaining the relation between the 
two expression observed that the second expression is coronary of first 
and it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the violation of 'the 
equal protection of the laws' will not be the violation of 'equality 
before the law". Equality before the law is a negative concept, and 
equal protection of law is a positive one. The former declares that 
everyone is equal before law, that is no one can claim special privileges 
and that all classes are to be equally subjected to the ordinary law of 
the land. The latter postulates equal protection of all alike in the same 
situation and under like circumstances. No discrimination can be made 
either in the privileges conferred or in the liabilities imposed.^ "* The 
impact of the negative content on the positive content has not so far 
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been clearly discerned and the Supreme Court has mostly been 
concerned with the positive aspect. 
However, the Right to equality as embodied in Article 14 is 
enforceable only against the arbitrary and unfair state sponsored action. 
The term state in reference to equality means all the organs of the state 
and its instrumentalities encompassed by Article 12 of the Constitution 
of India. 
(i). Equality Before Law 
A prominent English Jurist, Prof. A.V. Dicey, after having made 
a comparative study of all the important constitutions of the world, 
claims that English legal system has a distinction and specialty over 
other Constitution for it is based on principle of 'equality before the 
law', which is one of the ingredient of Rule of Law.^ ^ 
According to Dr. Jennings equality before law means that 
among equals the law should be equal and should equally be 
administered, that like should be treated alike. The right to sue and be 
sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted for the same kind of action should 
be the same for all citizens of full age and understanding and without 
distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status or political 
influence'.^^ It implies, thereby, the absence of any special privilege in 
favour of any individual. Every person, whatever be his rank or 
condition, is subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. No man 
is above the law. Every person may sue and be sued. But equality 
before the law does not mean identity of position as between citizens, 
irrespective of their duties and functions. Accordingly, wider powers 
may be conferred upon public officials then these of citizens. But if 
default is made or wrong is done in the exercise thereof, then they must 
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be treated according to law by the courts. Certain exceptions to this 
rule are recognized by the Constitution, and by the Criminal 
Procedure Code/" Every state, indeed, recognizes some exceptions to 
this rule. Some of these exceptions are based on the unity and integrity 
of nation and some are based on political grounds, which have also 
been recognized by our Constitution.'" Equality before the law does not 
seek to do away inequality, it comprehends that all persons should be 
treated equally, like should be treated alike. Among equal or placed in 
similar circumstances, law should be administered equally. 
(ii). Equal Protection of Laws 
The second expression, of Article 14 'the equal protection of the 
laws', taken from the American Constitution, is based on the last clause 
of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American 
Constitution. Fazal Ali and Mukherjee JJ. and some other judges of the 
Supreme Court have also pointed out that Article 14 of our Constitution 
corresponds to the 'equal protection' clause in Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United State of 
America,'*^ which declares "nor shall any state deny to any person 
equal protection of laws" 
The meaning of the phrase, therefore, is that all person and 
things under similar circumstances should be treated alike both in 
privileges conferred and liabilities imposed there should be no 
discrimination between one person and another by laws. Equal law 
should be applied to all in same situation.'*'' It does not, whoever, men 
that the law conferring privileges or imposing liabilities should be 
general in character and universal in application. What is prohibited is 
discrimination between persons, who are substantially in similar 
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circumstances or conditions. This gives rise to very important question 
of legislative classification or distinction between persons or things 
made by law. It has been accepted that persons or things can be 
classified into groups and such groups may differently be treated, 
provided there is reasonable basis for such difference or distinction. 
Accordingly, the legislature can make reasonable classification of 
persons and things for the purpose of legislation. Hence, if the law 
deals equally with those classification in a defined class, then it does 
not offend Article 14 and has been held justified by the Supreme Court. 
'A legislature which has to deal with diverse problems arising out of an 
infinite variety of human relations must, of necessity, have the power 
of making special laws to attain particular objects, and for that purpose 
it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and 
things upon which laws are to operate". '*^ 
However, in order to conform the reasonable classification to 
the constitutional requirements, a law must satisfy two conditions as 
pointed out by Das, J.'*^  
i. "The Classification must be founded on an 
intelligible differentia which distinguishes 
persons and things that are grouped together 
fi"om others left out of the groups." 
ii. "That differentia must have a rational relation 
to the object sought to be achieved by the 
Statute in question." 
The intelligible differentia, which is basis of the classification and 
object of Act, are two distinct things. What is necessary is that there 
must be nexus between basis of classification and object of Act, which 
makes classification. It is only when there is no reasonable basis for a 
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classification that legislation making such classification may be 
declared discriminatory. Article 14 of Indian Constitution is directed 
against the state actions and the expression "any person" used in the 
said Article denotes that guaranteed of equal protection of laws is 
available to any person which includes also the justice persons like 
company, association or body of individuals. The protection of Article 
14 extends to both citizens and non-citizens and to natural persons as 
well as legal persons. The equality before law is guaranteed to all 
without regard to race, colour or nationality. The corporations being 
justice persons are entitled be benefit of Article 14 of the Constitution 
oflndia. 
From bulk of cases decided by the Supreme Court of India it is 
evident that Article 14 is of the Constitution oflndia aims at to provide 
protection against every form of arbitrary unfair and unreasonable 
discrimination whether legislative or administrative. In a leading case 
E.P. Royappa Vs State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court of India 
challenged the traditional concept of equality which was based on 
reasonable classification and has laid down new concept of equality. 
The court speaking through Justice P.N. Bhagwati held; 
"Equality is a dynamic concept with many 
aspects and dimensions and it can not be cribbed 
cabined and confined within traditional and 
doctrinaire limits. Form positive point of view 
equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact 
equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; 
one belongs to rule of law in a republic while 
other to whim and caprice of an absolute 
monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit 
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in it that it is unequal both according to political 
logic and constitutional law and is, therefore, 
violative of Article 14" 
JO 
In Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India again Hon'ble justice 
Bhagwati said; 
"Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action 
and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. 
The principle of reasonableness, which legally 
as well as philosophically, is an essential 
element of equality or non-arbitrariness, 
pervades Article 14 like a brooding 
omnipresence." 
The court in R.D. Shetty Vs. Airport Authority of India 
prevented to discriminate ensuring equality between one citizen and 
another reiterated the principle. Article 15 enacts: 
"The State shall not discriminate against any 
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, 
sex, place of birth or any of them.' 
2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of 
them subjected to any disability, liability, 
restriction or condition with regard to 
(a). Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels 
and place of public entertainment, or 
(b). The use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads 
and place of public resort maintained wholly or 
partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use 
of the general public. 
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3.Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State 
from making any special provision for women 
and children. 
4.Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of 
Article 29"*^  shall prevent the State from making 
any special provision for the advancement of 
any socially and educationally backward classes 
of citizens or for the scheduled castes and the 
scheduled tribes". 
The rights of non-discrimination as specified in this Article were 
contained in the draft submitted by Munshi and Ambedkar. According 
Munshi's draft: 
All persons irrespective of religion, race, colour, 
caste, language or sex are equal before the law 
and are entitled to the same rights and are 
subject to the same duties. ^^  
All persons shall have the right to the 
enjoyment of equal facilities in public places 
subject only to such laws as impose limitations 
on all persons, irrespective of religion, race, 
colour, caste and language.^' 
Ambedkar expressed the same principles in his draft. In his 
explanatory note appended to his draft, he observed that discrimination 
was a menace to be guarded against, if the fundamental rights were 
meant to be real. In a country like India, he said, where it was possible 
for discrimination to be practiced on a vast scale and in a relentless 
manner, fundamental rights could have no meaning, unless provision 
was made for protection against discrimination on ground of race, or 
creed or social status."" 
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After discussing the draft the sub-committee on fundamental 
rights formulation provision as part of clauseS, the legal equality clause 
- in its draft report. 
I. All persons within the Union shall be equal 
before the law. No person shall be denied 
the equal protection of the laws within the 
territories of the Union. There shall be no 
discrimination against any person on 
grounds of religion, race, caste, language or 
sex. 
In particular :-
a. there shall be no discrimination against 
any person on any of the grounds 
aforesaid in regard to the sue of well, 
tanks, roads, schools and places of public 
resort maintained wholly or partly out of 
public funds or dedicated to the use of 
the general public."'*'' 
B.N. Rao, Constitutional Advisor said that the above provision, 
for the most part followed the drafts in the Nehru Report (1928) and the 
Congress declaration of 1933. He apprehended that draft might 
prejudicially affect the institution of separate schools, hospital, and the 
like for women. ^'* 
Allndi Krishnaswamy lyycr made a suggestion which was 
accepted and the word 'person' was replaced by 'citizen',"" Some basic 
issues were further discussed and after considering and examining 
them, the article was several times amended on the suggestions of the 
members of the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights Minorities 
Sub-Committee. Tlie Drafting Committee, in due considerations of the 
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suggestions, incorporated the Article in the Draft Constitution as 
Article 9. When the Draft Constitution was circulated for eliciting 
opinion, the members of the Assembly and others proposed a member 
of amendments. An amendment proposed by K.T. Shah was of great 
importance. It sought to add scheduled castes and backward tribes at 
the end of clause (2) of the draft Article. Ambedkar, who replied to the 
debated, accepted other amendments and the one moved by K.T.Shah 
and Mohd Tahir was considered to be not necessary.^^ Thereupon, 
Shah's amendment had been negatived by the Constituent Assembly 
and passed it after renumbering it. Article 9 became Article 15 of the 
Constitution as finally passed by the Constituent Assembly on 
November 26, 1949. ft may be noted clause (4) did not appear in the 
Article finally passed by the Constituent Assembly. A judicial 
decision^^ laid down that it would not be within the power of the State 
to give preferential treatment to backward communities in the matter of 
admission to educational institutions, as this would be contrary to 
Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 29(2).*'"' ft was 
felt that the special responsibility of the State for improving the 
condition of backward classes required that the state should have such 
power. The Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951.^' added this 
new clause to Article 15. The clause made it expressly clear that 
'nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the 
State fi-om making any special provision for the advancement of any 
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the 
scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes'. 
Article 15 now contains four clauses. Under the clause (1) the 
state is prohibited to discriminate citizens on the grounds only of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Clause (2) deals 
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with the social problems practiced in the society, on the basis of 
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth. It prevented the social evil 
practices of restricting others from access to shops, public restaurant or 
the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads, and places of public resort, 
maintained wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of 
the general public. The last two clauses were incorporated in the 
Article, which may be considered as specific instances of unequal but 
separate benefits to a section of citizens, who are socially or 
educationally weak and deprived citizens. 
By enacting Article 15, the framers of the Constitution imposed 
restrictions, both upon state and citizen, to discriminate even on very 
flimsy grounds and has gone into the minutest details of social 
relations, where discrimination was prevalent as a common feature. It 
is a social compromising approach of the Constitution so as to 
minimize the social sensitiveness of the people and to promote a sense 
of fellowship. In Indian society, any government that existed before 
never tackled social problems and their evil practices seriously. The 
Mughals remained unconcerned with these social problems. The feudal 
system of land holding, which they brought, rigidified these social 
practices. The Britishers continued it for their own purpose of retaining 
political power and the socially backward classes were use for dividin^" 
the people. This is borne out by the Minto-Morley Reforms, which 
introduced a system of separate communal representation for Muslims. 
This award was gradually extended to other communities, and it 
resulted into the division of Indian amongst themselves.*' The British 
courts almost followed the Executive Policy and attached more sanctity 
to customs*^ than to law. Those customs maintained the hereditary 
status quo with all its inequalities as advised and directed by the native 
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land officers. Those customs were never interpreted to benefit the 
society and make it move towards a new equinbrium and check the 
imbalance, but instances reveal that no effective and serious steps were 
ever taken either by the legislature or by the judiciary to release the 
society from unequal social burden. The Article in the light of past 
experience of 'inequality' gave a new dimension to age-old social 
values and emphasized rational relations. 
(a). Province of Article 15 (1). 
As to the scope of this Article the Supreme Court has held that 
"the fundamental right conferred by Article 15(1) is conferred on a 
citizen as an individual and is guarantee against his being subjected to 
discrimination in the matter of rights, privileges and immunities 
pertaining to him as a citizen generally." Regarding the meaning of 
'discrimination' which only occurs in Article 15 and 16 and is not used 
in Article 14, Patanjali Shastri, CJ, after referring the meaning given in 
Oxford Dictionary and bringing out the difference between Article 14 
on the one hand and Article 15 and 16 on the other, observed : 
"...Discrimination thus involves an element of 
unfavourable bias and it is in that sense that the 
expression has to be understood in this context. 
If such bias is disclosed and is based on any of 
the grounds mentioned in Articles 15 and 16, it 
may well be that the statute will, without more, 
incur condemnation as violating a specific 
constitutional prohibition unless it is saved by 
one or other of the provisos to those Article. 
Both the position under Article 14 is different. 
Equal protection claims under that Article are 
examined with the presumed that the state 
action is reasonable and justified". ^' 
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The social legislation seeking reforms in the personal law has 
been held constitutional and not discriminatory under Article 15(1), (2) 
and Article 14. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1946, which was enforced 
among Hindus and excluded Muslims, was challenged as 
discriminatory on the grounds of religion. The Act was held^* not 
violative of Article 14 and 15(1). The court said that the state is free to 
embark on social reforms in stages. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1946, 
which introduced social reforms was again challenged as 
unconstitutional. In G.Sambireddy V. G. Javamans, the court held the 
to 
Act constitutional and also approved the earlier case. 
The Supreme Court, in a number of cases, interpreted the Article 
to check the continuance of discrimination based on the ground 
enumerated in Article 15. Saurashtra, a law, which restricted the 
movements of certain communities by insisting on their reporting to the 
police daily, was held ultra-vires, as it was a discrimination based o 
race.^' Likewise a law which deprived a female proprietress to hold and 
enjoy her property on the ground of her sex was held violative of 
Article 15.'" In another case,'" the Supreme Court pointed out that a 
law which discriminates on the ground of residence does not infringe 
Article 15. Place of Birth is distinct from residence. In one case,'^ a 
rule of the State Medical College requiring a capitation fee, from non-
Madhya Bharat Students for admission to the college was held valid as 
the reasons for exemption fro payment of capitation fee was bonafide 
residence and not place of birth. Clause (2)(a) of Article 15 declares all 
the shops public restaurant, hotel and places of public entertainments or 
clause (b) wells, tanks and bathing ghats, roads and places of public 
resort, maintained wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the 
use of the general public, open to be freely used by any person and no 
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citizen shall on the grounds specified in the Article be subjected to any 
disability, liability, restriction or condition. 
In the light of preceding discussion, it may be well said that 
Article 15 constitutes a perfect guarantee of non-discrimination in any 
form, and pushes the society to merge with advanced social rules based 
on social justice. 
Article 16 consists of five clauses. Clause (1), which embodies 
equality principle, reads: 
"There shall be equality of opportunity for all 
citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any office under the state." 
Clause (2) describes the grounds on which citizen shall not be 
discriminated against, in respect of any employment or office under the 
State. The grounds are religion, race, caste, sex, descent, and place of 
birth, residence or any of them. 
Clause (1) of this Article declares all citizens equal in matters of 
public employment whereas clause (2) expressly prohibits 
discrimination on certain grounds. Clause (3) and (4) are 
discriminatory clauses. 
Article 16 is more specific I content than Article 15, related to 
public employment only. Taxing the three Articles, viz, 14, 15, and 16, 
together, it is evident that the entire three Articles incorporate the same 
principles of equality and denounce discrimination that operates in 
general, specific and more specific areas. Explaining the relative scope 
of Articles 14, 15, and 16, Das j . said: 
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"Article 14 guarantees the general right of 
equality, Article 15 and 16 are instances of the 
same right in favour of citizens in some special 
circumstances. Article 15 is more general than 
Article 16, the latter being confined to matters 
relating to employment or appointment to any 
office under the State. Article 15 does not 
mention descent as one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination as Article 16 does. 
Equality of opportunity is another most important element of the 
concept of 'equality' in any society there has always been three types 
of inequalities, namely, polifical, social and economic. Almost with the 
realization of its value and worth, social reformers fought to obtain 
'equality' in all these three types. Political equality is achieved through 
struggles of national freedom and enfranchisement, without 
discrimination on the basis of colour, religion etc. balancing the social 
values and economic equality to achieve opportunities for every 
individual to secure employment for his subsistence and well being. 
The Article is the reproduction of the Preamble of the constitution, 
which envisages among other things, equality of status and opportunity. 
Equality of status is only possible when economic conditions are 
improved by providing opportunities equally. Equality of opportunity, 
properly understood, means that "those conditions are created by the 
State, must be equalized so that each man's share of wealth may be 
determined solely by his natural abilities".''* Laski says that "the idea of 
equality is obviously an idea of leveling. It is an attempt to give each 
man as similar a chance as possible to utilize what powers he may 
possess".''^ he equality of opportunity to all citizens without 
consideration based on caste, race, colour etc. is the comer stone of all 
the democratic state as it enables every citizen to develop his 
personality and status of living, and the steps taken by the State in 
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solving this problems of economic inequality is therefore based on 
economic justice. Abraham Lincoln always defended equality on the 
ground that in the long run it favoured the best interests of every 
individual. To it he attributed every thing desirable in free society. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United State 
embodies the great ideas of Lincoln which required not merely the 
State to protect the freedoms, but also the federal government to secure 
those freedoms. 
In India, during the British Raj, equality principle was never 
adopted either in economic matters or in social relations. Although 
steps were taken in this regard but no serious efforts were made to 
operationalize those measures. The first legislative declaration to 
appoint Indians irrespective of religion, place of birth etc. was 
embodied in the Charter of 1833.'' it was the first legislation, which 
excluded caste criteria in the appointment of government services. The 
next legislative measure in which the British Policy to employ Indians 
was embodied in the Queen Victoria's Proclamation announced on 
November 1, 1858. The proclamation, which is of great historical 
importance, was embodied In the Government of India Act, 1858, 
under which the Government of India was transferred to the Crown 
7Q 
through Secretary of State, The Proclamation continued: 
"...We shall respect the rights, dignity and 
honour or native princes as our own. The 
principle of religion toleration was inculcated, 
differentiation on grounds of race or creed in 
the public service was disapproved, and the 
ancient rights, usages and customs of India were 
to be respected '^' 
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But in spite of the British liberal policy to provide opportunity to 
every person, the higher class of Indian elite or English people 
occupied all the higher posts. Before 1878 in almost all services, 
agriculture, post and telegraphs, customs, excise sale, opium, mint, 
prisons, archeology. Geology, registration higher officers were 
Britishers.*' Indian were mostly excluded from the important services 
and naturally with the passing of time the demand for the admission of 
Indians to the higher posts increased. British policy, in matters of 
services appears to be of two phases. The one of exclusion, which 
operated before the Crown adopted the powers in 1858. In the 
administration of justice, they only sought help from the native law 
officers in interpreting local customs and usages or in the collection of 
revenue and excluded any but covenanted servants from occupying 
places worth over 500 a years. Policy of exclusion of Indians from 
services or calculated administrative approach to recruit Indians were 
condemned by the nationalist leaders and on the basis of the exclusion 
of Indians, the Simon Commission*^ was boycotted. 
As the Simon Commission failed and the exclusion of Indians 
was justified, it was proposed by the British Government to have an 
agreed Constitution. This proposal was accepted and an all-party 
conference was held in 1928, which appointed a Committee with 
Pandit Motilal Nehru as its Chairman, to workout principle of 
constitutional reforms. The Committee recommended a report which s 
known as 'Nehru Report'. The Nehru Report contained various 
recommendations, the one was: 
"No person shall by reason of his religion caste 
creed be prejudiced in any ay in regard to public 
employment, office of power or honour and the 
exercise of any trade or calling..." 
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The British Parliament was considerate to give the due 
importance to the sentiments of Indians and also as a matter of policy, 
enacted Section 298(l/'* in the Government of India Act, 1935, when 
the present Constitution was being framed after acquiring 
independence, Munshi and Ambedkar^ ^ submitted a draft containing 
the principle of equality of opportunity and prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, or language in the 
matter of public employment. Shri K.T. Shah and Hamam Singh also 
incorporated this basic principle in Clause 2 and 8 of their respective 
drafts.^ ^ When the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights discussed 
the subject on March 24, 1947, Shah pressed his view that the 
Constitution should guarantee non-discrimination, not only I "public 
employment but also in employment in any enterprise aided and 
assisted by the State".*^ 
The Sub-Committee rejected the suggestion and its draft report 
contained a provision on equality of opportunity in public employment 
in Sub-Clause (I)(b) of clause 5.^ ^ 
In his explanatory notes on the draft clause, B.N. Rao pointed out that 
Sub-clause (l)(b) was actually adopted from Section 298 of the 
Government of India Act, 1935.*' When the Sub-clause was considered 
by the Sub-Committee on April 14 and 15, 1947, Alladi Krishan 
Swamy lyyer referred to enactments like the Hindu Religious 
Endowments Act which restrict certain appointments to Hindus and 
suggested that it would be necessary to protect such provisions. This 
suggestion was accepted and the provision was redrafted as an 
independent clause and appeared in the report of the Sub-Committee as 
clause 5:'": 
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There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens: 
i. in matters of public employment; 
ii. in the exercise or carrying on of any 
occupation, trade, business or profession, 
and no citizen shall on any of the 
grounds mentioned in the preceding 
section be ineligible for public office or 
be prohibited from acquiring, holding or 
disposing of property of exercising or 
carrying on any occupation, trade, 
business or profession within the Union. 
Nothing herein contained shall prevent a 
law made prescribing that the incumbent 
of an offices to manage, administer or 
superintendent the affairs of a religious 
or denominational institution shall be a 
member of a particular religion, or 
denomination.'' 
The Sub-Committee on Minorities recommended the addition of 
a proviso to clause 5 in order to meet the claims of minorities to special 
representation in the services.''^ After discussing the matter in detail it 
was finally decided to refer the clause for redrafting to the adhoc 
committee appointed earlier " for considering clause (4).''' When the 
clause as redrafted came before the Advisory Committee on April 22, 
1947, discussion centered round the respective merits of certain phrases 
used in the exception clause which as recommended by the adhoc 
committee read : 
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the state 
from making provision for reservations in 
favour of clauses not adequately represented in 
the public services. 
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The Advisory Committee accepted the entire provision after 
going through the spirit of the draft provision submitted by the adhoc 
committee and was discussed in the Constituent Assembly on April 30, 
1947. Tlie clause as accepted by the Constituent Assembly was 
reproduced in the Constitutional Advisor's Draft Constitution of 
October 1947, as clause 12 without any substantial alterations and 
appeared as Article 10 of the Draft Constitution prepared by the Draft 
Committee with one important modification: instead of the words "in 
favour of any particular class of citizens" the words "in favour of any 
backward class of citizens" were inserted. Draft Article 10 read as 
follows: 
1. There shall be equality of opportunity for all 
citizens in matters of employment under the State. 
2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, descent, place of birth or any of them, be 
ineligible for any office under the State. 
3. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State fi-om 
making any provision for the reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens who, in the opinion of the State, 
are not adequately represented in the services under 
the State. 
4. Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of 
any law which provides that the incumbent of an 
office in connection with the affairs of any 
religious or denominational institution or any 
person professing a particular religion or belonging 
to a particular denomination."^ 
The Draft Article came up for consideration before the 
Assembly on Nov. 30, 1948, for eliciting opinion a number of 
amendments were received. During the general elections the use of he 
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word "backward" in clause (3) of the draft Article, '^ Ambedkar said 
that the Draft Committee had to reconcile opposing points or view to 
produce a "workable proposition which will be accepted by all'. If this 
was borne in mind, it would be seen that no better formula could be 
produced than the one embodied in clause (3). He added: 
Unless you use some such qualifying phrases as 
'backward' the exception in favour of 
reservation will ultimately eat up the rule 
altogether...That I think...is the justification 
why the Drafting Committee under took on its 
own shoulders the responsibility of introducing 
the word 'backward' which, I admit, did not 
originally find a place in the fiindamental right 
in the way in which it was passed by this 
Assembly. ^  
Ambedkar referred, finally, to two questions raised during the 
debate; first, regarding the definifion of 'backward community' and the 
second regarding the justiciability of clause (3) of the draft Article. 
Regarding the former he said : 
Anyone who reads the language of the draft 
itself will find that we have left it to be 
determined by each local government. A 
backward community is a community, which is 
backward in the opinion of the Government.^ * 
As for the latter he said. 
It is rather difficult to give a dogmatic answer. 
Personally I think it would be a justiciable 
matter.'' 
On being put to vote, all the amendments, except those accepted 
earlier by Ambedkar, were negatived by the Assembly and draft Article 
10, as amended, was adopted to be added to the Constitution. 
Subsequently the Drafting Committee as Article 16 renumbered it 
without any alternation or modification in substance. 
As regards Clause (5) of the Article it provides another 
exception to equality principle added to the draft Constitution on the 
motion of Alladi krishnaswamy lyyer '°*' and is based upon the secular 
principle. 
"(4) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the 
state fi-om making any provision for the 
reservation of appointment or posts in favour of 
any backward class of citizens which, in the 
opinion of the State, is not adequately 
represented in the service under the State." 
(b). Province of Article 16(1). 
Article 16(1) provides a right to equality of opportunity in 
matter of public employment and clause (2) guarantees that no citizen 
shall be discriminated against in respect of any employment or office 
under the state on the ground only of religion, race, cast, descent, place 
of birth, residence or any of him or her. The rule applies only in respect 
of employment or offices, which are held under the State. It must 
therefore, be read with Article 12,"" which defines state. Both the 
clauses confer a right on each individual citizen.'" Article 16(1) does 
not confer a right to obtain a public employment but confers a right to 
equality of opportunity for being considered for such employment. 
Article 16 does not exclude selective tests nor does it preclude the 
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laying down of qualifications for office, not only of mental excellence 
but also of physical fitness, sense of discipline, and moral integrity 
loyalty to the State etc. Where the appointment requires technical 
knowledge evidence of such knowledge may be required. Since the 
equality of opportunity is in respect of any employment, Article 16 
cannot be confined to the initial matters prior to the act of employment 
but includes other matters relating to employment such as the provision 
about the salary and periodical increments therein, terms as to leave, 
gratuity and pension and as to the ages of superannuating. It also 
includes promotion to selection posts.'"'* Rules of equality is not 
applicable between members of separate and independent clauses of 
service. This equality of opportunity can only be as between persons 
who are securing the same employment. Thus the roadside 
stationmasters and guards belong to two separate and distinct classes of 
services between whom there is no scope for predicating equality or 
inequality of opportunity in matters of promotion. Article 16(1) 
accordingly was not infringed by rules enabling guards to be promoted 
faster than roadside stationmaster to posts of stationmaster. In another 
case, the Supreme Court considered the question of equality of 
opportunity and laid down that the three tier system evolved for police 
in Rajasthan was valid.'"-' There is no denial of equality if the service 
rules permit premature retirement of Government serviants.'"^ 
Likewise Article 16(1) has no application to persons occupying 
different grades in the same service.'"^ 
Article 16 has no application to a contract for the sale of goods 
to the state. Independent contractors cannot call themselves employees 
of the State and cannot claim the right conferred under this clause.'"^ 
Article 16(2) contains forbidden grounds to discriminate citizens in 
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matters of employment. The forbidden grounds of discrimination are 
race, caste, sex, descent, and place of birth, residence or any of them. 
The scope of Scope of Clause (1) of Article 16 is wider than the scope 
of clause (20 as it is limited only the specified grounds contained 
therein because discrimination on the grounds other than those 
mentioned in Clause (2) has to be judge in the light of the general 
principles laid down in Clause (1).'"^ The clause applied only to public 
or state employment as is evident from the words, "any employment or 
office under the state" make it clear that article applies only to public 
employment. The words "office" and "employment" are of wide 
connotation. Lord Wright accepting the New English Dictionary 
meaning declared a position or place to which certain duties are 
attached especially one of a more or less public character."" The word 
'employment' or appointment under the state means that the persons so 
appointed or employed holds a position of subordination to the state. " ' 
Another phrase used in clause920 'discrimination' is also important 
about which the judicial view has already been discussed."^ 
The word 'only' is very significant and its interpretation is 
possible in two ways. The one view is that the prohibited grounds 
should not be the only or sole consideration for discriminatory 
treatment. If sex, religion, etc. is not only ground for the differentiation 
the law will be valid irrespective of its operation. Accordingly it 
becomes necessary for the courts to consider the scope and object of 
the Act so that actual grounds of discrimination could be found of on 
which the law is based, and if he only basis of the impugned Act is 
discriminative on one or more grounds specified in Article 15, then the 
Act is bad but if the true basis of the Act is something different, the Act 
is not invalidated because one of its effects might be to invoke such 
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discrimination. According to other interpretation it is the effect and 
operation of the Statute which s the determining faction and its purpose 
or motive. As such the court should not hold a law repugnant to the 
guarantee given by Article 15(1) if, as a result of the law a person is 
denied any right or privilege solely because of his religion, caste, race, 
sex, or place of birth. Lord Thankerton in a case'" arose under Section 
298(1)"'' Government of India Act, 1935, where the similar 
interpretation of the word 'only' occurring in the section was involved, 
expressed the views"^ similar to the second interpretation. The 
Supreme Court has also affirmed the second vie in its decision in state 
of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society^^^ involving the 
interpretation of the word 'only' contained in Article 29(2) of the 
Constitution. 
The validity of various legislation discriminating in public 
services have been questioned under Article 16. Thus in a xase, The 
Supreme Court struck down an Act,"^ under which the Collector was 
required to select persons from among the last holders of office, 
because it amounted to discrimination on the ground of descent. 
Similarly in reservation of posts in favour of Hindus, Muslims and 
Christians was held violative of Article 16(2) as based on religion,"' 
Almost similar problem was raised in Triloki Nath v. State ofJ&K,^^^ 
where the State Government formulated a policy of reserving fifty per 
cent of the vacancies to the civil services of the state for Muslims of the 
entire state of Kashmir, forty per cent of vacancies for the Jain Hindus 
and ten per cent for Kashmir Hindus. The state justified such policy 
under Article 16(4) on the ground that Muslims of the state and the Jain 
Hindus constituted 'backward' classes of the citizen who not 
adequately represented in state services under Article 16(4). The 
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Supreme Court did not accept State jurisdiction and emphasized that in 
determining whether a section forms a backward class, a test based 
solely on caste, community, race, religion, sex, descent, place of 
residence of birth cannot be adopted because it would directly infringe 
Article 16(2). The Court said that the normal rule contemplated by the 
Constitution is equality between aspirants to public appointments, but 
in vie of the backwardness of certain classes the state could make a 
provision for reservation of posts in their favour. But here was an 
instance not of reservation in favour of any backward class but in 
effect, of distribution of he total number of posts on the basis of 
community or place of residence. This was contrary to Article 16(1) 
and (2) and as hardly permissible under Article 16(4).'^' 
Article 16(1) and (2) of the Constitution are non-discriminatory 
provisions safeguarding the interests of the citizens on the principle of 
equality. These clauses have been invoked innumerable time ever since 
the Constitution came into force. Beside these Articles, there are two 
other Article i.e. Article 17 and 18,'^ ^ in the fundamental rights chapter 
which secure equality to citizens social justice and equality of status as 
contained in the preamble of the Constitution. Article 17 relates to 
abolition of untouchability. Untouchability is a perpetuating social 
problem in Hindu society, which is an offshoot of caste, religion, and 
descent. On account of this evil a considerable size of Hindu society is 
treated unequal in all matters of life. This article declares this practice 
of untouchability as an offence punishable under the law. Although the 
content of this Article has already been covered by Article 15. Thus, on 
the ground of untouchability no one will be denied access to shops, 
public restaurant, bathing ghats etc, but there could be this Article 
forbids all many more forms of unequal treatment. 
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The other Article 18 is related to the abolition of 'title'. The 
practice of conferring titles was adopted by British Government and is 
feudalistic by its very nature. It creates inequality and the formation of 
a separate class of elite in the society. A title is an appellation given to 
a person or family as a sign of privilege of distinction or profession, as 
the title of Lord. It is something that hangs to one's name as an 
addition. The recent conferment of honours as Bharat Ratna, Padma 
Vibhushan (Dusra Varga), Padma Vibhushan (Tisra Varga), etc. are not 
to be treated in the category of title, for these distinctions are not meant 
to be used as appendages before one's name. 
The above discussion of equality principle and the constitutional 
provisions to prevent discrimination not only on the part of state but 
private citizens also are the obvious evidence of the aspirations of the 
framers of our Constitution the create a new society to be founded on 
new social order, equality and economic and political justice. As 
regards the political equality, it is dealt under other provisions of the 
Constitution guaranteeing equal right to vote to all adult citizens 
irrespective of caste, colour, race, religion, or sex etc. In a democratic 
state the right of franchise is not only necessary for the formation of the 
government but the guarantee secures every individual to protect his 
right. Through this right arbitrariness or discriminatory attitude of the 
legislature as well as of the executive is restricted. The political 
equality or equality in right to vote is an essential ingredient of 
democracy. 
C. FROM EQUALITARIANISM TO EGALITARIANISM. 
The preceding discussion related to the principle of equality 
including non-discriminatory provisions'^^ in the constitution. Under 
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these provisions the Constitution prohibits discrimination in general 
and also on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or 
any of them. Article 325 guarantees political rights to every adult 
citizen. The guarantees of the above nature essentially ensure equality, 
secularism and help serve the democratic norms to develop in India. 
These guarantees are of great significance in view of the social and 
economic history of India, which has revealed varied inequities 
prevalent in the social system. Rigidified by the feudal society and later 
exploited by the British Government, this phenomenon resulted into 
pushing a large section of the Indian people into the realm of 
'backward class', which could be identified through the sufferings of 
that class of people. 
Social and economical inequalities have been working upon 
each other in the Indian society. The social inequality is the byproduct 
of caste system prevalent amongst Hindus. The orthodox Hindu view 
has been that society is divinely ordained on the basis of the four 
castes. The authority on which this view rests is the statements in the 
'PURUSHASUKTA' in the Rig Veda,'" wherein it was devised that 
each division alienated the other, both in material existence and 
spiritual matters with a sense of caste superiority in the life style. It 
ultimately exerted hierarchical domination over one another and 
inevitably gave rise to the division of professions. Intellectualism 
became the preserve of those were placed in the superior order and the 
performance of manual and menial jobs went to lower orders so much 
so that men in the lowest rung of the order ere excluded from the social 
life and were never allowed to live in the main habitat parts of the 
towns and villages. These people were classified under the Constitution 
as scheduled ca.stes and schedule Tribes. Because of total alienation 
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they remained socially, educationally and economically backward and 
today are much behind from the rest of the society. These two 
categories constitute a large part of the Indian population. Almost 
seventy millions of people are living in the backward conditions for no 
fault of their own. Poverty and illiteracy have pervaded them and they 
had never had a chance to ameliorate themselves. They are doubly 
sufferers, both socially and economically. Influence by these problems 
the framers of the Constitution decided to bring these downtrodden, 
neglected and harassed people to the level of the society and human 
dignity. They, therefore, took an unprecedented step in human history 
by enacting provisions in the chapter on fundamental rights to provide 
them opportunities to improve their social condition and come at par 
•f 
with the society. These are the provisions under which preferential 
treatment by the state are permitted for their rapid advancement. Under 
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Article 15(4), 16(4) measures can be adopted exclusively for persons 
who are scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and 'backward' both in 
terms of social and educational criteria. Such measures shall be 
constitutionally protected and would not be considered as violative of 
equality principles embodied in the Preamble or in Article of 
Fundamental Rights.'^''' Thus, the state can adopt measures to provide 
for the advancement of classes of citizens who are socially and 
educationally backward, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and 
notwithstanding that this may amount discrimination. Under these 
clauses i.e. 15(4) and 16(4) discrimination is permitted and protected 
for the educational economic and social developments. These 
discriminatory clauses are in fact compensatory classes for assisting the 
backward citizen without which it would not be possible for them, to 
compete with the advanced sections of the society. These provisions 
may appear to be in derogation of the principle of equality and the 
196 
spirit of the Preamble, but in view of the past history - Indian social 
conditions the permissible or protective discrimination is necessary to 
bring equality in the society where such a vast difference between the 
advanced and backward sections of the population exists and which 
cannot be removed without providing the weaker sections opportunities 
to improve their lot even at the cost of the rights of others.* 
The 15(4) and 16(4) essentially reflect the liberal and humanistic 
approach of the constitution framers in the context of Indian social 
facts. Under these Articles the states are empowered to discriminate in 
favour of scheduled castes, schedule tribes and backward lasses in 
providing educational and employment opportunities by reserving seats 
in the educational institutions and jobs in public services. Although, the 
matter of reservation is left on the discretion of the state but it has been 
held by the Supreme Court that the discretion is not absolute, the 
guarantee of equal protection is to be kept in mind.'^ ^ 
(i). Article 15 (4) 
Article 15(4) did not exist in the Constitution and was added by 
the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, after the decision of the 
Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairaian.^^^ In 
this case two separate applications were considered, one by 
Champakam Dorairajan and the second by C.R. Srinivasan. The first 
application was concerned with the medical education in the State of 
Madras. The State of Madras maintained four Medical Colleges with 
330 seats. Out of these 330 seats some were reserved but the major 
group of seats had for many years before the commencement of the 
Constitution been apportioned in the manner stated below. Likewise, 
the State of Madras maintained four Engineering Colleges and the total 
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number of seats available in those colleges were 395. Out of these, 
some seats were reserved, but the majority of seats were also 
apportioned in the same manner. These apportionments were done 
according to what was laid down in directive called the communal G.O. 
Thus, for every fourteen seats to be filled the candidates were to be 
selected strictly one of the following basis : 
Non Brahmins (Hindus) 
Backward Hindus 
Brahmins 
Harijans 
Anglo-Indian & Indian 
Christians 
Muslims 
Total 
: 06 
: 02 
: 02 
: 02 
: 01 
: 01 
14 
This communal Government Order (G.O) was adhered to even 
after the commencement of the Constitution. Indeed, in June 1950, a 
fresh G. 0. was issued substantially reproducing the previous 
communal G.O. Champakam Dorairajan moved for admission to the 
Madras Medical College and it was her case that the restriction 
regarding the number of Brahmin candidates made it impossible for her 
to get admission. She, therefore, applied before the Madras High Court 
under Article 226,'^* challenging the communal G.O. as void in as 
much as it violated her fundamental rights under Article 15(1) and 
Article 29(2) '""^  of the Constitution. Srinivasan had applied for 
admission to the Government Engineering College nt Gundy, but 
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owing to the restriction on the number of admissions under the 
communal G.O. he was denied admission, although on merits his 
application was for superior to those who had actually been admitted. 
He also made an application before the Madras High Court under 
Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the communal G.O. being 
violative of his fundamental rights under the Constitution. The Madras 
High Court against which appeals ere granted these applications taken 
to the Supreme Court. It was contended on behalf of the State of 
Madras that the communal G.O. could be sustained under Article 37 
and Article 46'"'^  of the Constitution. Article 37 contained in Part IV, 
namely, the Directive Principles, provides that the state shall promote 
with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker 
sections of the people, and, in particular, of the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all 
forms of exploitation. Reliance was also placed on Article 1,'^ ^ which 
provides that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in 
matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the 
state, but it contains clause (4) which lays down that nothing in the said 
Article shall prevent state from making any provision for the 
reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of 
citizens which, in the opinion of the state, was not adequately 
represented in the services under the State. 
Mr. Justice S.R. Das (as he then as ) held that none of these 
Articles had any application. Articles 37 and 4 were Directive 
Principles, which could not override the provisions of the Fundamental 
Rights. As regards Article 1, it as held that it made a special provision 
in the case of services, but there as no corresponding provision in 
Article 29. It as held that the classification in the communal G.O. 
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proceeded on the basis of religion, race, and caste and was, therefore, a 
clear violation of Article 29(2) of the Constitution and was void. By 
this decision the object of the state to advance any socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizen suffered a set back. The 
provisions contained in the chapter of Directive Principle of State 
Policy proved to be ineffective for being subservient to Fundamental 
Rights and unjusticiable in character. The Government, therefore, felt it 
necessary to amend the Constitution to nullify the effect of the 
decision, empowering the State to adopt measures under which the 
interests of backward classes of people pertaining to education could be 
protected. This aim of the government was achieved by the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, which added clause (4) to 
Article 15. The Amendment thus cleared the way of state to assist the 
backward classes both socially and educationally. 
It may be recalled that when (Article 9 according to Draft)'"''' 
was discussed by the Constituent Assembly. Prof K.T. Shah had 
moved an amendment that at the end of Clause (2)'^' of Article 9 the 
following be added: 
"or for scheduled castes or backward tribes, for 
their advantage, safeguards or betterment.'''^ 
But Dr. Ambedkar had opposed the amendment on the ground 
that it might have just the opposite effect on the object'''^ to be 
achieved. The proposal made by Prof Shah, which was suppressed by 
the Constituent Assembly has been resurrected and embodied by the 
Parliament'"'* in clause (4) of Article 15, within three years of the 
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functioning of the Constitution as a result of the judicial decision in 
Champakam case. 
(ii). Article 16 (4). 
This clause provides another exception to non discriminatory 
rule contained in clause(l) of the Article. Article 335 of the 
Constitution supplements this clause. 
In the pre-partition days the India elite, irrespective of the 
consideration that they were efficient or deserved, those posts, 
monopolized almost all high posts in government services. The high 
posts ere considered to be 'elite posts' must be occupied by elite 
persons, on the theory of 'ascription'. The abilities and achievement 
were rarely acknowledged. The other people were regarded as 
disqualified one way or the other. With this approach, most of the posts 
in government services were not in circulation and remained dominated 
by higher classes. Moreover, the British government gave more 
emphasis on the criteria of caste and social status in the appointment to 
government posts. This trend gave rise to an 'institutionalized' pattern 
of profession and hereditary employment.''*" Moreover, the Brahman 
community in order to maintain its superiority in the society has always 
remained vigilant for their education and economical advancement. 
The Brahmins had taken to English education earlier than the other 
communities and thus were in a position to enjoy monopoly of jobs 
under the government services. On the other hand the other 
communities woke up late to the opportunities then available. 
Ultimately they ere pushed much behind of the Brahmins. This resulted 
into the organization of the non-Brahmins movement,^ **' particularly in 
southern India. Certain measures were thereafter adopted to curtail the 
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Brahmin representation in services as well as education and the policy 
of communal reservation was actively pursued by the Madras 
Government ever since i.e. 1920''*^ There was similar non-Brahmin 
movement in Maharashtra according to Kaka Kalelkar Commission 
Report.'''•' In Mysore, it achieved remarkable success. Commiunal 
reservation adopted in different regions of south was of different forms 
that carried on against non-Brahmins communities. It may be noted that 
the Supreme Court in Champakam case quashed one such government 
order, which had been operating in Madras before the commencement 
of the Constitution, in 1951. When the Constituent Assembly took up 
this problem of 'communal reservation' for discussion, Sardar Patel, 
the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Minorities and 
Fundamental Rights, dismissed a proposal for communal reservation in 
the services as 'a dangerous innovation'. He asserted that 'this 
Constitution of India, of free India, of a secular state, will not hereafter 
be disfigured by any provision on a communal basis". 
This clause and clause (4) of Article 15 are thus the inevitable 
provisions in a society like India which is stratified on the basis of race, 
caste, and socio-religious views, that have erected class and caste 
barriers, resulting into economic and social inequality. Justice requires 
that inequalities in the society must be corrected by special measures to 
protect those who had been adversely affected and have remained 
backward. The Constitution, in adopting these measures has of course 
endeavoured to break the caste and class barriers and has moved 
toward purging the society from these evils. In doing so, a new socially 
equilibrium will be inculcated and total welfare would be enhanced 
which would ensure equality and would be in conformity of the Rule of 
Law. 
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the general public. For instance non of us, I think would like that a 
separate school should be established for the scheduled castes when 
there is a general school I the village open to the children of the 
entire community. If these words are added, it will probably give a 
handle for a state to say, 'well, we are making special provision for 
the scheduled castes'. To my mind they can safely say so by taking 
shelter under the Article if it is amended in the manner the Professor 
wants it. I therefore, think it is not a desirable amendment". 
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PHILOSOPHY AND WISDOM OF 
PROTECTIVE DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
THE CONSTITUTION, VIZ-A-VIZ 
JUDICIAL DICTA 
A. AN OVERVIEW 
The whole philosophy and wisdom of protective 
discrimination are based upon social justice, which seeks to promote 
equality of opportunity mainly in the field of education and services. 
The promotion of equality of opportunity, without eradication of 
backwardness, is not possible. 
This chapter deals with the concept of protective 
discrimination, which in itself highlights the causes of backwardness 
and the need to eliminate this curse. Broadly speaking classification 
of backward people has been made under the following heads: 
(a). Scheduled Castes 
(b). Scheduled Tribes 
(c). Other Backward classes of Citizens 
The scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have been defined 
under the definifional Article 366 of the Constitution and further there 
is a procedure to specify them through notifications by the President. 
Such specification, however, is subject to amendment, if any, by the 
Parliament. Identification, af^ er such amendment, is final and has 
never been questioned in the Court. 
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The question of identification of backward classes of citizens 
other than scheduled castes and scheduled tribes led to divergent 
judicial approaches because the expression 'backward classes' has not 
been defined in the Constitution. In the absence of such definition, the 
identification made by the centre or the states have been questioned 
before the court. An effort has been made, in this chapter, to analyse 
these cases in order to identify the class which could be treated as 
'backward'. 
B. CONCEPT OF PROTECTIVE DISCRIMINATION 
Protective discrimination, as has been dealt at various places 
so far, is a policy of discrimination, which is protected under the 
Constitution. This policy is obviously inconsistent to principle of 
equality, though it seeks to remove or diminish social, educational 
and economic disparity in the people. It is a social necessity. Prof 
Alexendrowics defines it in these words : 
Protective discrimination indicates the 
measures of protection including reservation of 
seats in colleges and posts in government 
services sanctioned by the Indian Constitution, 
by way of exception to the general principle of 
equality and non-discrimination embodied in 
Article 14, 15(1), 16(1) and 16(2) of the 
Constitution and in favour of the scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes and backward 
classes.' 
Reservation policy is not based on merit but a non-meritorious 
candidate is to be preferred on fiilfilling the basic requirements. In 
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Janki Prasad case,^ Palelkar J. pointed out that 'it is implicit in the 
idea of reservation that a less meritorious person is to be preferred to 
another who is more meritorious'. Reservation is an inevitable policy 
in the countries where there has been or still exist social stratification 
or a section of society had been economically, socially and 
educationally suppressed. With the idea of equality or of equal 
treatment, it is necessary to protect the interest of suppressed at the 
cost of the interest of those who had been ahead of them. It is a 
process to bring social, economic and educational equality. 
Reservation thus implies equality. Mr. K. Subbarao, former Chief 
Justice of India in his book writes : 
In the race of life, unless adventitious aids are 
given to the under-privileged people, it would 
be impossible to suggest that they have equal 
opportunities with the more advanced people. 
This is the reason and the justification for the 
demand of social justice that the under-
privileged citizens of the country should be 
given a preferential treatment in order to give 
them an equal opportunity with other more 
advanced sections of the community.^ 
Without giving preferential treatment to the weaker sections, 
the object of providing equal opportunity to them cannot be achieved 
. The achievement of such object is necessary to meet the end of 
social justice. 
It may be noted that reservation does not mean to absolutely 
deny or totally pull down the high class or advanced section of 
society. No doubt the interest of advanced section of society is bound 
to be affected but care has to be taken that they are not affected 
arbitrarily. Subbarao in his book further explains that our enthusiastic 
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protective discrimination may be resisted by others as illogical and 
unjust on many ground; first it would amount to punishing innocent 
people for misdeeds of their predecessors; second why should 
somebody be punished for discriminatory practice of others in past 
and lastly, the persons for whom preferences are awarded now are 
being rewarded for wrong done to their ancestors/ Therefore, it is 
desirable that protective discrimination should not be allowed to 
result into reverse discrimination causing social disapproval and 
tension. While making reservation under Article 16(4), therefore, care 
should be taken that unreasonable, excessive or extravagant 
reservation are not provided for that would be eliminating the general 
competition in field which may create widespread dissatisfaction 
among the employees affecting their efficiency. Thus, the judiciary 
has been involved in guarding the general interest by keeping the 
extent of reservation within reasonable limits. 
C. Constitutional Classification for Preferential Treatment 
A large portion of populafion in India continues to remain 
backward because of persistent economic and social inequities. The 
pervading socio-religious prejudices against a class of persons and 
also the privileges enjoyed by others acknowledged the existence of 
status with differential treatment amongst the various groups and sub-
groups resulting in the formation of socially, educationally and 
economically under privileged class. If preferential treatment is not 
given to this under privileged class they will confinue to remain in a 
state of backwardness. Only through preferential treatment we can 
raise the level of backward groups and demolish to an extent the 
barriers created by socio-religions prejudices and predilections. 
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Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru intervening in the debate on Draft 
Constitution emphasized the eradication of backwardness in 
following words: 
"May I say one word about certain tendencies in the 
country which still think in terms of separatist 
existence or separate privileges and a like ? This very 
Objective Resolution set out adequate safeguards to 
be provided for minorities, for tribal areas, depressed 
and other backward classes. Of course that must be 
done, ....It is right and important that we should raise 
the level of the backward groups in India and bring 
them up to the level of the rest. But it is not right that 
in trying to do this we create further barrier, or even 
keep on existing barriers because the ultimate 
objective is not separatism, but building up an organic 
nation, not necessarily a uniform nation because we 
have varied culture, and in this country ways of living 
differ in various parts of the country, habits differ and 
cultural traditions differ. I have no grievance against 
that ultimately in the modem would there is a strong 
tendency for the prevailing culture to influence others. 
That may be a natural influence. But I think the glory 
of India has been the way it managed to keep two 
things going at the same time: that is, its infinite 
variety and at the same time its unity in that variety. 
Both have to be kept, because if we have only variety, 
then that means separatism and going to pieces. If we 
seek to impose some kind of regimental unity that 
makes a living organism rather lifeless."* 
Mr. Nehru warned against the unpleasant effects of 
backwardness. If it continues, it would generate feeling of separatism 
and adversely affect the unity of the nation. Further it may act as an 
obstacle in making India a welfare state free from exploitation. 
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The backwardness developed either due to economic causes or 
was embedded in socio-religious conditions. These have proved a 
great curse and a stumbling block in the way of nation's progress and 
unity. The Constitution, therefore, endeavors to eradicate the 
backwardness by providing special facilities to backward section of 
people. In order to achieve this aim these people have to be initially 
identified so as to ensure that only right persons are benefited by the 
constitutional measures. The Constitution has included various 
provisions to safeguard backward classes under a given social set-up. 
A list of scheduled caste, and scheduled tribes is prepared and 
periodically looked into. Article 338 provides for appointment of a 
Commission to determine the condition of backwardness of the 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. Under Article 335 the states are 
required to consider the interest of these two groups without any 
prejudice to maintenance of efficiency in the administration. The 
President under Article 340 may by an order appoint a commission to 
investigate the conditions of socially and educationally backward 
classes. Thus under the various provisions of the Constitution care 
and precautions have been taken to identify and provide special 
facilities only to such backward people as one fulfilling the 
constitutional criteria of backwardness. Preferential treatment under 
various provisions of the constitution is available to scheduled caste 
scheduled tribes and other backward classes (hereinafter backward 
classes). 
(a). Scheduled Castes 
The definitional Article 366 of the Constitufion defines 
Scheduled Castes as follows: 
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"Scheduled castes' means such castes, races or 
tribes or parts of or groups within such castes, 
race, or tribes as are deemed, under Article 341, to 
be scheduled castes for the purposes of this 
Constitution.* 
Under Article 341(1) the President may, after consultation with 
the governor with respect to a State, specify the castes as Schedule 
Caste in that State.^ However the Parliament is having power under 
Article 341(2) to exclude or include any caste, race, or tribe. The 
President issued the Constitution (Schedule Castes) Order, 1950 and 
Constitution (Schedule Caste) union Territories Order 1950 which 
specified Schedule Caste with relation to each State and Union 
Territories. By virtue of Clause (2) of Article 341 and 342 Parliament 
passed in 1976 the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Orders 
(Amendment) Act. 1976. 
The scheduled castes suffer from the economic and 
educational background. Article 341(1) is aimed at providing 
additional protection to them. The President is authorized: 
(i). To specify castes, races, and tribes as Scheduled Caste, 
(ii). to limit the notification to parts of or groups within the castes, 
race, or tribes considering the economic, social and 
educational backwardness of that part or group, and 
(iii). to specify castes, races and tribes or parts hereof in relation not 
only to the entire state, but in relation to parts of the State 
where he is satisfied that the examination of the social and 
educational backwardness of the race, caste, or tribe justifies 
such specification. 
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(b). Scheduled Tribes 
Scheduled Tribes have been defined in the Constitution as 
under: 
'Scheduled Tribes' means such tribes or tribal 
communities or parts of or groups within such 
tribes or tribal communities as are deemed under 
Article 342 to be scheduled tribes for the purpose 
of the Constitution.' 
Under Article 342(1)'°, the President may be public 
nolification specify the tribes or tribal communities or parts or groups 
within tribes or tribal communities which shall be deemed to be 
Scheduled Tribes for the purpose of the Constitution. The President 
issued the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order 1950, which has 
been amended from time to time. By virtue of clause (2) of Article 
342 Parliament passed in 1976 the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes Order (Amendment) Act. 1976. 
Scheduled tribes are regarded as aboriginals who from the 
beginning generally lived in forests or the mountain valley. They 
were thus cut off from the mainstream of civilization with limited 
interaction with other societies. They were governed by their own 
customs and traditions. In India there is the largest concentration of 
tribal population after Africa. According to 1971 census, there were 
38,000,000 members of scheduled tribes, constituting 6.97 percent of 
the country's population." These tribes are about 255'^ in number. 
Since Independence, the tribal people have been of special concern to 
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the government. They constitute an important minority and large 
sums of money are being spent on them every year to ameliorate their 
economic conditions. The Constitution has assured them equal 
protection and a number of legislative measures by the centre as well 
as the state governments have been introduced to protect their interest 
and promote their welfare. The setting up of community development 
blocks and tribal development agencies are among the organizations 
which were initiated by the government from time to time to improve 
the conditions of these people. But inspite of all these efforts there is 
very little change and improvements in their economic and 
educational conditions. It is mainly because of inaccessibility to the 
areas they live, internal communication, diversity in their language 
and culture. 
(c). Backward Classes 
So far as the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are 
concerned they are defined in the definitional Article 366 under 
clauses (24) and (25) respectively but nowhere in the Constitution the 
term 'backward class' has been defined. It has been left to the state 
governments to spell out the term. The pointer to this effect can be 
found in the Constituent Assembly Debate, which had set out that -
"A backward class is a class or community who is backward in the 
opinion of the Government."'^ 
But it has been judicially conceded that backward classes of 
citizens are those who are economically, socially and educationally 
weak. Due to these reasons they lag much behind the standards of the 
socially and educationally advanced people. Apparently determining 
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the definition of backwardness of people should not be difficult task. 
It is directly and primarily related to poor economic conditions, which 
in fact governs all faculties of life. A poor father's son will be poor 
and remain poor till the economic conditions of father are improved. 
But it is submitted that economic weakness is not the only expression 
of backwardness some other factors also intrinsically operate that lead 
to backwardness such as ignorance, illiteracy or religious views 
dominate the mind that their condition of life has been so determined 
by God and as such the backward people seldom think to come out of 
their backwardness. This has been the condition in pre-Independence 
India particulariy in the rural areas. But after Independence the efforts 
of framers of the Constitution were mainly directed to reconstruct the 
Indian society on the basis of equality and fraternity. This was only 
possible when this large chunk of population, which is the victim of 
backwardness, is drawn out from their present state. In the post 
constitutional period the President of India appointed two Backward 
Class Commissions''* to determine the criteria of socially and 
educationally backward classes and to prepare a list of such classes as 
were to be entitled for preferential treatment under the Constitution. 
The necessity of appointing the Commission was felt in view of the 
fact that the matter of determining the criteria of backwardness has 
been assigned to states. The states in doing so generally defines 
backwardness in its own way and political expediency play its own 
role. For example, a difference arose between the State West Bengal 
and the Commission for Backward Classes on the criteria of 
identifying socially and educationally backward classes in the 
country. The Chief Minister, Mr. Jyoti Basu told the Commission in a 
meeting that the West Bengal Government did not recognize the 
accepted criteria for classifying backward classes on social and 
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educational factors. He was of the view that the Government, the 
economic factor alone appeared to be the proper way to classify the 
backwardness of a community. The commission did not accede to the 
suggestion of the Chief Minister and expressed its opinion that a 
Marxist analysis would not be applicable to India where peculiar 
system of caste has been operative for a long time.'^ This attitude is 
likely to prevail in other states also. 
The Central Government considered it expedient to appoint 
Backward Classes Commission primarily with the object to evolve a 
criteria in accordance with the constitutional provisions and 
applicable to all the states. The criteria suggested by the First 
Commission was not acceptable to the Government, and the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Second Commission 
let to large-scale violence throughout the country. 
In fact defining 'backwardness' is much more difficult than it 
appears to be. Survey oriented information disclose that there are 
under-privileged sections of citizens in all the classes and castes. The 
categorization of these classes becomes more difficult when caste and 
economic factors are considered as the basis of their identification 
and the Supreme Court has not accepted both the factors as rational 
and constitutional. Moreover, the impact of these two facts is 
inevitable also. The Supreme Court has expressed its opinion that 
backwardness must be understood in social and educational context. 
Rejecting criteria of poverty the court said that in view of the fact that 
India is by an large poor country, a large section of population would 
fall under the backward category, and thus the whole object of 
preferential treatment would be defeated. In some cases Caste as a 
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factor to define backwardness was approved but in many cases the 
court gave its opinion that caste may have some relevance but it 
cannot be the sole or even the dominant criterion. Such a view was 
expressed primarily to prevent perpetuation of the caste system and to 
guard against the trend that higher castes are not included in the 
category of socially and educationally backward classes of citizen. 
These efforts were aimed at balancing the equality in society as 
embodied in the preamble of the Constitution. 
D. PROTECTIVE DISCRIMINATION AND JUDICIA L 
ACTION 
1. Identification of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes do not come into 
conflict as the President does their identification. The Constitution 
authorized the President of India to make notification specifying what 
castes, races, or tribes or parts of or groups within castes races or 
tribes would be treated as Scheduled Castes'^ and what tribes or tribal 
communities or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities 
would be identified as scheduled tribes.'^ The Parliament under 
Articles 341(2) and 342(2)'* has power to include in or exclude from 
such lists any caste, race, tribe or tribal community. The state cannot 
prepare their own lists of schedule caste and scheduled tribes. The 
state governments or any authority except the Parliament under 
Article cannot alter the notification of the President of India under 
Articles 341(1) and 342(1), The specification by the President is done 
with the consultation of governor of each state. The Purpose of such 
notification is mainly to provide an authentic list of groups of persons 
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to be treated as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes for 
constitutional protections and avoids any litigation on this issue in the 
court of law. The specification, of particular caste, race, tribe or tribal 
community as scheduled caste and scheduled tribe cannot be 
questioned in court. In Parsram Vs. Shivchand^^ the determination of 
a particular caste as scheduled caste was raised. The Supreme Court 
held that in order to determine whether particular caste is a schedule 
caste within the meaning of Art. 341, one has to look at the public 
notification issued by the President in this behalf. It is not open to the 
court to securities by evidence whether a person who is described as 
of one caste also falls within a specified caste. A person specified as 
'mochi' in Punjab does not fall within the caste of 'Chamars' as 
included in the notification issued by the President. The court refused 
to make for this purpose, scrutiny of the gazetteers and the glossaries 
of the castes in Punjab. 
Provisions were made that a special officer for scheduled caste 
and scheduled tribe to be appointed by the President of India and that 
it was the duty of such special officer to investigate the matters 
relating to safeguards provided to scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes under the Constitution. A report, annually, was to be made to 
the President relating to such investigation, inquiry or evaluation of 
the working of safeguards.^" 
It was felt that a high-level seven-member commission under 
Article 338 would be more effective than a single special officer. 
After Constitution (Sixty-fifth Amendment) Act 1990 (w.e.f 
12.03.1992) the Commission for Scheduled Caste & Scheduled 
Tribes consists of a Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and five other 
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members. It is a permanent body. Provisions are not available in the 
Constitution for such a permanent body for backward class. 
2. Determination of'Backward Classes' and Judicial Responses 
Soon after the enforcement of the Constitution the Supreme 
Court, in state of Madras vs. Champakam Daroirajan was 
considering the validity of the order, popularity be known as 
'communal G.O.' which fixed the proportion of students of each 
community that could be admitted to State medical and engineering 
colleges. The G.O. was issued before the enforcement of the 
Constitution and it was being acted upon. The special Bench of Seven 
Judges came to unanimous conclusion that the allocation of seats in 
the manner aforesaid is violative of Articles 15(1) and 29(2). The 
court pointed out that while in case of employment under the State, 
clause (4) of Article 16 provided for reservation in favour of 
backward class of citizen, no such provision was made in Article 15. 
Soon after the decision in the aforesaid case clause (4) was 
added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 which reads: 
"Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of 
Article 29 shall prevent the State from making 
any special provision for the advancement of 
any socially and educationally backward class 
as of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and 
the Scheduled Tribes." 
Article 16 (4), which existed before the First Amendment and 
still exist in the same form, reads: 
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"Nothing in this article shall prevent the State 
from making any provision for the reservation of 
appointments or posts in favour of any backward 
class of citizens which in the opinion of the State, 
is not adequately represented in the services under 
the state." 
Article 15(4) speaks about 'socially' and educationally 
backward classes'. The words 'backward classes' are qualified with 
the words 'socially and educationally', whereas the words 'backward 
class' in article 16(4) are independent of such qualifications. The 
difference in terminology raises the question. Whether the term 
'backward classes' in Article 16(4) is to be understood in the same 
sense as in Article 15(4) i.e. socially and educationally backward 
classes. It has been held in several cases that the term 'backward 
classes' under article 16(4) is identical with 'socially and 
educationally backward classes in article 15(4), leading to the 
conclusion that there is no difference between Article 15(4) and 16(4) 
as far as the definition of 'backward classes goes. This opinion was 
consistently taken in various vases.^ ^ 
However, opposite view was taken in Indra Sawhney Vs Union 
of Indiana was held that the scope the of term 'backward classes' in 
Article 16(4) is broader than the term 'socially and educationally 
backward classes' in Article 15(4) and certain classes who qualify 
under 16(4) within the meaning of 'backward classes', may not 
qualify within the meaning of 'socially and educationally backward 
classes.' In the light of this decision it becomes more vital to know as 
to who are 'socially and educationally backward classes. Thus it is 
desirable to determine the scope of 'backward Classes, After the 
addition of clause (4) to Article 15, a problem of determining socially 
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and educationally backward classes of citizens, has been faced by the 
states. Moreover, the determination of socially and educationally 
backward classes of people is made by the states and the courts only 
test the legality and constitutionality of such determinations. The first 
case in which reservation for backward classes of people and its 
legality and constitutionality was questioned before the Supreme 
Court is M.R. Balaji V State of Mysore}* This case is having special 
significance because it laid the basis of classifying people into 
socially and educationally backward classes of people, as well as, 
fixed the quantum of reservation. Therefore, this is a leading case to 
be discussed in detail. 
Before Balaji's case, some development, which took place in 
the State of Mysore, should be taken into account. On 26"^  July, 1958 
an order was issued, declaring all the communities excepting Brahmin 
community as socially and educational backward and reserving a total 
75% seats in educational institutions in favour of socially and 
educationally backward classes and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribes. This order was challenged before the High Court. But the 
State conceded that there was some drafting error. The order was 
quashed. Again two orders" dated May 14, and July 22 in 1959 were 
issued and all communities excepting Brahmins, Banyas, Kaysth, 
Muslims, Christains and Jains were classified as socially and 
educationally backward classes. About 65% of the seats were 
reserved for such backward classes and Schedule Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes. Both the orders were challenged in Rama Krishna 
Ram Singh Vs. State of Maysore.^ ^ The High Court quashed the 
orders. Thereafter the state appointed a committee ^^  to investigate the 
problems and advise the government as to the criteria to be adopted in 
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determining the educationally and socially backward classes and the 
specially provisions which should be made for their advancement. 
The committee submitted its final report in 1961, in which it 
recommended that the only practical method of classification could be 
the one based on caste and communities. The committee also 
specified the criteria to be adopted for determining the educational 
and social backwardness of the communities and recommended that 
the backward classes should be sub-divided into 'backward' and 
'more backward classes'. The state adopted the test laid down by the 
report and on the question of communities, which should be treated as 
backward, the state made some variations and passed the impugned 
order on July 31, 1962, under which the backward classes were 
divided into two categories viz; backward and more backward. This 
order reserved 28% seats for backward classes and 22% for the more 
backward classes. The reservation of \5% and 3% for the scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes respectively continued to be the same. The 
result was that only 32% of seats were available to the 'merit pool'. 
The petitioners applied for admission to the medical and 
engineering colleges affiliated to or maintained by the Mysore 
University. They were refijsed admission on the ground that the 
Government Order of July 31, 1962, had reserved a certain 
percentage of seats available for specified categories and that none of 
them fell within those categories, nor could they be included in the 
remaining percentage left for meritorious students. In Balaji's Case 
candidates who had secured more marks than those admitted under 
the order challenged the validity of the order. Though qualified on 
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merit they failed to get admission only because of the government 
order. The main contentions of the petitioner were as follows: 
a. That the basis adopted by the order in 
specifying and enumerating the socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizens in 
the state was unintelligible and irrational and 
the classification made on the said basis was 
inconsistent with Article 15(4) and was a fraud 
on the power conferred by this Article on the 
State. 
b. That the extent of reservation prescribed by 
the said order was also unreasonable and 
extravagant. 
c. That the impugned classification impinged 
upon Article 15(1) as it was based on caste and 
was not saved by Article 15(4). 
The learned Advocate General contended on behalf of the 
state, that Article 15 must be read in the light of Article 46. and 
argued that Article 15((4) has deliberately and wisely placed no 
limitation on the State in respect of the extent of special provision for 
the advancement of certain castes or communities as specified in the 
order and it was meant to carry out the directive principles enunciated 
in Article 46. It was also obvious that unless the educational and 
economic interests of all the weaker sections of the people were 
promoted quickly and liberally, the ideal of establishing social and 
economic equally would not be attained, and there could be no doubt 
that Article 15(4) authorized the state to take adequate steps to 
achieve the object which it had in view. It was also suggested that the 
absence of any limitation on the state's power to make an adequate 
special provision indicates that if the problem of backward classes of 
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citizens and scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in any given state 
is of such a magnitude that it requires the reservation of all seats in 
high educational institutions, it would be open to the state to take that 
course. So, the reservation of large number of seats for the weaker 
sections of the society would not affect either the depth or efficiency 
of scholarship at all. 
Mr. justice Gajendragadkar (as he then was), delivering the 
Judgment of the court, observed that the result of the order was that 
68% of the total available seats came to be reserved by the 
government for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the 
backward and more backward classes. No doubt Article 15(4) of the 
Constitution enables the government to make special provision for the 
advancement of educationally backward classes and the Scheduled 
Castes and Schedule Tribes, but such provisions must be within 
permissible limits contemplated by the Article. Further, in 
determining the categories which were to be included in the order, the 
learned judge observed that government had applied in the main the 
test of castes. The classification of backward and more backward 
classes had been made on the basis caste. Although caste might be a 
relevant factor in determining social backwardness, it was not the 
only factor and hence the state had proceeded on the wrong basis and 
the resulting classification was invalid. The learned judge also 
observed that the criteria used by the state to determine educational 
backwardness also suffered from infirmity. The government had 
included in its list of backward classes, castes and communities in 
which the average student population per thousand was slightly above 
or very near or just below the state average. The approach was not 
correct and that only those communities in which the average was 
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considerably below the state average could properly be classed as 
educationally backward. 
In considering the scope and extent of the expression 
'backward classes' under Article 15(4) the court pointed out that it is 
necessary to remember that the concept of backwardness is not 
intended to be relative in the sense that the classes who are backward 
in relation to the most advanced classes of the society should be 
included in it. The backwardness under Article 15(4) must be social 
and educational. It is not either social or educational but it is both. 
The group of citizens to whom Article 15(4) applies are described as 
'classes of citizens' not as 'castes of citizens '. If the classification of 
backward classes of citizens was based solely on the caste of citizen, 
it may not always be logical and may perhaps contain the vice of 
perpetuating the castes themselves.^' 
As regards the extent of reservation the court emphasized that 
reservation should be adopted, but that reservation must not be of 
such nature as to exclude other communities as a whole. While 
accepting the difficulties of the adjustment of the interests of the 
weaker sections with the community as a whole, the court said in a 
general way that a special provision should be less than 50% and how 
much less than 50% would depend upon the relevant prevailing 
circumstances in each case. Hence, the court concluded that the 
classification made by the impugned order rests on the sole basis of 
caste, which in its opinion is nor permitted by Article 15(4) and 
...that the reservation of 68% made by the impugned order is not 
authorized by Article 15(4). Therefore, it follows that the impugned 
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order is a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the state by 
Article 15(4). The important issues involved in this case were: 
a. Criteria for backwardness 
b. 'Caste' and 'Class' issue 
c. Extent of Reservation 
d. Clause (4) of Article 15 and 16 were compared and the court 
laid down the following principles: 
i. Bakcwardness of class must be both social 
and educational, 
ii. Article 15(4) refers to backward class and 
not caste, but conceded that caste may be a 
relevant factor in determining social 
backwardness but it cannot be the sole or 
dominant test, 
iii. As regards the extent of reservation, it 
should be less than 50% 
iv. 'Backwardness' has the same meaning 
under clause (4) of Article 15 and 16. The 
court said that 'what is true in regard to 
Article 15(4) is equally true in regard to 
Article 16(4)".^" 
It may be noted that Balaji case also considered the report of 
the Commission^' appointed by the President under Article 340 on 
January 29, 1953, to investigate the condition of socially and 
educationally backward classes of people within the territory of India. 
The Commission found that caste couldn't be avoided in laying down 
the test for the determination of backwardness. But the court was of 
the view that caste is not the appropriate test except in the case of 
Hindus and thereby did not agree with the findings of the 
Commission. 
The main thrust in Balaji was to diminish if not absolutely avert the 
effect of caste, which had kept the society divided on the basis of 
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inequality, and to ensure equality and foster the values enshrined in 
the preamble. The court distinguished 'caste' and 'class' and 
observed that there has been different sociological effect. Class has 
been included in Article 15(4) and 16(4) because it has mobility 
whereas 'caste' is stagnant concept. There is no possibility of shifting 
a person of one caste to another caste. A Brahmin will always remain 
a Brahmin, howsoever he is ignorant or illiterate. A Harijan whether 
learned would remain Harijan. Caste system has the quality of 
generating separatism, a sense of superiority on religious, racial and 
cultural grounds. It widens the gap in human relations and negates the 
idea of universal brotherhood and social integration, whereas the 
concept of 'class' has opposite effects and tendencies. The former is 
institutionalized and the latter is functional and mobile. It is because 
of these reasons caste criterion is not only constitutionally prohibited 
but sociologically undesirable. But the question is, what then should 
be the basis on which person may be classified as socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizen so that the benefits 
available under the Constitution may reach to the right and deserving 
persons and also be protected from the judicial scrutiny in order to 
achieve this object. The centre and states appointed various 
Commissions. The reports of such commissions, in determining the 
socially and educationally backward classes of persons show that the 
classes of people who are backward belong to a particular caste and 
the caste and social and educational status are inter-related, as such no 
satisfactory basis could be deduced so far, which could be workable 
and acceptable to the court. The Commission, therefore, due to social 
complexities found it difficult to avoid caste in preparing the list of 
backward classes and considered caste as an unavoidable factor. The 
analysis of the cases hereafter taken up highlights this endeavour of 
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States to determine backwardness and the judicial responses on those 
determinations. Such endeavour of state and judicial responses 
disclose that for determination of backward classes mainly two 
dominant factors have been considered which are as follows: 
i). Caste Criterion 
ii). Poverty or economic criterion 
Apart from the aforesaid considerations the court in order to 
determine the ambit and scope of the expression 'backward classes of 
citizens', compared Articles 15(4) and 16(4) which is being 
considered under the following heads: 
Compatibility of Articles 15(4) and 16(4). 
(i). Status of Clause 4 of Articles 15 and 16, 
whether it is an exception, proviso or an 
instance 
(ii). Whether reservation of backward classes is 
possible under clause (1) of Article 16 by 
applying the principle of reasonable 
classification? 
(a). Criteria For Backwardness 
The states while making notifications and the judiciary during 
the course of its judgements adopted, frequently, the caste and 
poverty factors for determining the 'backward classes.' Hereafter the 
analysis of cases is taken up taking in view these factors. 
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(i). Caste Criterion 
As the whole operationalization of Article 15 (4) as well as 16 (4) 
is base on the determination of backward classes or people, it is, 
therefore, an essential pre-requisite to identify people as to who are 
backward. Backwardness in Indian social system is common 
particularly in the people who have been economically poor and in 
the social development they formed a caste identifiable by their 
profession or occupation. The Supreme Court has tested the adequacy 
of determining backwardness since Balaji's case. 
In Balaji's case the Nagan Gowda Committee Report^ ^ was 
rejected. Therefore, the government of Mysore brought out another 
order"*^  adopting different pattern for categorizing backward classes 
which is explained in para 2 of the order which stated as under 
Backwardness for purposes of Article 15(4) of the 
Constitution must be social and educational. The 
problem of determining who are socially and 
educationally backward classes is a complex one. 
An elaborate investigation and collection of data 
and examination of such data, which would 
inevitably involve considerable length of time, 
may be desirable. But the obligation of the state to 
make special provision for the advancement of the 
backward classes is a pressing problem and cannot 
be postponed. Pending such elaborate study and 
investigation of the problem government considers 
that the classification of socially and educationally 
backward classes should be made on the following 
basis-
(i). Economic Condition, and (ii) occupation. 
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By this order, the class of people whose annual income was 
Rs. 1200/- or less and who belonged to any of the following 
occupations- (i). actual cultivator, (ii). Artisan, (iii). Petty 
businessmen, (iv). Inferior services, and (v) Any other occupation 
involving manual labour, were classified as socially and educationally 
backward. 
Although the order did not take 'caste' into consideration for 
defining backward classes but the classification could not be spared 
and was challenged in the state High Court."''* It is notable that it was 
challenged on the ground that caste should have been taken into 
consideration for classifying backwardness as it was held in Balji's 
case that case in relation to the Hindu may be a relevant factor though 
it was also observed that it cannot be sole basis for determining 
backwardness. The High Court held that the classification made by 
the state was a very imperfect classification however observed: 
"It is clear fro the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Balaji's case, AIR 1963 SC 649, that 
in the very nature of things, there can be no 
satisfactory classification of the backward 
classes belonging to the Hindu religion, if we 
ignore the 'caste' basis."^•'' However the court 
upheld ^ the classification under Article 14 
because it had fulfilled the two tests viz; 
1. The classificafion being rafional and based on 
intelligible differentia and 
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2. The basis of differentiation having rational 
nexus with its avowed poHcy and object. 
Chitralekha."''' The Supreme Court thus got another opportunity 
to review the classification made by the state government brought the 
case to the Supreme Court in appeal. The court considered mainly 
two important issues: 
(i). whether a caste can be treated as a 
class of citizen, 
(ii). Whether a caste as a whole could 
be classified as backward. 
The Supreme Court in the first place said "it is obvious that the 
government as a temporary measure, pending an elaborate study, has 
taken into consideration occupation of the family concerned as a 
criteria for backward classes within the meaning of Article 15 (4) of 
the Constitution". The court held the classification as correct under 
the circumstances. Then referring the earlier of decision of Supreme 
Court and the interpretation given to it by the Mysore High Court, 
through Subba Rao J., explained,^ ^ in relation to that case (Balaji) 
that, two principles stand out prominently ; 
a. that the caste of a group of a citizens may be a 
relevant circumstance in ascertaining their 
social backwardness, and 
b. that though it is a relevant factor to determine 
the social backwardness of a class of citizens, 
it cannot be the sole judge or test in that behalf, 
and also pointed out that Balaji's decision was 
misinterpretated by the High Court and added 
that if the intention was to equate classes with 
castes, nothing prevented the makers of the 
Constitution to use the expression 'backward 
castes' instead of classes. 
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Subba Rao J., observed : 
"Article 15 (4) does not speak of caste but only 
speaks of classes. If the makers of the 
Constitution intended to take caste also as units 
of social and educational backwardness, they 
would have said so as they have said of the 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes ...The 
juxtaposition of the expression 'backward 
classes' and 'scheduled castes' in Article 15 
(4) also leads to a reasonable inference that the 
expression 'classes' is not synonymous with 
'castes'"^' 
Mr. Justice Subba Rao further expressed the opinion, in this regard : 
"Various provisions^" recognize the factual 
existence of backward classes in our country 
brought about by historical reasons and make a 
sincere attempt for welfare of the weaker 
sections thereof. They shall be so construed as 
to effectuate the said policy but not to give 
weight age to progressive section of our 
society under false colour of caste to which 
they belong...The juxtaposition of the 
expression 'backward classes' and 'scheduled 
castes' also leads to a reasonable inference that 
expression 'classes' is not synonymous with 
'castes'"."' 
Form the decision of the Supreme Court in this case the court 
took the same view, which was taken in Balaji's case, that caste 
should not be considered either the sole or dominant factor in 
determining 'backwardness,' however, caste may have some 
relevance for ascertaining whether a particular citizen belongs to a 
class. Furthermore, the courts have not oreciuded the concerned 
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authority from determining the social backwardness of group of 
citizens if it can do so without reference to caste. But, it has not made 
it one of the compelling circumstances affording the basis of 
ascertainment of backwardness of a group of persons. If the court can 
ascertain the backwardness of a group of persons on the basis of other 
relevant criteria it would not be invalid. 
Obviously the rationale of this view (of Justice Subba Rao) is 
that India being caste-ridden society operates predominantly on the 
consideration of caste, which develops a sense of separation from 
each other and prejudices in day to day life. In case caste is given 
importance then the vice of caste would perpetuate, and the 
egalitarian social set up as desired by the founding fathers of the 
Constitution would be defeated. Thus the Supreme Court in these two 
cases i.e. Balaji and Chtralekha rejected the view taken by the Mysore 
High Court that caste is an inevitable factor in determining 
backwardness, however upheld the order of Mysore Government in 
the later case, classifying backward classes on the basis of income 
and occupation. 
In another case, P.Rajendran v. State of Madras, *^ (hereinafter 
Rajedran) the same problem that whether a classification of backward 
citizens be made on the basis of their caste, was again considered by 
the Supreme Court. In this case, the state of Madras made rules for 
the selection of candidates for admission to the first year integrated 
M.B.B.S. Course. Rule 6 of those rules classified as socially and 
educationally backward and reserved seats for the classes specified in 
Group III of revised Appendix 17-A to the Madras Educational Rules. 
Rule 8 distributed seats in the M,B.B.S. course and provided for 
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admission on a district wise basis. The criterion fixed for determining, 
a candidate's district, was nativity. The candidate could ordinarily 
choose the district from where he had passed his S.S.L.C. 
examination or specified in his nativity certificates, or the place of 
birth of his parents or guardian or the sites of his parent's immovable 
property. The government constituted a number of Selection 
Committees to select candidates from each district for admission to 
the M.B.B.S. course. The petitioner's challenged the validity of the 
rules reserving the case seats for backward classes and distributing 
district wise seats in the M.B.B.S. course. They contended that those 
rules are contrary and an infringement of the rights available under 
Article 15(1) and 14 of the Constitution. The court struck down, only 
that rule which distributed district wise seats in the M.B.B.S. course, 
on the ground that it infringed Article 14. The court found that the 
classes of persons referred to in rule 5 as socially and educationally 
backward were only castes. But accepting the state's plea that each of 
those castes was as a whole socially and educationally backward, the 
court held that, in view of petitioner's failure to controvert the states 
plea and to establish that even one of those castes was not as a whole 
backward, the said rule was valid. The court further said: 
"A caste is also a class of citizens and if the 
caste as a whole is socially and educationally 
backward, reservation can be made in favour 
of such a caste on the ground that it is a 
socially and educationally backward class of 
citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4)".''^  
The above observation of the Court, that a caste is also a class 
of citizens if the caste as a whole is socially and educationally 
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backward, is a clear deviation from Balaji's and Chitralekha case 
which decided that the caste could not equated with class and caste 
could not considered as sole basis for determining backwardness. 
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Sagar** the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in 
Sukhdev V. The Government ofA.P.*^ the list of castes prepared by the 
State of Andhra Pradesh for purpose of selecting candidates from 
backward classes in Medical Colleges of the States, was declared 
invalid by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the ground that the 
order notifying the said list classified the backward classes on the 
basis of caste which subverted the object of Article 15 (4) of the 
Constitution. Therefore, the State of Andhra Pradesh prepared a fresh 
list, claiming to have been made taking into account all considerations 
and criteria given by the senior expert law officers and reserved 20 
per cent of the seats for the backward classes. 
The list was challenged in State of A.P. Vs P. Saga/^ the 
petitioner contended that the Government had adopted the same list of 
backward classes which was struck down by the High Court of 
Andhra Pradesh in Sukdeo's case'*^  and the new lists with some 
modification, basically the same, made reservation in favour of castes 
and not classes, infringed the guarantee under Article 15 (1). On 
behalf of the state it was urged that caste is one of the relevant tests in 
determining backwardness, and cannot be ignored in determining the 
socially and educationally backward classes; if a group has been 
classified as backward on other relevant consideration, the 
classification is not liable to be challenged as invalid on the ground 
that for the purpose of classifying the designation of caste is given. 
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The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that since the fresh G.O 
was under challenged and it was again prepared on the same basis it 
could not be sustained since it did not fall within the exception 
provided in Article 15(4). Thus, the court following Balaji and 
Chitralekha, declared the classification as unconstitutional being 
based on caste and community. Shah J., pointed out that the 
expression 'class in Article 15 (4) means a homogenous section of the 
people grouped together because of certain likeness of common traits 
and who are identifiable by some common attributes such as status, 
rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race, religion and the like. In 
determining whether a particular section forms a class, caste cannot 
be excluded altogether. But in the determination of a class as a test, 
solely based upon the caste or community, cannot also be accepted'. 
The court said: 
"The Parliament has by enacting clause (4) 
attempted to balance as against the right of 
equality of citizens the special necessities of 
the section of the people by allowing a 
provision to be made for their advancement. In 
order that effect may be given to clause (4), it 
must appear that the beneficiaries of the 
special provisions are classes which are 
backward socially and educationally and they 
are other than the scheduled castes and 
schedule tribes and that the provision made is 
for their advancement".'** 
In the opinion of the court reservation may be adopted to 
advance the interests of weaker sections of society, but in doing so 
care must be taken to see that deserving and qualified candidates are 
not excluded from admission to higher educational institution: 
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"Accordingly, the criterion for determining the 
backwardness must not be based solely on 
religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, and 
backwardness being social and educational 
must be similar to the backwardness from 
which the scheduled castes and schedule tribes 
suffer"/' 
The court interpreted the word 'class' as distinct from caste 
and made no departure from earlier two cases except Rajendran in 
which the class was treated at par with caste. 
After the G.O. of Andhra Pradesh was struck down, the 
Government appointed a Commission^" to determine the criterion to 
be adopted in considering whether any section of the citizens of India 
in the State of Andhra Pradesh are to be treated as backward classes. 
The Commission was appointed by a Government G.O., which was 
primarily to investigate and determine the various matters regarding 
the preparation of list of backward classes for providing a reservation 
in educational institutions and also for appointment of posts in 
Government services. The Commission after having completed its 
work submitted its report to the Government on June 20,1970. The 
Commission recommended a list of 92 classes which were classified 
as socially and educationally backward and for whom reservation was 
advised in educational institutions. The Government accepted the 
criteria adopted by the Commission for determining the social and 
educational backwardness of the citizens and consequently G.O.'^ was 
issued for identification of backwardness mainly on the basis 
following facts: 
i. the general poverty of the class or 
community as a whole. 
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ii. occupations pursued by the classes of 
citizens the nature of which must be 
inferior or unclean or undignified or 
unremunerative or one which does not 
carry influence or power, 
iii. caste in relation to Hindus, 
iv. educational backwardness. 
Under the G.O. 25% of the seats in professional colleges were 
to be reserved for backward classes. The order was challenged and 
the Andhra Pradesh High Court declared on May 13,1971, the criteria 
as invalid on the ground that the criteria adopted was mainly based on 
caste which is opposed to the principle laid down by the Supreme 
Court in Balaji case. This issue came before the Supreme Court in 
appeal in State of A.P. v. U.S. V. Balarm,^^ in which the court agreed 
with the High Court that the list of backward classes of people is 
based on caste but the court was of the view that even on the 
assumption that the list was based exclusively on caste, it is clear 
from the materials before the Commission and the reasons given by it 
in its report that the entire caste is socially and educationally 
backward.^ Thus, the court took the view that if an entire caste is as a 
fact, found to be socially and educationally backward, their inclusion 
in the list of backward by their caste name is not violative of Article 
15 (4) or in other words the view that a caste is also a class and the 
reservation in favour of an entire caste is not bad in law. The court 
concluded: 
"The list of backward classes which is under 
attack before us may be considered to be on 
the basis of caste, a close examination will 
clearly show that it is only a description of the 
group following the particular occupations or 
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professions, exhaustively referred to by the 
Commission, Even on the assumption that the 
list is based exclusively on caste, it is clear 
from the materials before the Commission and 
the reasons given by it in its report that the 
entire caste is socially and educationally 
backward and therefore their inclusion in the 
list of backward classes is warranted by Article 
15(1). the groups mentioned therein have been 
included in the list of backward classes as they 
satisfy the various tests which have been laid 
down by this court for ascertaining the social 
and educational backwardness of a class".^^ 
The Supreme Court did not follow the Balaji's principle and 
totally relied on Rajendran decision that if caste as a whole is socially 
and educationally backward, reservation can be made in favour of 
such a caste on the ground that it is socially and educationally 
backward class of citizens within the meaning of Article 15(4). 
In Triloki Nath Tiku Vs State of J & K ^\ the Supreme Court 
totally relied upon Rajendran's view on 'caste' as ground for 
reservation. The court held that an entire caste or community may in 
the social, economic and education scale of values at a given time be 
backward but that is not because they are member of caste or 
community but because they form a class. The approach of the court 
shows that there may be situations where the entire caste or 
community be considered as backward for being considered to be 
given protection. But the court disapproved the state policy and struck 
down the Government Order, whereby 50% seats for Muslims, 4% 
for Hindus of Jammu and 10% for Kashmiris were reserved saying 
that the state proceeded not to make reservation in favour of any 
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backward class but on the basis of community and reservation based 
on community, or place of residence is contrary to Article 16(4) and 
hence 'no reservation permitted by clause (4) of Article 16 can be 
said to be made.^ ^ 
The Supreme Court in Periakaruppan,^* approved the list 
framed on the basis of caste, and held that it did not suffer any 
infirmity because the entire caste was substantially socially and 
educationally backward. But the court struck down the unit-wise 
distribution of seats for the medical institutions.^' Thus, 
Periakaruppan followed the Rajindran view that caste could be 
equated with class if the entire caste is socially and educationally 
backward. 
In Janki Prasad Case^°, the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice 
Palelkar distinguished between 'caste' and 'class' and asserted that 
Article 15(4) speaks of only classes of citizens and the 'class' 
identified as backward must be both educationally and socially 
backward. The court followed Chitralekha case which discarded caste 
as the dominant criterion in the identification of backward classes of 
citizens, and observed that "if we interpret the expression 'class' as 
'caste', the object of the Constitution will be defeated and the people 
who do not deserve any aid may get it to the exclusion of those who 
really deserve. This anomaly will not arise if, without equating caste 
with class, caste is taken as only one of the considerations to ascertain 
whether a person belongs to a backward class or not. On the other 
hand if the entire caste by and large is backward, it may be included 
in the scheduled caste by following the appropriate procedure laid 
down in the Constitution". 
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Palelkar J., speaking for the majority, observed that "in 
identifying backward classes, therefore, one has to guard oneself 
against including therein sections which are socially and 
educationally advance because the whole object of the Constitution 
would otherwise be frustrated".^^ The court relied upon the principle 
laid down in Sagar," but deviated from Rajendra^ "* in which it was 
enunciated that the classification of backward classes on the basis of 
caste is within the purview of Article 15 (4) provided those castes are 
shown to be socially and educationally backward. The principle is 
attributed to the entire caste on the basis of which the classification of 
backward classes by their caste name will not be violative of Article 
15 (4). Thus the court rejected to equate caste with class. 
In another case State ofU.P. v. Pradip Tondon'^ the man issue 
for consideration for the Supreme Court was whether the instructions 
framed by the State, in making reservations in favour of candidates 
from rural areas, hill areas and Uttar Khand for admission of students 
to medical colleges in State of Uttar Pradesh was intra-vires of the 
Constitution. Ray, CJ.,^ * categorically rejected caste as the sole test 
for determining backwardness and observed that 'neither caste, nor 
race, nor religion can be made basis of such classification".^^ When 
Article 15 (1) forbids discrimination on such grounds, they cannot be 
made the criteria for determining backwardness, Article 15(4) will 
stultify Article 15(1). When a classification takes recourse to caste as 
one of the criteria in determining socially and educationally backward 
class, the expression 'classes' in that case violates the rule of 
expressio unius est exclnsio alteriiis. The socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens arc groups other than groups based on 
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caste. Validating reservation for candidates from hill areas and the 
Uttarkhand Division as instances of socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens the court opined that backwardness is 
judged by the economic basis when they do not make effective use of 
resources. When large areas of land maintain a sparse, disorderly and 
illiterate population whose property is small and negligible, the 
element of socially backwardness is observed, but the same could not 
be said for the rural areas as 80 per cent of the population in the State 
of Uttar Pradesh, who live in rural areas cannot be homogenous class 
by itself*" The Supreme Court thus laid down that reservation of 
seats in medical colleges for candidates from rural areas is 
unconstitutional. However, such reservation for candidates from hill 
areas and Uttarkhand division is valid.'" It further asserted that social 
and educationally backward classes of citizens are groups other than 
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groups based on caste. Caste, as sole test, for determining 
backwardness was categorically rejected. Janki Prasad was relied 
whereas totally deviated from Rajindran and Balram. 
In K.S. Jayashree v. State of Kerala, in which it was again 
asserted that in determining the backwardness, caste cannot be the 
sole or imminent test. In this case income criteria was adopted in 
pursuance of which the state government issued an order that 
members of families of certain specified communities whose 
aggregate annual income is below Rs. 6000/- which was revised and 
enhanced to Rs. 10,000/- would be entitled to the reservation. The 
petitioner in this case applied for admission to one of the medical 
colleges at Trivandram in the State of Kerala and produced a 
certificate showing that the total income of her family from all 
sources is Ra. 11,752/- for the year 1975-76 and she belongs to 
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Ezhava community. She was not selected, though candidates 
belonging to Ezhava community who obtained less marks were 
selected. The Principal, medical college sent a memorandum to her 
that according to specification of G.O., she cannot be considered 
under reservation scheme as her family income exceeds Rs, 10,000/-. 
The petitioner contention was that the exclusion of her case from 
reservation scheme was not based on rational ground for there was no 
reason to exclude a community on the basis of income and if the 
socially and educationally backward classes are set out in the 
annexure, income cannot be the criterion of admission to provide the 
benefits of Article 15(4). The state contention was that the expression 
backward class is not used as synonymous to backward caste or 
backward community. The members of entire community or caste 
may at a given time in social, economical, and educational scale of 
values be backward and may be identified as backward classes on that 
account. The reason is that they are treated as backward not because 
they are members of a caste or community because they form a class. 
The court accepted the reasoning of the state and dismissed the 
petition. Chief Justice, A.N. Ray," virtually reproduced the reasoning 
of GajendragadkarJ. (as he then was) in Balaji.^ "* Ray, C.J. Observed: 
"ascertaining social backwardness of a class of 
citizens it may not be irrelevant to consider the 
caste of the group of citizens. Caste cannot 
however, be made the sole or dominant test. 
Social backwardness is in the ultimate analysis 
the result of poverty to a large extent. Social 
backwardness, which results from poverty, is 
likely to be aggravated by consideration of 
their caste. This shows the relevance of both 
caste and poverty in determining the 
backwardness of citizens. Poverty by itself is 
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not the determining factor of social 
backwardness. Poverty is relevant in the 
context of social backwamdness". 
The learned Chief Justice further explained: 
"any classification of backward classes of 
citizens is based solely on the caste of the 
citizen, it will perpetuate the vice of caste 
system. Again, if the classification is based 
solely on poverty, it will not be logical".'* 
Thus the court rejected either caste or poverty as sole criteria for 
determining backwardness. However, it was held that social 
backwardness, which results from poverty, is likely to be aggravated 
by consideration of their caste. 
In Chotey Lai vs State ofU.Pr an advocate of Allahabad High 
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Court and some others challenged the order of government of Uttar 
Pradesh under which reservation, of posts in the state judicial services 
for backward classes, dependents of freedom fighters, ex-detunes 
under MISA and DISIR were made. The petitioners appeared at the 
State Judicial Services Examination, which had been held in April 
1978, to fill 150 temporary posts. Of the total posts 27 were reserved 
for scheduled castes, 3 for scheduled tribes, 8 for dependents of 
freedom fighters, 12 for disabled officers of Military services and 23 
for backward class. The main thrust of the petitioners was on the 
reservation for backward classes. The Order of the U.P. Government 
specified the backward classes that including Ahirs and Kurmis and 
some other castes. The petitioners contention was that the castes 
mentioned in the Order, were not backward classes within the 
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meaning of Article 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution as Ahirs and 
Kurmis are big farmers, and many of them are highly educated and 
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occupied high post. Hence, the entire castes mentioned in the G.O. 
could not be termed as 'backward class' within the scope of Article 
16 (4). Therefore, there was no rational basis for creating reservation 
for them. The vital issues involve in this case were the tests to 
determine whether a group of people included in the list constituted a 
backward class of citizen and secondly whether the Government of 
Uttar Pradesh had correctly determined as to who should be included 
in the backward classes. The other issues, which were included in the 
petition, were, eight post reserved for dependents of freedom fighters, 
12 posts for disabled officers of Military services. Eight posts 
reserved for dependents of freedom fighters were also available to 
those persons who were actually detained under MSA and DISIR for 
six months but this benefit should not be available to anti-social 
elements. These issues were neither much pressed nor the court 
elaborated it except that the court justified these reservations on the 
classification adopted by the state. The court referred some of the 
cases of Supreme Court'" wherein it was held that there could be 
valid reservations apart from those permissible under Article 15(4), 
that such reservation did not necessarily infringe the equality 
protection under Article 14 and that classification based on lawful 
state policy was not violative of that Article. Relying heavily on the 
principle that emerged from the decision in some of the earlier 
cases, Mr. Justice Misra who gave the judgment on behalf of himself 
and of Mr. Justice K.N. Goyal observed: 
"Reservation for children of Defence 
Personnel and Ex-Defence Personnel can 
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validly be made. The application of these 
principles can be extended to the children of 
freedom fighters who in consequence of their 
participation in the emancipation of struggle 
become unsettled in life and in some cases had 
been economically ruined, hence they were not 
in a position to make available their children 
that class of education which would place them 
in fair competition with the children of those 
who did not suffer from that disadvantage.' 
As regards the reservation of posts for backward classes of 
citizen and determination of backward classes, the two most pressed 
issues, Misra J. made a thorough and detailed analysis of all the 
preceding cases pertaining to the latter issue. In connection with the 
former it appears that the Government of Uttar Pradesh had been 
endeavouring to prepare a list of backward classes for providing them 
educational facilities. In 1945 the Edcuation Department of the 
Provincial Government prepared a list of 59 communities. Out of 59, 
38 castes belonged to Hindu community and 21 castes belong to 
Muslim community for providing educational facilities treating them 
as backward classes. After Independence a Sub-Committee of the 
Cabinet of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh again examined the 
matter. A list of 15 communities described as backward classes for 
the purposes of being considered for recruitment to the public 
services was drawn. Almost all these 15 communities were selected 
out of the said 59 communities without making any subsequent study 
of these communities. It was pointed out by the state that the reason 
for leaving the position undefined so far was that it was felt that the 
Backward Classes Commission would initially drew up a list of 
backward classes in each state and the list submitted by the state till 
then should be treated as working or provisional list and the same will 
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be replaced by the authoritative list when issued by the Backward 
Classes Commission. Thus, the list was merely a provisional list and 
working list. But the striking thing was that no reason was stated as to 
why the castes mentioned in the list were considered as backward 
classes. In other words the castes, which were earlier recognized only 
for grant of educational facilities, were in future to qualify also for 
preferential treatment in matters of recruitment to public services. 
In 1953, the President appointed a Backward Classes 
Commission. The Commission identified some of the castes as 
'most backward' classes of citizen. In December 1975, the state of 
U.P. appointed Chhedi Lai Sathi Commission for considering the 
conditions of what are described as 'most backward' classes as 
contradiction from 'backward' classes of citizens and to suggest 
means to improve their lot. What the Sathi Commission did was to 
enlarge the list of 'most backward classes' as identified Kaka 
Kalelkar Commission. The Muslim backward castes were set out in 
list ' C while the remaining were set out in list 'B' . The caste in 
respect of which exception has been taken by the petitioners are to be 
found in list "B'. About them the Sathi Commission stated that these 
castes comprised even big farmers and craftsmen and that their 
condition was much better than that of the 'most backward classes'*"*. 
Towards the end of the recommendations it was specifically 
mentioned 'that these castes did not really stand in need of any 
reservation, but ten per cent reservation was recommended for them.*' 
As regards the report of Kaka Kalelkar Commission, the 
Central Government did not feel satisfied about the approach adopted 
by the Commission in determining as to who should be treated as 
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'backward classes' under Article 15 (4). Mr. Justice Misra 
summarized the whole efforts of the State in determining socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizen as: 
"What we thus find is that the enumeration of 
certain castes among Hindus as well as 
Muslims as backward classes by the State 
Government is based ultimately on the list 
prepared by the pre-independence Provincial 
Government in 1945. That list was presumably 
prepared on the basis that those castes were at 
that point of time educationally backward, 
though even for coming to that conclusion the 
tests applied or the data acted upon are not 
disclosed, and accordingly, it was necessary to 
provide for them special educational 
facilities".'*^ 
In the above set of circumstances the state thus failed to defend 
the impugned G.O. and could not convince that it had applied the 
correct lists and proceeded in a proper manner after proper 
investigation. The learned judge therefore, found the G.O. 
unconstitutional and declared, the Government Orders'^ are a fraud 
on the constitutional power conferred on the state under Articles 
15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution in the sense the expression has 
been defined** in M.R.Balaji and are as such invalid. The High Court 
upheld the reservation for the scheduled caste and others while 
striking down part of the state government orders that applied to 
backward classes and the court regarded Kurmis and Ahirs and other 
castes mentioned in the Government Order as not backward classes 
within the meaning of Article 15(4) and 16 (4). 
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The Constitution of Independence India has given a new look to cast 
issue and envisaged to establish a society free from caste feeling. The 
Constitution distinguishes between 'castes' with 'Class' and defined 
that the social units who are identified as deserving to be specially 
helped economically, socially and educationally must not be based 
upon 'Caste'. The judiciary therefore, asserts that the 'backwardness' 
must be social and educational. But in actual differenfiation process, 
it has been experienced that the 'Caste' becomes an indispensable 
factor for the reasons that those who are 'backward' in any way have 
been so of their low 'caste'. Backwardness and caste are linked 
together or caste has played a distinctive role to keep them backward. 
It is on this faith, Supreme Court in Chitralekha case, relying o the 
opinion of Gajendragadkar J., in Balaji case observed that if class is 
treated as caste, the whole object of the Constitution would be 
frustrated. Justice Subba Rao in Chitralekha case took the view that 
cast should not be taken at all into account in determining 
backwardness as classes is not synonymous with caste. The court 
while considering the word class as contained in Articles 15(4) & 
16(4) of the Constitution, asserted that 'caste' and 'class' are 
sociological and ftinctionally distinct and disfinguishable. Mainly the 
following two opinions have emerged: 
(a). 'Class' cannot be equated with caste. 
However caste may be relevant in determining 
the backwardness but not sole consideration, 
(b). 'Class' can be equated with caste if whole 
caste is socially and educationally backward. 
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Finally comes the famous case of Indra Sawhney in the senes 
in which the principles regarding determination of backwardness has 
been crystallized along with other issues from Article 15 and 16 by 
the Supreme Court. Facts of this case, in brief, are as follows: 
In January 1979, the second Backward Classes Commission was 
appointed under Article 340 of the Constitution headed by Sri B.P. 
Mandal. 
The terms of reference of the Commission were:-
(i).to determine the criteria for defining the socially 
and educationally backward classes; 
(ii). to recommend steps to be taken for the 
advancement of the socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizen so identified; 
(iii). to examine the desirability or otherwise of 
making provision for the reservation of appointments 
or posts in favour of citizens which are adequately 
represented in the public services and posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Union or of any 
State and 
(iv). to present to the President a report setting out the 
facts as found by them and making such 
recommendations as they think proper. 
The report was submitted on 31'' December 1980 identifying 
as many as 3743 castes as socially and educationally backward 
classes and recommended for 27 percent reservation for them. On 
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August 13, 1990 Office Memoranda (called O.M.) was issued in order 
to implement the commission report, reserving 27 per cent seat for 
backward classes in government services. Consequently violent anti-
reservation movement continued for three month resulting in heavy 
loss of person and property. The Supreme Court Bar Association 
challenged the O.M. in question and its stay was sought. On October 
1, 1990 the Five Judges Bench of Supreme Court till the final disposal 
of the case stayed the operation of O.M.. 
After the change of government at the centre following general 
election in the first half of 1991, another Office Memo was issued on 
25"^  September 1991 modifying the earlier one, keeping in view the 
violent agitation. Following modifications were made: 
(i). Within 25 per cent of the vacancies in civil 
posts and services under the government of 
India reserved for SEBCs, preference shall be 
give to candidates belonging to the poorer 
sections of the SEBCs. In case sufficient number 
of candidates are not available, unfilled 
vacancies shall be filed by other SEBCs. 
(ii).lO per cent of the vacancies in civil posts 
and services under the government of India shall 
be reserved for other economically backward 
sections of the people who are not covered by 
any of the existing schemes of reservation. 
(iii). The criteria for determining the poorer 
sections of SEBCs or other economically 
backward sections of the people who are not 
covered by any existing schemes of reservation 
are being issued separately. 
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The Supreme Court considered the class-caste issue and 
elaborately opined in the following words: 
"Coming back to the question of identification, 
the fact remains that one has to begin 
somewhere-with some group, class or section. 
There is no set or recognized method. There is 
no law or other statutory instrument prescribing 
the methodology. The ultimate idea is to survey 
the entire populace. If so, one can well begin 
with caste, which represent explicit identifiable 
social classes/groupings, more particularly 
when Article 16(4) seeks to ameliorate social 
backwardness. What is unconstitutional, with 
it, more so when caste, occupation, poverty and 
social backwardness are so closely intertwined 
in our society?"'^ 
In some of the cases discussed earlier it was held that 
identification of backwardness with caste is unconstitutional with 
which the court in this case did not agree holding that one can well 
begin with castes, which represent explicit identifiable social 
class/groupings. The reasons for identifying backwardness with caste 
were given by the Court B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J." giving majority 
opinion emphasized: 
"...If a Commission/Authority begins its 
process of identification with caste (among 
Hindus) and occupational groupings among 
others, it cannot by that reason alone be said to 
be unconstitutionally or legally bad. We must 
also say that there is no rule of law that a test to 
be applied for identifying backward classes 
should be only one/or uniform. In a vast 
country like India, it is simply not practicable. 
If the real object is to discover and locate 
backwardness, and if such backwardness is 
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found in a caste, it can be treated as backward; 
if it is found in any other groups, section or 
class, they too can be treated as backward.''* 
The court emphasized that in a vast country like India 
it is absolutely not possible to apply a uniform test but if a 
real object is to discover and locate backwardness, and if 
such backwardness is found in a caste, it can be treated as 
backward. 
Objection was raised in the court against adopting caste as the 
basis of identifying backwardness in the light of Article 16(2), which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of 'caste' also. The court did not 
agree with the objection giving the reasons and further asserted: 
"The only basis of saying that caste should be 
excluded from consideration altogether while 
identifying the Backward Class of citizens for 
the purpose of Article 16(4) is clause (2) of 
Article 16. This argument, however, overlooks 
and ignores the true purport of clause (2). It 
prohibits discrimination on any or all the 
grounds mentioned therein. The significance of 
the word 'any' cannot be minimized.'^ 
Reservation is not being made under clause (4) 
in favour of a 'caste' but a backward class. 
Once a caste satisfied the criteria of 
backwardness, it becomes a backward class for 
the purposes of Article 16(4). Even that is not 
enough. It must be fiirther found that backward 
class is not adequately represented in the 
services of the State."'* 
The Supreme Court has finally settled that caste may be 
considered to identify backward class and further that Article 16(2) is 
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no bar for such consideration. Further, if representation in the services 
is inadequate of such class, it is entitled to reservation which will 
fulfill the object of Article 16(4). 
It is submitted that before Indra Sawhney case the opinions of 
the Supreme Court and various High Courts were not uniform. In one 
way or the other the judicial opinion played an important role which 
led to unsettled policy formulations by various states employing 
varying parameters and eventually such parameters could not provide 
positive results even after fifty years of independence. Even today the 
fruits of reservation policy do not reach the actual needy sections of 
the society. Identification of this section on the basis of caste will go a 
long way inter-alia we apply the principles of creamy layer and 
identification of backward classes and most backward classes with a 
sense of achieving the desired objects of protective discrimination. 
For the purpose of identification of backwardness, the basis of 
poverty or economic factor time and again has come up for 
consideration by leading to Indra Sawhney's case. It is desirable to 
make an analysis of the case so far decided, right now, dealing with 
'poverty' factor. 
(ii). The Poverty or Economic Criteria 
How far the poverty criteria would suit and be practical in 
India? The judicial opinion has sought to take into account this factor. 
In the Poverty is linked generally with the low caste people in the 
Indian society. To adopt the poverty criteria would thus be giving an 
indirect approval to the identification of socially backward classes of 
people on the basis of caste. In Balaji case, Gajendragadkar J. said: 
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Social backwardness is on the ultimate 
analysis the result of poverty, to a very large 
extent. The classes of citizens who are 
deplorably poor automatically become socially 
backward. They do no enjoy a status in society 
and have, therefore, to be content to take a 
backward seat. It is true that social 
backwardness which results from poverty is 
likely to be aggravated by considerations of 
caste to which the poor citizens may belong, 
but that only shows the relevance of both caste 
and poverty in determining the backwardness 
of citizen.' 
The court also pointed out the relevance of occupation and 
habitation could be the criteria of social backwardness.'* In 
Chitralekha," therefore, the Supreme Court reiterated Balaji. After 
Chitralekha, the Supreme Court had been analyzing the 'caste' and 
'calss' criteria with the poverty criteria gloved in. In 1973, the 
Supreme Court had an occasion to test the validity of the poverty 
criterion. In Janki Prasad,""* Plaelkar, J., referred to Balaji case and 
conceded that in India, social backwardness was associated with 
economic backwardness, but he refrained from adopting this criterion 
as it would make a very large proportion of the population backward. 
He adopted a new approach i.e. educational criteria by saying that:-
In India social and educational backwardness 
is further associated with economic 
backwardness it is observed in Balaji's case 
'that backwardness, socially and educationally, 
is ultimately and primarily due to poverty. But 
if poverty is the exclusive test, a very large 
proportion of population in India would have 
to be regarded as socially and educationally 
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backward, and if reservations are made only on 
the ground of economic considerations, an 
untenable situation may arise because even in 
sectors which are recognized as socially and 
educationally advanced there are large pockets 
of poverty. In this country except for a small 
percentage of the population the people are 
generally poor-some being more poor, others 
less poor. Therefore, when a social investigator 
tries to identify socially and educationally 
backward classes, he may do it with 
confidence that they are bound to be poor. His 
chief concern is, therefore, to determine 
whether class or group is socially and 
educationally backward. 
Justice Palelkar asserted that as a matter of fact, the concept of 
education was a cardinal element in social equipment and 
suggested that the policy-matter should ascertain as to who are 
educationally backward and extend protective discrimination to that 
section of society. 
It is submitted that the criteria of 'education' and 'poverty' 
have similar effects. The 'poverty' and 'education' criteria become 
coextensive and are unsuitable for purposes of protective 
discrimination. This may be evident form decision of the Supreme 
Court and High Courts in a group of cases."'"' 
In the case of T. Shameem v. Medical College, Trivandram,^^* 
the Government Ordcr'"^ based on Kumara Pillai Commission ""* was 
questioned in the Kerala High Court. Pillai Commission 
recommended that families whose annual income did not exceed Rs. 
4,200/- per annum would be entitled to the benefits of protective 
discrimination in the form of reservation. The Government increased 
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the ceiling of income from 4,200/- to 6000/-"" and then issued the 
impugned order, and insisted that only applicants belonging to the 
backward classed, who are members of families whose annual income 
is below 6,000/- p.a. will be entitled to admission to the seats reserved 
for students belonging to the backward classes. A single judge bench 
of the Kerala High Court found the income limit arbitrary, 
unsustainable and the poverty criteria as irrelevant to social 
backwardness. The learned judge said: 
The Commission has really accepted the test of 
poverty as the determining factor of social 
backwardness, it is here exactly where the shoe 
pinches. On page 36 para of he report, the 
Commission reached to the following 
conclusion: 
Members of the families in the state which 
have an aggregate income of Rs. 4,200/- and 
above per annum from all sources put together 
cannot be considered to belong to any social 
backward class whatever may be the caste or 
community to which they belong. 
The learned judge further said: 
The test of poverty cannot be the determining 
factor of social backwardness. According to 
the Kumar Pillai Commission Report and Ext. 
P.l G.O. : nobody who is not a member of the 
castes and committee listed in Appendix VIII 
to the Commission Report (Annexure in Ext. 
P.l G.O.) will come under the socially and 
educationally backward classes. The listed 
committees and castes are those who are 
treated as backward classes for the purposes of 
reservation in public services under Article 
16(4) of the Constitution. What has been done 
... is to take a few members of those 
communities out on the basis of their income 
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and to treat the rest as socially and 
educationally backward classes. The basis of 
this differential treatment is poverty and 
poverty alone. This cannot be the determining 
factor for determining the social and 
educational backwardness under Article 15 (4) 
of the Constitution."" 
Considering the income limit of Rs. 6000/- the learned judge analysed 
the issue from practical point of view and observed that, 
The income limit of Rs.6000/- cannot be 
considered to be just and proper. In a case 
where both the father and mother of an 
applicant are class IV employees in the state 
services, the aggregate annual income will be 
more than the ceiling fixed... Simply because 
they have got an income above the ceiling 
fixed can be considered as not socially and 
educationally backward and their son or 
daughter be denied admission. Viewed fi-om 
another angle also this ceiling of Rs, 6000/- is 
highly arbitrary. A family whose annual 
income is less than the ceiling fixed will not be 
in a position to send their children to a medical 
college. To maintain a son or daughter alone in 
a medical college more than fifty per cent of 
their annual income will be necessary. With 
the balance left, the head of the family will not 
be in a position to make both ends meet 
considering the high cost of living at present. 
The ceiling of income provided... is highly 
arbitrary and hence cannot be sustained."" 
The question that came up for consideration in State ofU.P. 
Vs Pradip Tandon^^ was whether the orders of the State of U.P. 
reserving seats in the medical college in the state for candidates from 
rural, hill and Uttarakhand areas of the state are constitutionally valid. 
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The contention on behalf of the state was that reservation for persons 
belonging to the rural, hill and Uttarakhand areas are for socially and 
educationally backward classes. It was also contended that these 
reservations are valid on geographical or territorial basis. The 
reservation was considered necessary in view of the lack of 
educational facilities in these areas who have been either illiterate or 
one with very modest education. The level of income is low and their 
economic condition is unsatisfactory. Considerable emphasis was laid 
on the feature that rural India is socially and educationally backward 
by reason of poverty. The court (through Ray C.J.), in this case 
reiterated the interpretation of 'caste' in Balaji and Chitralekha cases 
and held that 'socially backward classes of citizens are groups other 
than groups based on caste'."^ 
; On this reasoning the court accepted the people of hill and 
Uttarkhand areas as instances of socially and educationally backward 
classes of people and upheld the reservation of seats for them but 
refused to sustain the reservation for rural areas on the ground that 
rural areas represent socially and educationally backward classes of 
citizens. Ray, CJ, said that on the basis of 'poverty' and common 
traits of agriculture the majority population of rural areas of the 
state cannot be a homogenous class."^ The court said that it is 
incomprehensible as to how 80.1 per cent of the rural population 
areas or 7.5 crores in rural parts in Uttar Pradesh can be suggested to 
be socially backward because of poverty. The court further asserted 
that it lis also not possible to predict poverty as the common trait of 
rural people. Poverty in rural areas cannot be the basis of 
class!fiication to support reservation for rural areas. Poverty is found 
in all parts of India.""* Thus criteria of'poverty' as the basis of social 
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and educational backwardness enunciated in Janki Prasad was not 
followed in the above case. 
It is striking to note that the Kerala High Court, accepting the 
recommendations of Pillai Commission upheld the poverty criteria in 
State of Kerala v/s Krishan Kumari^^^ by overruling its own decision 
in Sh^meem case.''* P.G. Nair, C, J, analysed the judgments of all 
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the previous cases including Balaji, wherein 'poverty' was not 
accepted as criteria for the determination of socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens, though considerable emphasis was 
given. Nair, C.J., regarded poverty as one of the most important 
element responsible for social and educational backwardness. Citing 
from R. Jacob case " ' h e pointed out that, 
In these regions of human life and values the 
clear cut distinctions of cause and effect merge 
into each other. Social backwardness 
contributes to educational backwardness, 
perpetuates social backwardness and both are 
often no more than the inevitable corollaries of 
the extremes of poverty and the deadening 
weight of custom and tradition.'^" 
Further the observations of Gajendragadkar, J., in Balaji 
case was cited to show that 
Social backwardness is in the ultimate anaylsis 
the result of poverty to a very large extent. The 
classes of citizens who are deplorably poor 
automatically become backward. 
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The Chief Justice asserted: 
We do not understand the judgment as laying 
down that poverty is not a relevant factor. All 
that has been ruled is that poverty cannot be a 
determining factor. The very same judgment 
stresses the relevancy of poverty and accepts 
the position that it is one of the elements to be 
considered in determining social and 
111 
educational backwardness. 
The learned Chief Justice accordingly felt that 'poverty' plays 
a very dominant role in preventing the citizen to make any effort 
towards social and educational advancement and the citizens by their 
position of stagnation become backward. Stressing 'poverty' as a 
relevant factor Chief Justice Nair finally said.: 
The conclusion therefore is irresistible that 
poverty or economic standards is a relevant 
factor in determining social backwardness or 
even educational backwardness because the 
economic position has a direct nexus to social 
and educational status. Economic 
backwardness contributes to social 
backwardness and prevents educational 
advancement.'^^ 
Thus, Kerala High Court reversed Shameem'^ '*to upheld the 
criterion of 'poverty' and laid down that economic backwardness 
plays a part in social backwardness and in educational backwardness. 
Poverty is a relevant factor. Economic backwardness contributes to 
social backwardness.'^^ 
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In K.S. Jayshree Vs State of Keala,'^* 'poverty' element came 
for cqnsideration before Supreme Court. The brief facts of this case 
has already been mentioned during the consideration of caste factor 
for idbntifying backwardness. It was clearly observed that poverty by 
itself could not be considered as sole criteria for determining social 
backwardness. A.N. Ray, C.J.'^' held: 
"Social backwardness in the ultimate analysis 
is the result of poverty to a large extent. Social 
backwardness, which result from poverty, is 
likely to be aggravated by consideration of 
their caste. This shows the relevance of both 
caste and poverty in determining the 
backwardness of citizens. Poverty by itself is 
not the determining factor of social 
backwardness. Poverty is relevant in the 
context of social backwardness."'^' 
: Thus the court accepted the relevancy of caste and poverty 
both for determining backwardness within the meaning of Article 
15(4). Poverty by itself is not relevant in determining factor for social 
backwardness but it may be relevant in the context of social 
backwiardness. Thus the court held that poverty can be adopted as a 
criteria for determining social backwardness and unless social 
backwardness is ascertained we cannot proceed to determine the 
backwardness within the meaning of Article 15(4). 
K.C, Vasant Kumar VState of Karnataka^^^ is an unusual case 
in which the court expressed its view without reference to any 
specific facts. The Kamataka government wanted to appoint a 
commission for examining the question for affording better 
educational and employment opportunities and the government 
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requested the court to lay down guidelines for the commission on the 
issue of reservation under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). The five judges of 
the court, however, expressed a diversity of views. 
According to Chandrachud, CJ., two tests should be 
conjunctively applied for identifying backward classes:'^' 
(i). They should be comparable to the Scheduled 
Caste and Scheduled Tribes in the matter of 
backwardness, and 
(ii).They should satisfy the means test laid down 
by the state government in the context of 
prevailing economic conditions. 
Desai, J. is against 'caste' being regarded as a major 
determiinant of backwardness. He has argued, "If state patronage for 
preferred treatment accepts caste as the only insignia for determining 
social and educational backwardness the danger looms large that this 
approach alone would legitimize and perpetuate caste system.""^ He 
opined: "the only criterion which can be realistically devised is the 
one of economic backwardness." 
Chinnappa Reddy, J. observed: "Poverty, caste, occupation and 
habitation" are the principal factors contributing to "social 
backwardness""^ Further he was of the view that identification of 
backward classes on the basis of caste cannot be taken exception to 
for the reason that in the Indian context caste is a class. Caste the 
learned, Judge said, is the primary index of social backwardness so 
that social backwardness is often readily identifiable with reference to 
person's caste. According to Sen, J.: 
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"The predominant and the only actor for making 
special provisions under Article 15(4) or for 
reservation of posts and appointments under 
Article 16(4) should be poverty, and caste or a 
sub caste or a group should be used only for 
identification of persons comparable to 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes."'^'* 
Venkataramiah, J. agreed with Chinnappa Reddy, J. that 
identification of backwardness can be made on the basis of caste, he 
has, however suggested 'caste-cum-means' test as a 'rational test' to 
identify backward people for the purpose of Article 15(4) and 16(4) 
for all members of a caste need not be treated as backward.' ' 
It is submitted that the following two views explicitly come 
out made by judges in vasnat Kamar case:'^^ 
(i). 'Poverty' is predominant or one of the 
principal factors for determining backwardness. 
(ii).'Poverty' is a relevant factor in the context 
of prevailing economic conditions in 
determining the backwardness. 
In some way or the other almost all the judges emphasized that 
poverty factor cannot be altogether ruled out in determining 
backwardness. 
Now, ciomes the important case Indra Sawhney V. Union of India. '^' 
The court observed: 
"...a backward class cannot be determined only 
and exclusively with reference to economic 
criterion. It may be a consjderation or basis 
alongwith and in addition to social 
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backwardness but it can never be the sole 
criterion.""" 
Thus it is submitted that the court did not agree with the view 
of Desai, J. expressed in Vasant Kumar Case. It is thus, finally, 
settled that poverty or economic factor cannot be sole criterion for 
determination of backwardness. However it is submitted that 
consistently, the economic factor though not sole but a relevant factor 
for determining backwardness in association with other factors. 
A survey of cases from Balaji to Indra Sawhney indicates that 
in order to determine 'backward class of citizens' various tests have 
been applied. Mainly two factors i.e. caste and poverty have been 
taken into account. Five sets of opinions have emerged which are as 
follows: 
(i).Caste is equated with class - caste in the sole 
factor for identifying backward class if the 
whole caste is socially and educationally 
backward.'^" 
(ii).Caste is not equated with class - Poverty is 
the principal factor for determining backward 
classes."'*' 
(iii).'Caste cum means test' 142 
(iv).Neither caste nor poverty could be taken as 
sole factor but are to relevant in determining the 
backwardness,''*' 
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(v).If backwardness is found a caste, it can be treated as 
backward; if it is found in any other group, section or 
class, they too can be treated as backward.' * 
(b). Article 15 (4) & 16 (4) - Compatibility and Judicial 
Treatment 
Article 15 (1) prohibits the state from making any 
discrimination against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15 (4) allows 
discrimination, which reads 
Nothing in this Article or in clause (2) of 
Article 29 shall prevent the state from making 
any special provision for the advancement of 
any socially and educationally backward 
classes of citizens or for the scheduled castes 
and scheduled tribes. 
Article 16 of the Constitution contains five clasuses.'''^ Clause 
(1) embodies basic principle that there shall be equality of 
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any office under the state. Clause (4) of this Article 
authorities the state to protect the interests of backward classes of 
citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any 
office under the state. It reads: 
Nothing in this Article shall prevent the state 
from making any provision for the reservation 
of appointments or posts in favour of any 
backward class of citizens which, in the 
opinion of the state, is not adequately 
represented in the services under the state. 
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ITie High Courts and Supreme Court interpreted the two 
provisions on several occasions. In both the provisions the expression 
'backward' classes of citizens has been used with the difference that 
in Article 15(4), this expression is qualified by 'social and 
educational' whereas in Article 16(4) a condition is attended i.e. 
"which in the opinion of the state is not adequately represented in the 
services under the state." The court in almost all the cases in which 
the interpretation of 'backward class' was involved, said that his 
expression of both the provisions has the same and similar 
meaning.'"*^ In Janki Prasad case,'"*^ Palelkar J., speaking for the 
Constitution Bench stated: 
"Article 15 (4) speaks about socially and 
educationally backward classes of citizens 
while Article 16 (4) speaks only of 'any 
backward class of citizens'. However, it is now 
settled that the expression 'backward class of 
citizens' in Article 16 (4) means the same thing 
as the expression 'any socially and 
educationally backward called of citizens in 
Article 15 (4). In order to qualify for being 
classed a 'backward class citizen', he must be a 
member of socially and educationally 
backward class. It is social and educational 
backwardness of a class which is material for 
purpose of both Article 15 (4) and 16 (4).'^"" 
The matter, as to whether 'backwardness' in Article 15(4) and 
16(4) has the same meaning, came for consideration in Indra 
Sawhney's Case.''" It was held: 
"Clause (4) of Article 16 does not contain the 
qualifying words 'socially and educationally' 
as does clause(4) of Article 15. It may be 
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remembered that Article 340 (which has 
remained unamended) does employ the 
expression 'socially and educationally 
backward classes' and yet that expression does 
not find place in Article 16(4). The reason is 
obvious: 'backward class of citizens' in Article 
16(4) takes in Scheduled Caste, Scheduled 
Tribes and all other backward classes of 
citizens including the socially and 
educationally backward classes. Thus, certain 
classes which may not qualify for Article 15(4) 
may qualify for Article 16(4)." '•'"' 
The court flirther emphasized: 
"if one keeps in mind the context in which 
Article 16(4) was enacted it would be clear that 
the accent was upon social backwardness. It 
goes without saying that in Indian context, 
social backwardness leads to educational 
backwardness and both of them together lead 
to poverty - which in turn breads and 
perpetuates the social and educational 
backwardness."'^' 
Earlier the courts took the view, consistently, that 
'backwardness' has the same meaning for both Articles 
15(4) and 16(4). But in Indra Sawhney's case' different view 
was taken. The view taken, was that meaning of 
backwardness' under Article 16(4) is wider than Article 
15(4). 
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(i). Article 16(4) - exception, proviso or instance of 
Article 16(1) ? 
According to the principles which have been enunciated the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in Balaji, " Chitralekha, " and 
Devadasan'•''•* these two provisions viz., Article 15 (4) and 16(4) are 
exception to clause (1) of Article 15 and clause (1) of Article 16 
respectively. By exception it does not mean that clause (4) of Article 
15 and clause (4) of Article 16 render clause (1) of both the Article 
ineffective or inoperative. But the court while considering the effect 
of these provisions upon each other kept the interest of backward 
classes of people in view. The court thus maintained a balance 
between two competing interests and did not suppress other's 
interests. This is what the court did in Balaji. It preserved the rights of 
the citizens, having merit and efficiency while protecting the interest 
of the weaker section. In Janki Prasad case,'^^ Palelkar J., reproduced 
the observations of Shah J., (as he then was ) in State of A.P. v. P. 
Sagar^^^ Palelkar, J. described the scope of clause (4) of Article 15 
holding it as an exception to clause (1) of Article 15, in the following 
words: 
Clause (4) is an exception to clause (1) being 
an exception; it cannot be extended so as in 
effect to destroy the guarantee of clause (1). 
The Parliament has by enacting clause (4) 
attempted to balance as against the right of 
equality of citizens the special necessities of 
the weaker sections of the people by allowing 
a provision to be made for their advancement. 
In order that effect may be given to clause (4), 
it must appear that the beneficiaries of the 
special provision are classes which are 
backward socially and educationally and they 
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are other than the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes and that the provision made is 
for their advancement. Reservation may be 
adopted to advance the interests of weaker 
sections of society, but in doing so, care must 
be taken to see that deserving and qualified 
candidates are not excluded fi"om admission to 
higher educational institutions. The criterion 
for determining the backwardness must not be 
based solely on religion, race, caste, sex, or 
place of birth and the backwardness being 
social and educational must be similar to the 
backwardness fi'om which the scheduled castes 
and scheduled tribes suffer.'^ ^ 
It is submitted that prominently the aforesaid four cases i.e. 
Balaji, Chitralekha, Devadasan and Janki Prasad held that clause 4 of 
Article 16(4) an exception to clause (1) of Article 16. However it is 
worth noting that way back in 1964 in Vevadasan case, Subbarao, J., 
opined in his dissenting opinion that Article 16(4) is not an exception 
to Article 16(1) but it is only an emphatic way of stating the priciple 
inherent in the main provision itself''''* This dissenting opinion of 
Subbarao, J., was upheld in Thomas case'^' in which the majority 
(Ray, C.J., Mathew, Krishan Iyer and Fazal Ali, JJ.) stated that 
Article 16(4) in not an exception to Article 16(1) but it was merely an 
emhatic way of stating principles implicit in Article 16(1). Finally, in 
Indra Sawhney case'*" the court held: 
"We too believe that Article 16(1) does permit 
reasonable classification for ensuring 
attainment of the equality of opportunity 
assured by it. For assuring equality of 
opportunity, it may well be necessary in certain 
situations to treat unequally situated persons 
unequally. Not doing so, would perpetuate and 
accentuate in equality. Article 16(4) is an 
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instance of such classification, put in to place 
the matter beyond controversy. The "backward 
class of citizens" are classified as a separate 
category deserving a special treatment in the 
nature of reservation of appointments/posts in 
services of the state. Accordingly, we hold that 
clause (4) of Article 16 is not an exception to 
clause (1) of Article 16. It is an instance of 
classification implicit in and permitted by 
clause (l)."'**' 
The consistent view taken in various cases'* that Article 16(4) 
is an exception of Article 16(1) was not accepted in Thomas'*^ case 
and same view was taken in Indra Sawhney's case with the difference 
that in Thomas case the court opined that Article 16(4) is an emphatic 
way of stating the principle inherent in the main provision i.e. 16(1) 
whereas in Indra Sawhney case the court stated that Article 16(4) is 
an instance of Article 16(1). Further the court held that: 
(a). Article 16(1) permits reasonable 
classification for ensuring attainment of equality 
(b). For assuring equality of opportunity it may 
well be necessary in certain situation to treat 
unequally situated person unequally. 
Now it is settled that Article 16(4) is an instance of Article 
16(1) rather than exception or proviso. Apart fi-om this the court 
observed that Article 16(1) permits reasonable classification being a 
facet of Article 14. 
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(ii). Whether 16(1) permits reservation? 
The ambit of Article 16(1) with respect to Article 16(4) was 
also came for consideration in Indra Sawhney's case. The court 
observed: 
"We wish to clarijfy one particular aspect. 
Article 16(1) is a facet of Article 14. Just as 
Article 14 permits reasonable classification, so 
does Article 16(1). A classification may 
involve reservation of seats or vacancies, as the 
case may be. In other words, under clause (1) 
of Article 16, appointments and/or posts'^ "*^  can 
be reserved in favour of a class." 
Thus, the inference is that reservation could be made even 
under 16(1) by applying the principle of reasonable classification. 
The question arises, what is that class which come within the purview 
if Article 16(1)? The Court explained the view in the following 
words: 
"On a fuller consideration of the matter we are 
of the opinion the clause (4) is not, and cannot 
be held to be, exhaustive of the concept of 
reservations; if is exhaustive of reservations in 
favour of backward classes alone. Merely 
because, one form of classification ins stated as 
a specific clause, it does not follow that the 
very concept and power of classification 
implicit in clause (1) is exhausted thereby. To 
say so would not be correct in principle. But, at 
the same time, one thing is clear. It is very 
exceptional situations - not for all and sundry 
reasons-that any further reservation, of 
whatever kind, should be provided under 
clause (1). In such cases, the state has to satisfy 
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if called upon, that making such provision was 
necessary (in public interest) to redress a 
specific situation. '*^" 
It is submitted that from the aforesaid observations the 
following inferences may clearly be deduced: 
1. The claims for reservations on the ground of 
'Backward Classes' could be made only under 
Article 16(4) and not under Article 16(1). 
2. Applying the principle of reasonable 
classification may make under Article 16(1) 
reservations. 
3. Reservation of a class other than backward 
classes may be made only in very exceptional 
situations and the state has to satisfy that such 
provision for reservation was necessary, in 
public interest, at a given point of time, to 
redress a specific situation. 
E. LIMITATION AND LAXITIES 
The consideration for limitation arose in Balaji's case under 
the background that the quantum of reservation should not be allowed 
to go beyond the contemplated constitutional scheme. The reservation 
to needy class is permissible in order to raise their status so that they 
may compete with the advanced section of society in a fair manner 
but not at the cost of merit and efficiency. 
Secondly, Nagan Gowda Committee way back in 1961 
classified 'backward classes' into 'backward' and more 'backward' 
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classes. The matter from Balaji's to Indra Sawhney's did not escape 
the consideration by the courts. 
Thirdly, the policy of reservation is to facilitate the actual 
needy persons and to eliminate those who have been already 
benefited. The idea is to identify that compact backward class who is 
entitled for reservation and hence the concept of creamy layer came 
for consideration. 
Thus under the head of limitation and Laxities the following 
points are taken up: 
(i). Limitation on Reservation 
(ii). Backward and More backward 
classification 
(iii). Concept of creamy Layer 
(i). Limitation on Reservation 
The State may provide reservation, to weaker sections of the 
society, in educational institutions and government services under 
Article 15(4) and 16(4). Article 15(4) is silent about the extent of 
reservation whereas Article 16(4) enumerates merely for adequate 
representation. This clause came to be interpretated for the first time 
by Supreme Court in Balaji case.'^' In this case, the court laid down a 
general principle in regard to the extent of reservation by saying: 
"The reservation should and must be adopted 
to advance the prospects of the weaker sections 
of society, but in providing for special 
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measures in that behalf care should be taken 
not to exclude admission to higher educational 
centers to deserving and qualified candidates 
of other communities. A special provision 
contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation 
of posts and appointments contemplated by 
Article 16(4) must be within reasonable limits. 
The interests of weaker sections of society, 
which are a first charge on the states and the 
centre, have to be adjusted with the interests of 
the community as a whole. The adjustment of 
these competing claims is undoubtedly a 
difficult matter, but if under the guise of 
making a special provision, a State reserves 
practically all seats available in the colleges, 
that clearly would be subverting the object of 
the Article 15(4). In this matter again we are 
reluctant to say definitely what would be a 
proper provisions to make speaking generally 
and in a broad way a special provisions should 
be less than 50%, how much less than 50% 
would depend upon the relevant prevailing 
circumstances m each case. 
The issue pertaining to the extent of reservation starts from this 
stage. Ti\e Supreme Court decided this issue in large number of cases 
and held reservations to be excessive where the extent was found 
beyond 50%. Balaji decision made the extent of protective 
discrimination an important issue to be scrutinized by the court as to 
see that in applying protective discrimination the interests of other 
communities are not completely eroded and it maintains a balance 
between the competing claims. In Ramesh Chandra Garg v. State of 
Punjab^^^ wherein a rule of Government provided for reservation of 
60 per cent of seats for weaker sections of the society was challenged 
to be excessive. The Punjab High Court applied Balaji decision and 
struck down the rule. In many subsequent cases the rule of 50 per cent 
was applied in relation to education and public services. 
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In Chitrelekha''" the Supreme Court said that reservation can 
be minimum and not maximum. The Gujarat High Court declared 
unconstitutional an order of government making reservation of all the 
100 per cent of land for Harijans. Adivassis and backward persons. 
Such reservation ceased to be reservation at all within the meaning of 
Article 15(4) as the order amounts to be a class legislation. In 
another significant case, the state indirectly made a rule that the 
reserved quota of 12.5% seats for scheduled castes and 5% seats for 
scheduled tribes which could not be utilized will be carried forward to 
next year and would continue in the same way in the subsequent 
years. The order was challenged in T. Devadasan v. Union of India, 
and the court by majority decision invalidated reservation of about 65 
per cent of government jobs resulting from the 'carry forward' rule in 
a particular year. Mudholka J., (for the majority) noted that the 
members of scheduled castes and tribes are by and large backward in 
comparison with other communities in the country but the purpose of 
Article 16(4) is to ensure that such people, because of their 
backwardness, should not be unduly handicapped in the matter of 
securing employment in various services of the sate. He observed: 
"Where the object of a rule is to make 
reasonable allowance for the backwardness 
...by reserving certain proportion of 
appointments ...what the sate would in fact be 
doing would be to provide the members of 
backward classes with an opportunity equal to 
that of the members of the more advanced 
cla.sscs in the matter of appointments to public 
services. If the reservation is so excessive that 
it practically denies a reasonable opportunity 
for employment to members of other 
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communities, the position may well be 
different and it would be open then for a 
member of more advanced class to complain 
that he has been denied equality by the 
state..."'" 
The court noted that the reservation policy contemplates the 
idea for making reasonable allowance for the backward classes. The 
reasonable allowance means a certain portion of appointment. It 
should not be so excessive that it practically denies the reasonable 
opportunity to other advanced sections of the society. 
In Thomas case,'^ '* Balaji's limit of 'less than 50% was 
questioned and was considered by the two judges (Krishna lyear and 
Fazl Ali JJ.) Fazal Ali, J. observed: 
"This means that reservation should be within 
permissible limits and should not be cloak to 
fill all posts belonging to a particular class of 
citizens and thus violate Article 16(1) of the 
Constitution indirectly. At the same time clause 
(4) of Article does not fix any limit on the 
power of the Government to make reservation. 
Since clause (4) is a part of Article 16 of the 
Constitution it is manifest that the State cannot 
be allowed to indulge in excessive reservation 
so as to defeat the policy contained in Article 
16(1). As to what would be a suitable 
reservation within permissible limits will 
depend upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid 
down, nor can this matter be reduced to a 
mathematical formula so as to be adhered to in 
all cases. Decided cases of this Court have no 
doubt laid down that percentage of reservation 
should not exceed 50%. As I read the 
authorities, this is however, rule of caution and 
does not exhaust all categories. Suppose for 
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instance a State has a large number of 
backward class of citizens which constitute 
80% of the population and the government, in 
order to give them proper representation, 
reserves 80% of the job for them can it be said 
that the percentage of reservation is bad and 
violates the permissible limits of clause (4) of 
Article 16? The answer must necessarily be in 
the negative. The dominant object to this 
provision is to take steps to make inadequate 
representation adequate."'^^ 
Krishna lyyer, J. agreed with the aforesaid view in the 
following words: 
"I agree with my learned brother Fazal Ali, J. 
in the view that the arithmetical limit of 50% in 
any one year set by some earlier rulings cannot 
perhaps be pressed too far. Overall 
representation in a department does not depend 
on recruitment in a particular year, but the total 
strength of a cadre. "'^ ^ 
Fazal Ali, J. held that 50% rule enunciated in Balaji's case is a 
rule of caution not based on mathematical formula. He asserted that 
situation may arise when the reservation may be made of 80% seats 
of the job. It is submitted that idea of 80% seats is certainly beyond 
reasonable limit, which the scheme of reservation does not permit. It 
is abundantly clear from next case, which is taken up. 
In Indra Sawhney's case'^^the court viewed: 
"Adequate representation cannot be read as 
proportionate representation. Adequate 
representation cannot be read as proportionate 
representation. Principle of proportional 
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reservation is accepted only in Articles 330 and 
332 of the Constitution and that two for a 
limited period Just as every power must 
be exercised reasonably and fairly, the power 
conferred by clause (4) of Article 16 should 
also be exercised in a fair manner and within 
reasonable limits and what is more reasonable 
than to say that reservation under clause (4) 
shall not exceed 50% of the appointments or 
posts, barring certain extra ordinary 
situations...."^^ 
In Thomas case'^' justification for reservation upto 80% was 
based on population, as backward class of citizens and the idea of 
proportionate reservation constituted 80% of the population was as 
such accepted which is not feasible in the light of the decision in 
Indra Sawhney case. The majority took the view that clause (4) of 
Article 16 speaks about adequate representation and adequate 
representation does not mean proportionate reservation. 
It is submitted that efficiency and merit of the class other than 
backward class cannot be overlooked on the ground of proportionate 
reservation. Centanily the scheme of clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 
taken together is entirely different. Emphasis to this aspect was given 
in Indra Sawhney case in the following words: 
"It is needs no emphasis to say that the 
principle aim of Articles 14 and 16 is equality 
and equality of opportunity and that clause (4) 
of Article 16 is but a means of achieving the 
very same objective. Clause (4) is special 
provision though not an exception to clause 
(1). Both the provisions have to be harmonized 
keeping in mind the fact that both are but the 
restatements of the principles of equality 
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enshrined in Article 14. The provision under 
Article 16(4) conceived in the interest of 
certain sections of the society - should be 
balanced against the guarantee of equality 
enshrined in clause (1) of Article 16 which is a 
guarantee held out to every citizen and to the 
entire society From the above discussion, 
the irresistible conclusion that follows is that 
the reservations contemplated in clause (4) of 
Article 16 should not exceed 50%."""^ 
Thus the permissible limit for reservation of weaker sections of 
the of the society has been fixed as 50% and this principle should be 
strictly followed. If under any peculiar or characteristically 
conditions, the principle is needed to be relaxed, extreme caution is 
1 ft 1 
to be exercised and special case made out. In view of the aforesaid 
consideration it appears that reservation beyond 50% is not 
permissible and the principle should , strictly, be followed. 
(ii). Backward and More Backward Classification 
In Balaji's case'^ ^ the Supreme Court had the occasion to 
consider the division of backward classes into backward and more 
backward categories as the order issued by the state of Mysore based 
on the recommendations of the Nagan Gowda Committee'*^ made 
such classification. Considering the classification in Balaji's case the 
court held: 
"That the sub-classification made by the order 
between Backward Classes and more 
backward classes does not appear to be 
jusfified under Article 15(4), Article 15(4) 
authorizes special provision being made for 
the really backward classes. In introducing two 
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categories of backward classes what the 
impugned order, in substance, purports to do is 
to devise measures for the benefit of all the 
classes of citizens who are less advanced 
compared to the advanced classes in the state 
and that, in our opinion is not the scope of 
Article 15(4). The result of the method 
adopted by the impugned order is that nearly 
90% of the population of the state is treated as 
backward and that illustrates how the order in 
fact divides the population of the State into 
most advanced and the rest, and puts the latter 
into two categories of backward and more 
backward. The classification of these two 
categories, therefore, is not warranted by 
Article 15(4).'"' 184 
Chinnappa Reddy, J., in Vasant Kumar cae'^ ^ stated: 
"We do not see why on principle there cannot 
be classification into Backward classes and 
More Backward classes, if both classes are not 
merely a little behind, but far behind the most 
advanced classes. In fact such a classification 
would be necessary to help the More 
Backward Classes; otherwise those of 
Backward Classes who might be a little more 
advanced than the More Backward Classes 
might walk away with all the scats."'^^ 
Keeping in view both the observations, the respondents in 
Indra Sawhney's case raised the matter and questioned the correctness 
of the opinion in Balaji's case, which was opposed to such 
classification. Considering the opinions given in Balaji '*^  and Vasant 
Kumar'** cases, the Supreme Court held: 
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"We are of the opinion that there is no 
Constitutional or legal bar to a State 
categorizing the backward classes as backward 
and more backward. We are not saying that it 
ought to be done. We are concerned with the 
question if a state makes such categorization, 
whether it would be invalid. We think not. Let 
us take the criteria evolved by Mandal 
Commission. Any caste, group or class, which 
scored eleven or more points, was treated as 
backward class. Now, it is not as if all the 
several thousands of castes groups/classes 
score identical points. There may be some 
castes/groups/classes, which have scored 
points between 20 to 22, and there may be 
some who have scored points between 11 and 
thirteen. It cannot reasonably be denied that 
there is no difference between these two sets 
of castes/groups/classes." 
The effect of the aforesaid opinion expressed by B.P. Jeevan 
Reddy, J. is that the decision of Balaji's case with respect to 
classification of backward classes stands overruled. It is submitted 
that such classification should be made and for both categories of 
classes i.e. backward classes and more backward classes percentage 
of reservation may be fixed so that backward classes other than more 
backward classes not walk away with major proportion of seats. The 
classification is an appropriate measure to ensure that most backward 
classes raise their status speedily so that historic injustices and 
inequities afflicting in the society may be removed with greater pace 
in order to fiilfill true object of Article 15(4) & 16(4) 
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(iii). Concept of Creamy Layer 
The Principle of 'creamy layer' as such was not a point of 
consideration in Jayashree case"" but the validity of such idea was 
accepted. Therefrom the idea came to be considered in subsequent 
cases whenever the occasion arose. Though the case has already been 
discussed earlier in this chapter but from different point of view. 
However it appears desirable to discuss the case in the context of the 
concept of creamy layer. 
An order of the State of Kerala issued by the government came 
for consideration. According to that order members of families of 
certain specified communities whose annual income was below 
10,000/- were entitled to the reservation. The petitioner applied for 
admission to one of the medical college at Trivendram and produced 
certificate showing that the total income of her family from all 
resources was Rs. 11,752/- for the year 1975-76 and she belongs to 
Ezhava community. She was not selected, though candidates of her 
community having less mark were selected. The principal of the 
college informed her that the annual income of her family exceeds Rs. 
10,000/- and she could not be selected for admission. The petitioner 
contention was that the exclusion of her case from reservation scheme 
was not based on rational ground for there was no reason to exclude a 
member of a community on the basis of income. The State contended 
that they were treated as backward not because they were members of 
a caste or community but because they form a class based on income. 
The court accepted the contention of the State and dismissed the 
petition.''' The cut-off point based on income to treat a set of persons 
as constituting a different class within the same community. 
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In Vasant Kumar,"^ Chinnappa Reddy, J. while considering 
the issue of'creamy layer,' made following observation: 
"...one must however, enter a caveat to the 
criticism that benefits of reservation are often 
snatched away by the top creamy layer of 
backward class or caste. That a few of the seats 
and posts reserved for backward classes are 
snatched away by the more fortunate among 
them is not to say that reservation is not 
necessary. This is bound to happen in a 
competitive society such as ours. Are not the 
unreserved seats and posts snatched away in 
the same way, by the top creamy layers 
amongst them on the same principle of merit 
on which the non reserved seats are taken away 
by the top layers of society. How can it be had 
if reserved seats and posts are snatched away 
by the creamy layer of backward classes, if 
such snatching away of unreserved posts by the 
top creamy layer of society itself is not 
bad?"''' 
Reddy, J., did not agree with the identification of creamy layer 
as a class within a broader class (backward class). It is submitted that 
observations of Reddy, J., as it goes did not approve the idea which 
was enunciated in Jayshree case.'''' It may be noted that he gave his 
observations as an individual whereas in Jayshree case A.N. Ray, C.J. 
made observation speaking for himself, M.H. Beg and Jaswant Singh 
J.J. Thus the opinion cannot be considered to have been overruled. In 
Indra Sawhney"^ after quoting the aforesaid observation of Reddy, J., 
the majority view was given by B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.,"^ in the 
following words: 
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"The very concept of a class denotes a number 
of persons having certain common traits which 
distinguish them from the others. In a 
backward class under clause (4) of Article 16, 
if the connecting link is the social 
backwardness, it should broadly be the same in 
a given class,. If some of the members are far 
too advanced socially (which in the context, 
necessarily mean economically and, may also 
mean educationally) the connecting thread 
between them and the remaining class snaps. 
They would be misfits in facts. After excluding 
them alone, would class be a compact class."'' 
After giving the aforesaid reasoned opinion in was fiirther 
asserted: 
"It is pointed out that clause (4) of Article 16 
aims at group backwardness and not individual 
backwardness. While we agree that clause (4) 
aims at group backwardness. We feel that 
exclusion of such socially advanced members 
will make the 'class' as truly backward clause 
and would more appropriately serve the 
purpose and object of clause (4). (This 
discussion is confined to other Backward Class 
only and has no relevance Scheduled Tribes, 
Scheduled castes.)"' 
Thus the court approved the exclusion of 'creamy layer' from 
other backward classes and after exclusion the remaining class is the 
backward class within the meaning of clause (4) of Article 16. In this 
way the object of the clause could be served better because the 
remaining class is that compact backward class which is the real 
claimant 
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CONCLUSION & SUGGESTIONS 
Equality as envisioned by the Constitution is of various kinds. 
These are social and economic equality, political equality and civil 
equality. The Constitution comprehends all these forms of equality 
enumerating them under its various provisions. Article 14 contains civil 
and natural equality. It guarantees right to 'equality before the law' and 
'equal protection of the laws'. Article 17 and 18 has been introduced in 
order to substantiate equality by abolishing untouchability (Article 17) 
and feudal tradition of conferring any title or any distinction (Article 18). 
Although these provisions are significant as they deal with important 
social and economic situations but the basic doctrine of equality is in fact 
implanted in Article 14 which governs all the forms of equality. 
In State of Kerala V N.M. Thomas^ , the Supreme Court realized 
the coverage and poignancy of Article 14 and applied equality principle 
contained therein to the problems of protective discrimination which is 
permitted under Article 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution. This Article 
can also largely be applied to others matters of civil and criminal laws 
and administration of justice. It is a repository of secularism and 
socialism and the whole concept of welfare state is embodied in this 
article. It can be submitted said that Article 14 lays down such principles 
from which the whole jurisprudence of equality can be derived. Besides 
these Articles dealing with social and economic equality, the Constitution 
also guarantees political equality on the basis of adult franchise under 
Articles 326 and 326. 
Equality involves, first of all absence of legal discrimination 
against any individual or group of persons and secondly, claim of all the 
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Opportunities and privileges on equal basis. To secure equality to all 
persons in India who have ever remained divided and stratified on the 
basis of caste, religion, language and culture which resulted into 
inequality was the most difficult task. Moreover, in Indian society 
inequality operated for so long a time not as a social norm but as a 
religious injunction that an endeavour to abolish all these centuries long 
existing evils and to build a society based on equality and equal justice 
may seemingly appear to be the collective misadventure of the framers of 
the Constitution. But inspite of realizing the task to be very difficult to 
achieve, they did not loose their spirit and determination and enacted 
various provisions to eradicate past practices of inequality. They were 
convinced that if the base of social structure will be replaced by the 
concept of equality all the social evils i.e. poverty, injustice, exploitation 
and social stratification would automatically be uprooted. 
In view of the social history and vast social and economic gap they 
had to deviate from the basic principle of equality embodied in the said 
provisions of the Constitution. Social gaps had to be filled up through 
legal means by providing special help to those who formed the lowest 
stratum of the society. As such they enacted some provisions in the 
Constitution under which discrimination in their favour has been 
permitted otherwise it would not be possible for them to come up or 
compete the advance section of the society on account of their dire 
backwardness. These backward groups are termed as scheduled castes, 
scheduled tribes and other backward classes. They are constitutionally 
kept under special policy of protective discrimination enveloped in 
Article 15(4) and 16(4) under which these groups of persons are specially 
helped in educational and economic fields. Schedule castes and scheduled 
tribes have been provided special help in political matters also under 
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Articles 330, 332, and 335. The Constitution, here allows denying 
equality for the sake of equality in view of the past social inequality. 
The implementation of protective discrimination thus involves the 
exercise of balancing the social, economic and political interests. The 
provisions relating to reservation of seats in educational institutions 
(Clause (4) of Article 15 reservation in employment or appointments by 
the State (Clause (4) of Article 16) and political equality (Articles 330 
and 332) are the examples through which the constitutional policy of 
protective discrimination is being implemented. These articles authorize 
the centre and state governments to reserve seats in educational 
institutions, government services and House of People and Legislative 
Assemblies of the states to achieve the object of advancing the socially 
and educationally backward sections of the society, as well as of 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. In carrying out this policy of 
reservation some basic questions have arisen viz, who are entitled; what 
should be the quantum of reservation, its continuation, viz, how long 
reservation benefit will be available to the weaker sections of the people 
and whether on each point of service tenure reservation would be 
available to them. All these issues have been coming up before the 
Supreme Court for its decision in a large number of cases. 
As regards the entitlement, the Constitution recognizes scheduled 
caste and scheduled tribes and other backward classes as weaker sections 
of society, they are, therefore, entitled to get reservation benefits. The 
scheduled caste and scheduled tribes are defined categories but who are 
backward classes is a matter, which has neither been defined by the 
Constitution nor by the Court satisfactorily. The Constitution in Article 
15(4) only contains the words 'socially and educational backward classes 
of citizens? The problem is who are socially and educationally backward 
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classes of citizens'. Of all the problems the most controversial has been 
the problem of identification of backward classes. This issue first came 
before the Supreme Court in Balaji's case. The court laid down four 
important points which are : (1) caste based criteria for the identification 
of backward classes is unconstitutional, (2) caste may be one of the 
relevant factor but must not be the sole factor or the criteria, (3) social 
backwardness was in the ultimate analysis the result of poverty to a large 
extent, (4) the special provision should be less than 50% and how much 
less than 50% would depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances 
is each case. 
In Indian social system, those who are socially and educationally 
backward are the groups belonging to low caste. Caste and social and 
educational backwardness are interwoven, therefore, it is very difficult to 
separate them. Thus, the present position is that neither there is any 
national policy, nor the Supreme Court could lay down any suitable 
criteria for the identification of backward classes. Although, the court 
attempted other criterion such as poverty to enable the states to cany on 
the policy of reservation but it also could not serve the purpose. In the 
absence of any nationally recognized criteria, the states were allowed to 
work out their own criteria and pursue the reservation policy. In doing so 
states were mostly guided by caste oriented political pressure and 
provided reservation on the basis of caste. 
At the time of elections it has been noted that reservation policy 
was being used to catch votes and caste feeling generally aroused to win 
the election. This trend will not only defeat the constitutional objects but 
the country might be caught in the throes of an inter-caste civil war. At 
present no section of Indian population is against reservation system but 
resentment is shown when it is wrongly implemented and politicized 
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under the garb of social justice. It is, therefore, high time that the central 
government formulates a uniform policy to deal with the problems of 
weaker sections of society and the reservation system be supervised by 
high powered central agency until it is abolished. 
The quantum is another issue about which our Supreme Court has 
said much. On this issue the Supreme Court through Gajendragadkar J. in 
Balaji's case evolved a formulae of "50 per cent and less" depending 
upon the condition and population of backward classes in a state but in 
any case it must not exceed 50 per cent. In Devadasan^ case the 'carry 
forward rule' which resulted in a quota reservation of 60% was struck 
down by a majority of 4:1. Similar issue came before the court in Thomas 
case in which the dissenting opinion of Pathak, J., coincided with 
Gajendragadkar, J., who observed that 50 per cent for reservation quota in 
totality is a rule which appears fair and reasonable, just and equitable and 
violation of which would contravene Article 335. But the Supreme Court 
in subsequent cases deviated from this principle and finally in Thomas 
case Krishan Iyer and Murtaza Fazl Ali, JJ, were of the opinion that the 
reservation could go to the extent of 80 per cent. It is agreed that 
backward classes have been the social sufferers and to liberate them from 
position is the primary aim of the Constitution. But it would be an 
irrational approach to neglect the interest of others or other factors like 
efficiency is ignored altogether. These would antagonize the society at 
large and the implementation of reservation policy would be vigorously 
retarded. Gajendragadkar, J., laid down a very reasonable and acceptable 
principle of "50 per cent and below". This principle must be restored and 
adhered to in order to avoid any social conflict. 
Tlie Thomas'* case has widened the scope of quantum by so 
interpreting Article 16(1) vis-a-vis 16(4) and applying 'legislative 
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classification' principle of Article 14 to the matters of protective 
discrimination. Under Article 14 any classification, which fijlfils two, 
tests i.e. that the classificafion must be based on reasonable differentia 
and secondly the differentia should have a rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved, by the statute in quesfion. In case of classification 
of backward classes two tests are in full compliance of constitutional 
requirements and hence the method of classification was taken to be the 
most befitting and an uncontroversial principle to sustain the impugned 
order. Such classification will help to get rid of the 'caste and class' 
controversy. Despite it, the issue of 'quantum' is still very important and 
delicate in the overall economic and social context. The application of 
Article 14 to the problem of protective discrimination is constitutional 
and Thomas decision establishes it, accordingly the whole of the 
backward classes of people can be rafionally classified as 'backward' and 
would be entitled for the benefit of reservation. It is not workable because 
in Thomas case percentage of entitlement was based on percentage of 
populafion take, for example, the backward people comes to the figure of 
say 60 per cent in a state then 60 per cent and the percentage of scheduled 
castes and scheduled tribes, would come roughly to about 80 per cent. 
Further in case the children or dependent of freedom fighters 
distinguished sportsmen or women, handicapped etc. are also included 
which is possible under Article 14, then the whole of the educational or 
employment opportunities would be swallowed by the reservation scheme 
and nothing will be left for the meritorious. 
In providing reservation, caste-oriented polifical pressure has often 
been disturbing the social condition and temperament. During Janata 
Government, when it came into power in 1978, the two states, U.P. and 
Bihar ambitiously increased the quota of reservation and some castes like 
312 
Kurmis, Yadav and Ahirs were classed as backward classes and accorded 
reservation. The quantum of reservation increased to 49 per cent. The 
'reservation' made for the castes were all prosperous and the state of 
Uttar Pradesh in classifying these castes as backward was influenced by 
the political motive by the Bhartiya Lok Dal (BLD) group of the Janata 
Party which was dominating in U.P., and those castes supported the BLD. 
The High Court of Allahabad upheld the reservation of scheduled castes 
and others while striking down part of the state government order that 
applied to backward classes. From the attitude of the then government of 
Uttar Pradesh it is obvious that the 'caste' factor played a dominant role 
in framing the policy of reservation and as such the attitude was not only 
unconstitutional but happened to be the main cause of caste clashes and 
atrocities. The same attitude was adopted by the increasing the 
reservation quota as to achieve political gains. In these states, particularly 
Gujarat the caste conflict and anti-reservation agitations have become the 
regular events since 1981. What is required and appropriate for the State 
is to keep the policy matters away from the caste influence. A caste-
ridden policy would not only be unconstitutional but would be vigorously 
repulsed creating law and order problem. It is, therefore, necessary that 
states should take extra precaution in identifying backward classes and 
fixing quota for them. What is to be again emphasized that the 
classification of backward classes and 'reservation' for them are the areas 
of delicacy and social animosity. It must of course be carried on in order 
to establish social and economic equality but it should be absolutely 
politically immune otherwise serious complications and dissatisfaction 
might erupt, leading to chaotic situation. 
The present study has envisaged that the identification of 
'Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes' and determination of'backward 
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classes of citizens.' 'Scheduled castes' and 'scheduled tribes' have been 
defined under Article 366(24) and 366(25) respectively but the 
expression 'backward classes of citizens' as appears in Article 15(4) and 
16(4) has not been defined under the definitional Article 366. The 
determination 'backward class' which is entitled to preferential treatment 
is vital because unless such class is determined, the object of raising its 
social status cannot be achieved in order to establish an egalitarian 
society. 
Many States tried to identify 'backward classes' in their own way and 
such identifications were questioned before the courts and consequently 
no definite criteria for determining the 'backward classes' came to be 
recognized. The Central Government for the first time appointed 
Backward Class Commission under Article 340 of the Constitution on 
January 29, 1953. The Commission popularly known Kaka Kalekar 
Commission submitted its report on March 30, 1955. The report made by 
the Commission was considered by the Central Government, which 
apparently was not satisfied with the approach adopted by the 
Commission in determining the criteria for identifying the backward class 
under Aiticle 15(4). The Memorandum of action appended to the Report 
of the Commission while placing it on the table of Parliament (as required 
by clause (3) of Article 340) on September 3, 1956, pointed out that the 
caste system is the greatest hinderance in the way of our progress to 
egalitarian society and that in such a situation recognition of certain 
specified castes as backward may serve to maintain and perpetuate the 
existing distinctions on the basis of caste. The Memorandum also found 
fault with certain tests adopted by the Commission for identifying the 
backward classes. It expressed the opinion that a more systematic and 
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elaborate basis has to be evolved for identifying backward classes. The 
report was never discussed by the Parliament. 
On August 14, 1961 the Central Government wrote to all states 
governments stating inter aliaJhaX "while the state governments have the 
discretion to choose their own criteria for determining backwardness, in 
the view of the government of India it would be better to apply economic 
tests than to go by caste". It was open to every state to draw up its own 
lists for the purposes of Articles 15 and 16. So far as the Central services 
are concerned, no reservation was ever made in favour of other backward 
classes though made in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
By the order of the President of India, in the year 1979, under 
Article 340 of the Constitution Second Backward Class Commission was 
appointed to investigate the conditions of 'socially and educationally 
backward classes' within the territory of India. It submitted its report on 
December 31, 1980 identifying as many as 3743 castes as 'socially and 
educationally backward classes' and recommended for 27 percent 
reservation for them. Thus, basically identification for backwardness was 
based on castes. 
From the survey of judicial attitude in various cases it is evident 
that in some way or the other caste and poverty were the factors which 
came up for consideration. These two factors were considered for 
determination of backwardness either as sole factor or relevant factor. 
The matter to a greater extent crystallized in Indra Sawhney's case 
(1993). The view taken in 1993 was that the caste can be treated as a 
class. If it is socially backward it would be a backward class for the 
purposes of Article 16(4). The view taken in Indra Sawhney' (1993) was 
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explained by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney II (2000) in the 
following words: 
"Caste only cannot be the basis for reservation. 
Reservation can be for a backward class citizen 
of a particular caste. Therefore, from that caste, 
creamy layer and non backward class of citizens 
are to be excluded. If the caste is to be taken 
into consideration then for finding out socially 
and economically backward class, creamy layer 
of the caste is to be eliminated for granting 
benefit of reservation, because that creamy layer 
cannot be termed as socially and economically 
backward."' 
Thus after excluding the creamy layer from a particular caste, the 
remaining section of that caste is the truly backward class entitled for 
reservation. In a caste creamy layer is an advanced section of that caste 
and the remaining section is backward. The advanced section of 
particular caste and backward section of that caste cannot be treated equal 
because it would mean treating unequals as equals and it is against the 
principle of equality enunciated in Article 14 of the Constitution. The 
scheme of the constitution also envisages preferential treatment only to 
that section of citizens which is truly backward. Therefore, to determine 
such truly backward class exclusion of 'creamy layer' appears to be 
justified, pragmatic and constitutionally sound. 
Unless the 'creamy layer' is identified it could not be possible to 
exclude them from a backward caste in order to determined truly 
backward class. The declaration of law relating to creamy layer expressed 
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in Indra Sawhney (1993) was considered in Indra Sawhney (2000) in 
order to identify the 'creamy layer' in the following words: 
"...in each of these named backward classes 
listed one below the other, it is not difficult to 
make horizontal divisions of those belonging to 
(i) constitutional offices, (ii) particular services 
(iii) professions, (iv) industry and trade, (v) 
particular income level and (vi) particular 
holding of property etc. to segregate the creamy 
and non creamy layers in each vertical sub-
classification of backward class and say that the 
children of such persons in these horizontal sub-
divisions of the backward classes be creamy 
layer and therefore outside the backward class. 
Thus identification of creamy layer could be made on the basis of 
'means test' or by applying 'economic criteria'. To determine truly 
backward class, tests at two stages are to be made. Firstly the 
classification of backward class is made by applying caste criteria and 
secondly sub-division of such backward class is made between creamy 
and non creamy layers by applying 'means' test in order to exclude 
creamy layer and identify truly backward class which would be entitled 
for reservation. 
The Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney case (1993) directed the 
government of India to specify the basis of exclusion whether on the basis 
of income, extent of holding or otherwise of 'creamy layer'. A sincere 
effort by the State to identify 'creamy layer' may implement the 
declaration of law made in Indra Sawhney's case. In the light of the 
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direction by the court in Indra Sawhney's case (1993) government of 
India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions 
(Development of Personnel and Training) issued office memorandum 
dated September 8, 1993 providing for 27% reservation for other 
Backward Classes. Para 2(c) of the memorandum excludes the 
persons/sections mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule.' In the said 
memorandum the schedule consists of "creamy layer" for exclusion form 
the reservation. The determination of 'creamy layer' based on the said 
schedule is applicable to services covered by the centre. In Ashoka Kumar 
Thakur v/s State ofBihar^^ the criteria for identifying the 'creamy layer' 
by the government of India was found to be in conformity with the law 
laid down in Indira Sawhney case (1993)" 
The states of Bihar and U.P also made criteria for identification 
of 'creamy layer'. The Supreme Court in Ashoka case'"* held such criteria 
as violative of Article 16(4) and wholly arbitrary violative of Article 14 
and against the law laid down in Indira Sawhney Case (1993).^' State of 
Kerala made statutory declaration to the effect that 'no creamy layer' 
exists in the State of Kerala. Such statutory declaration was held by the 
Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney Case (2000) as unconstitutional. The 
approach of the State of Bihar, U.P. and Kerala speaks of the volume of 
political considerations aimed at keeping the vote back intact. 
New dimensions associated with the reservation policy have 
emerged out of political considerations which appear to have eclipsed the 
positive developments of long judicial exercise. A controversy has arisen 
over the move announced by the congress in Rajasthan seeking support to 
have 14 percent reservation in public employment for the economically 
backward sections among the advanced casteis. The B.J.P. pleads 
apparently for the 'poor' in addition to reservation for Scheduled Caste, 
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the Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Class. Seven more castes have 
been added to OBC's list in Delhi. The Delhi University has opened up to 
5 per cent reservation for the talented in sports, music, drama and the like. 
The present scheme of reservation which is being followed 
includes 15 percent scheduled castes, 7 per cent scheduled tribes and 27 
per cent OBC's. The sum of all comes to 49 per cent. The court has ruled 
that reservation cannot exceed 50 per cent keeping in view the merit and 
efficiency. If more classes are added to the present scheme of reservation, 
it is possible only by curtailing the share of OBCs. It is sure to lead to 
anger, if not violence, among the OBC against the forward class. 
Rajeev Dhavan, a senior learned advocate of Supreme Court 
reacting over the recent controversy has rightly said. 
"ITie pursuit of equality has been hijacked by politics 
to become a pursuit for votes. India's reservation 
policy was designed to make 'unequals equal - not to 
open the door to every demand for preference by all or 
any community... Today's politics of reservation 
follows the quest for electoral victory, not social 
justice. An already divided nation on many fronts will 
be cleaved and pared into competing groups on an 
unparalleled scale that will make the Mandal 
controversy seems like a wisp of smoke."'^ 
The Attorney General, Soli Sorabji informed the Centre that 
reservation for Economically Backward Classes (EBCs) cannot be 
effectuated by an ordinary legislation in view of the Supreme Court 
Judgment in Indra Sawhney's case.'' Elaborating he said: 
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"Article 15(4) can be suitably amended by inserting the 
word "economically" before the words "socially and 
educationally backward." 
Similarly he said: 
Article 16(4) can be amended by adding the words 
"including economically backward class" after the 
words "any backward class of citizens" and before 
"which in the opinion of the state..." 
The Attorney General strikes a note of caution that such 
reservation would come within 50 per cent limit fixed by the Supreme 
Court. And to exceed this limit to provide for reservation to the EBCs, a 
further Constitutional amendment was needed. Such amendment will also 
be subject to judicial scrutiny on the ground that it violates the basic 
structure of the constitution, viz., and equality. 
On October 3, 2003, the Union Cabinet approved, in principle, the 
proposal for Constitutional amendments in order to proved reservation for 
EBCs. The Cabinet decided to appoint a National Commission for 
working out the modalities in consultation with the State and Union 
Territories to recommend steps to be taken for advancement for such 
category of citizens.^" 
It is submitted that the whole scheme of reservation was to raise 
the standard of oppressed class popularly known as backward class and 
the scheme never contemplated the class to be identified solely on 
economic consideration. The Supreme Court may annul the whole 
political exercise leading to legislation. If the pursuit for votes is allowed 
to continue the Mower' castes will continue to be discriminated against in 
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their daily life. The caste evil has to be fought collectively and 
comprehensively. The battle plan should be carefully modified in order to 
provide justice to the truly oppressed and needy among us. 
The other vital aspect of reservation is its continuation. It was 
accepted as a mode to social transformation for a period often years but it 
is continuing even after a lapse of five decades. Its continuation is another 
very sensitive area and agitates the mind of the community. Another 
aspect of reservation, which is related to its continuation, is alarming and 
requires constant attention. There are signs of an elite class being created 
within the backward classes. It comprises of those socially and 
educationally backward classes of people who were benefited by the 
reservation policy and have attained better economic and social status 
after becoming civil servants and professionals like-IAS, PCS officers, 
Physicians and Engineers. But under the definition of socially and 
educationally backwardness, their children continue to get benefits out of 
reservation policy, and those who are in no position to take advantage of 
reservation are being deprived by this elite of so called backward classes 
of people. Thus, the policy is not being properly implemented and as such 
frustrates the objects of Article 15(4) and 16(4). Such backward people 
should be de-listed and be carefiilly looked that they do not get the 
benefit of reservation any more because they do not suffer fi-om economic 
and social disabilities and there remains no reason to provide them or 
their children the benefits of reservation. They stand on equal footing as 
other non-backward classes. Thus, any benefit or privilege to these 
classes in the form of reservation would be a denial of socio-economic 
justice to truly backward class. 
During some general conclusion fi"om the above study it is 
suggested in the first place that reservation is a historic need and should 
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be continued. To abolish 'reservation' would be early but a fresh look at 
the way the reservation policy is necessary and consistent effort should be 
made to keep it separate from the influence of'caste polities'. It has been 
conceded that reservation to the weaker sections has not produced the 
desired change in their social, educational and economical structure. All 
that it has achieved is the creation of a new 'elite classes,' within that 
section, by availing reservation benefits, and still their children are 
entitled to reservation. A section of citizens is highly critical of the 
continuation of such reservation system. They rightly believe that nation 
cannot afford to invest a huge amount of money on the backward classes 
of citizens for so long when it does not help truly needy class. The 
increase in number of seats in professional colleges in various states 
(Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh are recent example) off and on is also 
provocative and amounts to destruction of right guaranteed under Article 
29(2). Besides the reservation in jobs and professional colleges, the 
reservation in 'promotions' is conceded as killing the enthusiasm and zeal 
to work and would adversely affect the standard and efficiency of 
administrative machinery. 
It is widely felt that reservation on the caste basis has given rise a 
lot of controversy, and bitterness and as such economic criteria will be 
more appropriate. But if 'poverty' is made the criteria it would again fail 
as a sizeable population live below the poverty line. In K.C. Vasant 
Kumar, the Chief Justice Chandrachud gave his opinion that economic 
backwardness must be adopted and the reservation policy should be 
reviewed every five years. The other judges although gave separate 
judgments but all of them adopted same approach as expressed by the 
Chief Justice. A view also sometimes come on the surface that all 
necessary financial help be given to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes 
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candidates to pursue their studies but at every stage the selection be made 
strictly on merit. 
Apart from reservation in professional colleges and jobs, 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribe have also been granted several 
concessions including relaxation of age limits, fee and in the required 
standard and more opportunities for promotions whereas for general 
candidates even though belonging to the poorest upper caste families are 
required to submit the whole requisite fee. Even after that the chances of 
the already employed scheduled castes candidates to get the new jobs are 
far greater. 
There is a lot of substances in these charges. There can be no doubt 
that the policy of reservation will have to continue till the backward 
classes are integrated with the society. They have right to assistance but 
they should not be wholly and always dependant on reservation for that 
would reduce their spirit of competitiveness. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the 
principal architect of our Constitution had made it clear that reservation 
would not be a permanent feature. It was meant only for ten years but the 
ten years period was considered to be insufficient and therefore, has been 
extended five times. But it should not perpetuate. Its continuation will not 
only by harmful for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes but would 
disintegrate the society and some time may lead to explosive situation. 
But so long 'reservation' is continuing it must be streamlined and 
supervised by high-powered committee to ensure that the working of 
reservation system operates on democratic and constitutional principles 
and its side effects are also minimized. Regarding the abolition of 
reservation, it is suggested that whenever it is thought to abolish 
reservation. Article 16(4) and 335 be deleted first and almost ten years 
thereafter Article 15(4) 330 and 332 be deleted from the Constitution. 
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Another important question is that although the constitutional 
policy of protective discrimination will realize equality through 
educational and economic opportunities to the downtrodden but whether 
the economic upliftment would solve their social problem of 
discrimination and oppression. The society would remain stratified if they 
were not integrated with other advanced sections of the society without 
which social justice or equality would remain an unaccomplished goal. 
Although, reservation will continue so long social and economic 
inequalities exist but it would be better in the interest of the backward 
classes and scheduled castes and scheduled tribes themselves to become 
self-reliant as early as possible. This would also help them in the process 
of their social acceptance and assimilation. These aforesaid problems are 
the most significant and sensitive aspects of reservation system which 
need to be careflilly looked at and directed in accordance with judicial 
inquiries and declaration. 
In the very end it is submitted that reservation prima facie is 
against the ethos of equality but it has been adopted to eliminate 
inequalities existing in all forms in our social system in which the inter-
caste barriers operated not as social norms but as religious injunction. In 
the present situation the views of old generation are continuing although 
we have made notable progress in the post-constitutional period. But 
what we are venturing to achieve is a matter, which is based on social and 
moral attitude of the society and is not purely a legal matter. It is, 
therefore, a matter to be carefully dealt with and the zeal or enthusiasm to 
provide help to the downtrodden may rupture the social fabric. 
It is, therefore, necessary that while framing the policy, the 
prevailing temperament of the society should never be overiooked, 
otherwise the aim of social equality is bound to be defeated or it would 
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have to be achieved by indirect method as being done after the 
recommendations of two Backward Classes Commissions. The two 
commissions could not accomplish what it was expected except the 
identification of large number of castes as backward and recommending 
reservation in their favour, thus reducing the opportunities for other 
classes. This resulted into obvious caste-clashes and the social relations 
become more sensitive and caste-oriented. The primary aim is to establish 
social equality. Social equality, as conceded by the apex judiciary, is very 
difficult to achieve. It cannot be forced upon people by the laws. But, if 
the sentiments of social equality were carefiilly and wisely cultivated, 
surely there would be a considerable progress to the realization of social 
justice. 
Continuance of reservation of scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes at national level and reservation of backward classes provided by 
various States with varying policies for more than fifty years have not 
produced desired result. The main cause is the section of society within 
scheduled caste, schedule tribes and backward class which had already 
been benefited, continue to be benefited for generation to come and more 
deserving class among them are left with no mercy. For example, a class 
within scheduled caste and scheduled tribes or backward class was 
extended reservation and thereafter this class attained the status 
equivalent to advanced class by all standards of education and wealth. 
But the members of this class if allowed to continue to get the benefit of 
reservation they walk away with major share of reservation leaving apart 
truly needy class. Under this background a strong case is made out for 
applying the principle of creamy layer not only to backward classes but 
also to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. A proviso should be 
inserted in Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution providing for 
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indicators to identify the class within Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribes, which had already been benefited, may be excluded for purposes 
of reservation. Thereafter actual needy section of scheduled castes and 
schedule tribes will get the total share of reservation. Only through this 
process the needy section will get the opportunity to raise their standard. 
The Creamy layer principles, evolved in Indra Sawhney case, are a 
declaration of law and should be implemented enveloped with rule of 
law. The Constitutional scheme of reservation is for actual needy groups 
or sections of the society. The continuance of benefit to that class who 
has already been benefited is beyond constitutional scheme because 
treating advanced class and disadvantaged class of particular caste 
equally is against the principle of equality. As we have seen in earlier 
paras while making criteria for idehtification for 'creamy layer' the 
approach of the State Government is highly arbitrary and against the 
mandate of the Constitution. Constitutional amendment is required so that 
a comprehensive scheme may be introduced, dealing with creamy layer to 
be applicable, uniformally, to all States. 
The reservation policy for backward classes should be made more 
effective. The President had so far appointed two Backward Class 
Commissions. The recommendations of First Backward Class 
Commission were not accepted. However the recommendations of 
Second Backward Class Commission were accepted by providing 27 per 
cent reservation for backward classes. The Third Backward Class 
Commission is to be appointed by the President as approved by the Union 
Cabinet on 3'^ '' October 2003. A system of regular monitoring of the 
implementation of reservation policies is necessary. Constitutional 
amendment is needed to provide for National Commission of Backward 
Classes as a permanent body like National Commission for Scheduled 
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Caste and Scheduled Tribes. This body should monitor and investigate 
the matters relating to backward classes. A provision should also be made 
to place the report of such commission on the table of the Parliament 
annually. It must be empowered not only to make recommendation but 
also to issue guidelines where it feels glaring disparities in the process of 
implementation of reservation policies. Thus it is suggested that Article 
340 should suitably be amended so as to provide a permanent body of 
National Commission for Backward Class having adequate representation 
of members from backward class. 
It has been conceded that the existing reservation regime has failed 
to address the plight of actual needy people hitherto even after more than 
half a century. The protective discrimination, keeping in view the socio-
legal analysis, in shape of reservation has to be programmed in such a 
manner that the most deserving section of the Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribes and backward class is benefited. In order to achieve the 
constitutional mandate expeditiously and to make the reservation regime 
result oriented some suggestions, has been made in the concluding paras 
above, and is summarized as follows: 
1. The creamy layer principles must be extended to Scheduled Caste 
and Scheduled Tribes also. 
2. Criteria for creamy layer should be determined by the centre to 
exclude the classes which have already been benefited and attained 
the status equivalent to advanced class. Such criterion should be 
made uniformally applicable to reservations made by the Centre as 
well as all the States. 
3. A proviso should be inserted to Articles 15(4) and 16(4) to exclude 
creamy layer for the purpose of reservation. 
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4. A clause should be inserted in definitional Article 366 defining the 
expression "backward class of citizens" taking guidance fi-om the 
judicial exercise made, from Balaji's case to Indra Sawhany case 
keeping it in view that such guidance was not available when the 
Constitution was enforced. 
5. Article 340 should suitably be amended so as to provide a 
permanent body of National Commission for Backward classes for 
monitoring investigating and issuing guidelines on regular basis 
dealing the matters related to backward classes. 
It is submitted that to realize and accomplish the Constitutional 
vision of just, equitable and egalitarian society, the guidelines and 
suggestions arrived at supra must be incorporated, crystallized and be 
codified whenever any legislative exercise in future is undertaken 
therefor as well as other legislations governing the reservation policies 
and programmes. 
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Annexure-I 
SHEDULE 
Description of category To whom rule of exclusion will apply 
1. 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL POSTS Son(s) and daughter(s) of 
(a). President of India; 
(b). Vice President of India 
(c). Judges of the Supreme 
Court and High Courts: 
(d). Chairman & Members of 
UPSC and of the State Public 
Service Commissioner; 
Comptroller & Auditor 
General of India; 
(e). Persons holding 
Constitutional positions of 
like nature 
11 
A. 
SERVICE CATEGORY Son(s) and daughter(s) of 
Group A/Class I Officers (a), parents, both of whom are 
Of the All India Central and Class I officers; 
State Services (Direct Recruits). 
(b). parents; either of whom is 
a Class I officer; 
(c). parents, both of whom are 
class I officers, but one of 
them dies or suffers 
permanent incapacitation. 
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(d). parents, either of whom is 
a Class I officer and such 
parent dies or suffers 
permanent incapacitation and 
before such death or such 
incapacitation has had the 
benefit of employment in any 
International Organisation 
like UN, IMF, World Bank, 
etc. for a period of not less 
than 5 years 
(e). parents, both of whom are 
class I officers die or suffer 
permanent incapacitation and 
before such death or such 
incapacitation of the both, 
either of them has had the 
benefit of employment in any 
International Organisation 
like UN, IMF, World Bank, 
etc, for a period of not less 
than 5 years 
Provided that the rule of 
exclusion shall not apply in 
the following cases; 
(a). Sons and daughters of 
parents either of whom or 
both of who are Class I 
officers and such parents(s) 
dies/die or suffer permanent 
incapacitation. 
(b). A lady belonging to OBC 
category has got married to a 
Class-I officer, and may 
herself like to apply for a job. 
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B. Group B/Class 11 officers of the Son(s) and daughter (s) of the 
Central & State Service 
(Direct Recruitment) (a), parents both of whom are 
Class II officers. 
(b). parents of whom only the 
husband is a Class n officers 
and he gets into class I at the 
age of 40 or earlier, 
(c). parents, both of whom are 
Class II officers, and one of 
them dies or suffers 
permanent incapacitation and 
either one of them has had the 
benefit of employment in any 
International Organisation 
like UN, IMF, World Bank, 
etc. for a period of 5 years 
before such death or 
permanent incapacitation; 
(d). parents of whom the 
husband is a Class I officer 
(direct recruit or pre-forty 
promoted) and the wife is a 
Class II officer ad the wife 
dies; or suffers permanent 
incapacitation; and 
(e). parents, of whom the wife 
is a Class I officer (Direct 
Recruitment or pre-forty 
promoted) and the husband is 
a Class II Officer and the 
husband dies or suffers 
permanent incapacitation. 
Provided that the rule of 
exclusion shall not apply in 
the following cases: 
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Sons and daughters of 
(a).Parents both of whom are 
Class n officers and one of 
them dies or suffers 
permanent incapacitation. 
(b). Parents, both of whom 
are Class II officers and both 
of them die or suffer. 
Permanent incapacitation, 
even though either of them 
has had the benefit of 
employment in any 
International Organisation 
like UN,IMF, World Bandk, 
etc. for a period of not less 
than 5 years before their 
death 
Employment in Public Sector The criteria enumerated in A 
Undertaking etc. & B above in this Category 
will apply mutatis mutandis 
to officers holding equivalent 
or comparable posts in PSUs, 
Banks, Insurance 
Organisation Universities, 
etc. and also to equivalent or 
comparable posts and 
positions under private 
employment, pending the 
evaluation of the posts on 
equivalent or comparable 
basis in these institutions, the 
criteria specified in Category 
VI below will apply to the 
officers in the Institutions. 
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III. ARMED FORCES INCLUDING Son(s) and daughter(s) of 
PARAMILITARY FORCES 
whom (persons holding civil 
posts are not included) 
parents either or both of 
whom is or are in the rank of 
Colonel and above in the Air, 
Army and to equivalent posts 
in the Navy and the Air Force 
and the Para Military Forces. 
Provided that:-
(i). if the wife of an Armed 
Forces Officer is herself in 
the Armed Forces (i.e. the 
category under consideration) 
the rule of exclusion will 
apply only when she herself 
has reached the rank of 
Colonel; 
(ii). the service ranks below 
Colonel of husband and wife 
shall not be clubbed together; 
(iii). If the wife of an officer 
in the Armed Forces is in 
Civil employment, this will 
not be taken into account for 
applying the rule of exclusion 
unless she falls in the service 
category under item No.II in 
which case the criteria and 
conditions enumerated therein 
will apply to her 
independently 
IV PROFESSIONAL CLASS 
AND THOSE ENGAGED IN 
TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
(I). Persons engaged in Criteria specified against 
profession as a doctor, lawyer, Category VI will apply:-
chartered accountant, Income 
-tax consultant, financial or 
management consultant, dental 
surgeon, engineer, architect. 
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computer specialist, film artists 
and other film professional, 
author, play wright, sports person, 
sports professional, media 
professional or any other vocations 
of like status. 
II. Persons engaged in trade, 
business and industry. 
Criteria specified against 
Category VI will apply: 
Explanation: 
(i). Where the husband is in 
some profession and the wife 
is in class 11 or lower grade 
employment, the 
income/wealth test will apply 
only on the basis of the 
husband's income. 
(ii). If the wife is in any 
profession and the husband is 
in employment in a class II or 
lower tank post, then the 
income/wealth criterion will 
apply only on the basis of the 
wife's income and the 
husband's income will not be 
clubbed with it. 
V. PROPERTY OWNERS 
Agricultural holdings 
Son(s) and daughter(s) of 
persons belonging to a family 
(father, mother and minor 
children) which owns 
(a), only irrigated land which 
is equal to or more than 85% 
of the statutory area, or 
(b). both irrigated and 
unirrigated land, as follows: 
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(i). The rule of exclusion will 
apply where the precondition 
exists that the irrigated area 
(having been brought to a 
single type under a common 
denominator) 40% or more of 
the statutory ceiling limit for 
irrigated land (this being 
calculated by excluding the 
unirrigated portion). If his 
precondition of not less than 
40% exists the only the area 
of unirrigated land will be 
taken into account on the 
basis of the conversion 
formula existing, into the 
irrigated type. The irrigated 
area o computed from 
unirrigated land shall be 
added to the actual area of 
irrigated land and if after such 
clubbing together the total 
area in terms of irrigated land 
is 80% or more of the 
statutory ceiling limit for 
irrigated land, then the rule of 
exclusion will apply and 
disentitlement will occur. 
(ii). The rule of exclusion will 
not apply if the land holding 
of a family is exclusively 
unirrigated. 
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B. Plantations 
(i). Coffee, tea, rubber, etc. Criteria of income/wealth 
specified in Category VI 
below will apply. 
(ii). Mango, citrus, apple Deemed as agricultural 
plantation etc. holding and hence criteria at 
above under this Category 
will apply. 
Vacant land and/or buildings in Criteria specified in Category 
urban areas or urban agglomerations VT below will apply. 
Explanation : Building may 
be used for residential 
industrial or commercial 
purpose and the like two or 
more such purposes. 
VI. INCOMEAVEALTH TEST Sons(s) and daughter(s) of 
(a). Persons having gross 
annual income of Rs. 1 lakh 
or above or possessing wealth 
above the exemption limit as 
prescribed in the Wealth Tax 
Act for a period of three 
consecutive years. 
(b). Persons in Categories 
I,II,ni, and V A who are not 
disentitled to the benefit of 
reservation but have income 
from other sources of wealth 
which will bring them within 
income/wealth criteria 
mentioned n (a) above. 
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Explanation : 
(i). Income from salaries or 
agricultural land shall not be 
clubbed; 
(ii). The income criteria in 
terms of rupee will be 
modified taking into account 
the change in its value every 
three years. If the situation, 
however, so demands, the 
interregnum may be less. 
Explanation : Wherever the expression 
"permanent incapacitation" occur in this 
schedule, it shall mean incapacitation 
which results in putting an officer out 
of service." 
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Annexure - II 
The Governor of Bihar promulgated Ordinance No. 5 of 1995 on 
January 27, 1995 called "the Bihar Reservation of vacancies in Posts 
and Services (for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Backward Classes) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1995. By the said 
Ordinance Section 4 of the Bihar Act 3 of 1992 was amended and after 
the second proviso, the following was added; 
"Provided also that reservation under clause (d) shall not apply 
to the category of backward classes specified in Schedule III." 
Scheduled HI is reproduced hereunder: 
Scheduled III 
[See Section 4(2)] 
1. The son or daughter of the President of India, the Vice-President 
of India, the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court of 
India, the Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court the 
Chairman and Members of the Union Public Service 
Commission and the Chief Election Commissioner; 
2. The son or daughter of such officers who has been directly 
recruited in Class I Services of the Central Government or a 
State Government or an Undertaking or an institution fully or 
partly financed by them; and 
(a). Whose income from salary is rupees ten thousand or more 
per mensum, and 
(b). Whose wife or husband, as the case may be, is at least a 
graduate, and 
(c). Who or his wife or her husband, as the case may be owns a 
house in an urban area, and 
(d). Whose mother or father has also been directly recruited to 
Class I services. 
Explanation - Class I means the pay bracket fixed by the State 
Government from time to time for Class I. 
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3. The son or daughter of such person engaged as doctor, advocate, 
charter accountant, tax consultant, financial consultant, 
management consultant, architect or other professionals, and 
(a). Whose average income from all sources for three 
consecutive financial years is not less than rupees ten lakhs per 
annum; and 
(b). Whose wife or husband, as the case may be, is at least a 
graduate; and 
(c). Whose family owns immovable property at least of rupees 
twenty lakhs. 
4. The son or daughter of such person engaged in trade or 
commerce, and 
(a). Whose average income from all sources for three 
consecutive financial years is not less than rupees ten lakhs per 
annum; and 
(b). Whose wife or husband, as the case may be, is at least a 
graduate; and 
(c). Whose family owns immovable property at least of rupees 
twenty lakhs. 
5. The son or daughter of such industrialist 
(a). Whose level of investment in running unit or units is more 
than rupees ten crores; and 
(b). Such unit or units are engaged in commercial production for 
at least five years; and 
(c). His wife or husband, as the case may be, is at least a 
graduate. 
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6. The son or daughter of such agricultural land holder: 
(a). Whose average income from all sources other than 
agriculture for three consecutive financial years is not less than 
rupees ten lakhs per annum; and 
(b). Whose wife or husband, as the case may be, is at least a 
graduate; and 
(c). Who or his wife or her husband, as the case may be, own 
house at least of rupees twenty lakhs in an urban area. 
7. The son or daughter of person, other than the persons specified 
in serial 1 to 6 of this Schedule :-
(a). Whose main source of income is other than animal 
husbandry, fisheries, poultry, weaving, craftsmanship, 
handicraft and artisanship; and 
(b). Whose average income from all sources for three 
consecutive financial years is not less than rupees ten lakhs per 
annum; and 
(c). Whose wife or husband, as the case may be is at least a 
graduate; and 
(d). Whose family owns immovable property at least of rupees 
twenty lakhs. 
8. If a person included in serial 1 to 7 of this schedule performs 
inter-castes marriage with a backward class person other than 
the categories under serial 1 to 7 of this Schedule, his/her son or 
daughter shall not be excluded. 
Note:- I. The level of income and the value of property shall be 
modified taking into account the variation in the money value every 
three years or less period, as the situation may demand. 
Note:- II. An affidavit filed by the father or the mother of the 
candidate, or in case of their death, by the candidate himself, shall 
be deemed to be decisive in respect of income, value of property 
and educational qualification." 
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Annexure- III 
So far as the State of Uttar Pradesh is concerned the categories 
sought to be excluded from the backward classes (creamy layer) are 
mentioned in Schedule II read with Section 3(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Public 
Service Reservation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Backward Classes Act, 1994. The said categories are as under: 
"Categories of Persons excluded" Criteria for exclusion 
1. Sons and daughters of 
(a), IAS, EFS, IPS, Indian Forest Service 
other Central service (direct or promotee) 
(i). Income from 
salary of service is 
10,000/- or above per 
mensum 
(b).U.P. Civil Service, U.P. Police Service 
State Service (direct recruitment) (ii). Spouse is at least 
Graduate. 
(Hi). He or his spouse 
owns a house in 
urban area, 
(c). Group A/Class-I offiers of any Deptt. 
or Ministry of Govt, of India or Educational, 
Research or other institutions (No. 1 included 
In above(a).) 
(d). Group A/Class-I officer of any Deptt. or 
Institution of State Govt. (No. 1 included 
In (b) above) 
(e). An officer of defence forces or Para Military 
forces not below rank of colonel or equivalent. 
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2. Sons and Daughters of • 
Persons engaged in profession as a doctor. 
Surgeon, engineer, lawyer, architect. 
Chartered Accountant, media & 
Information professional, management and 
other consultant,film artist & other film 
professional, running educational 
institution or coaching institute or 
engage in the business as a share broker 
or in entertainment business 
i) his average income from 
all sources should not be 
less than Rs. 10 Lakh per 
for 3 consecutive financial 
years. 
ii). Spouse at least a 
graduate 
iii). His family property 
(immovable) should be 
worth Rs. 20 Lakh. 
3. Sons and daughters of 
Businessman. 
i). Provided whose average 
income for 3 consecutive 
financial years is not less 
thanRs. 10 Lakh per 
annum. 
ii). Spouse at least a 
graduate. 
iii). immovable family 
property worth at least 20 
lakhs. 
4. Sons and daughters of Industrilist. i).whose Level of 
investment in running units 
is over Rs. 10 crore and 
such units are engaged in 
production for at 
least 5 years. 
ii).Spouse at least a 
graduate. 
5. Sons and daughters of - a person whose 
holdings is within limit fixed under the. 
U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land 
Holdings Act 1960. 
i). has an income of Rs. 10 
Lakhs in a year from 
sources other than 
agriculture. 
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ii). His Spouse at least a 
graduate, 
6. Sons and daughters of- any other person not i). Whose income from all 
mentioned in aforementioned categories. sources for 3 consecutive 
financial years is not 
less than Rs. 10 Lakhs per 
annum. 
ii). Spouse at least a 
graduate. 
iii). Immovable family 
property worth at least Rs. 
20 Lakhs. 
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